which we have, as yet, little thought of.-I begged him, then, that we might now consider them. He was willing, he said, for his part, and immediately went on, by asking, what I thought was the beginning of art?—I mean, said he, by beginning, that cause for the sake of which it operates, and which being supposed away, men would be never moved to follow it."-To this, I told him, I was unable to answer. You will not think it, said he, so difficult, when you have a little more considered. Reflect with yourself: was it not the absence of health which excited men to cultivate the art of medicine?—I replied, it was.-What, then, said he, if the human body had been so far perfect and self-sufficient, as never to have felt the vicissitudes of well and ill; would not, then, this art have been wholly unknown?—I replied, I thought it would. And what, said he, if we extend this perfection a degree further, and suppose the body not only thus healthful, but withal so robust, as to have felt no uneasiness from all inclemencies of weather: would not, then, the arts of building also, and clothing, have been as useless as that of medicine?I replied, it seemed they would.-But what, said he, if we bound not this perfection of ours even here?—What if we As the cause here spoken of, is that cause usually called final, it may be asked, how it comes in this place to be considered as a beginning. The answer is, that what comes last in practice, stands in theory first; or, in other words, the order of ideas in the intellect of the artist is exactly inverted, with respect to the order of his energies. Thus Ammonius: Kalóλov yap Tĥs uèv Dewpías tò téλos yíyvetai apxǹ tŷs pά ξεως· ἔμπαλιν δὲ τῆς πράξεως τὸ τέλος, ἀρχὴ τῆς θεωρίας. οἷον ὁ Οἰκοδόμος, ἐπιταγεὶς οἶκον, λέγει καθ' ἑαυτὸν, ἐπετάγην οἶκον ποιῆσαι· ὑπέρ ἐστι σκέπασμα, κωλυτικὸν ὄμβρων καὶ καυμάτων· τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, μὴ γινομένης ὀροφῆς. Ἐντεϋθεν οὖν ἄρχεται τῆς θεωρίας. προβαίνων δὲ φησίν· Αλλα τοῦτο οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, μὴ γινομένων τοίχων· οὗτοι δὲ οὐκ ἂν γένοιντο, μὴ ὑποβληθέντων θεμελίων· οἱ δὲ θεμελίοι οὐκ ἂν βληθεῖεν, μὴ ὀρυχθείσης τῆς γῆς. ἐνταῦθα κατέληξεν ἡ θεωρία. Εντεῦθεν οὖν ἄρχεται ἡ πρᾶξις. πρότερον γὰρ ὀρύττει τὴν γῆν εἶθ ̓ οὕτω βάλλει τὸν θεμέλιον· εἶτα ἐγείρει τοίχους· καὶ ὕστερον ἐπιτί θησι τὴν ὀροφὴν, τίς ἐστι τέλος τῆς πράξεως. ἡ δ ̓ ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως, τέλος τῆς θεωpías. 'Aμμ. els Kaтnу. p. 15. edit. Ven. 8vo. "For in general the end of theory is the beginning of practice; and so reciprocally, the end of practice, the beginning of theory. Thus, for instance: an architect, being ordered to build a house, says to himself, I am ordered to build a house; that is to say, a certain defence, to protect against the rains and the heats. But this cannot be, without a roof or covering. From this point, therefore, he begins his theory. He proceeds and says-but there can be no roof, if there be no walls; and there can be no walls, without some foundations; nor can there be laid foundations, without opening the earth. At this point, the theory is at an end. Hence, therefore, commences the practice, or action. For, first, he opens the earth ; then lays the foundation ; then raises the walls ; and, lastly, puts on the roof, which is the end of the action or practice, [but beginning of the theory,] as the beginning of the practice was the end of the theory.” See also Arist. Ethic. l. iii. c. 3. et de Anima, l. iii. c. 3. i Vide Platon. de Rep. l. i. vol. ii. p. 341. edit. Serrani. "Ωσπερ (ἔφην ἐγὼς εἴ με ἔροιο εἰ ἐξαρκεῖ σώματι, εἶναι σώματι, ἢ προσδεῖται τίνος· εἴποιμ ̓ ἂν, ὅτι παντάπασι μὲν οὖν προσδεῖται. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ τέχνη ἐστὶν ἰατρικὴ νῦν εὐρεμένη, ὅτι σῶμα ἐστι πονηρὸν, καὶ οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ αὐτῷ τοιούτῳ εἶναι. 66 Quemadmodum, inquam, si a me quæreres, an satis sit corpori, ut sit corpus, an alia quapiam re indigeat: responderem, omnino indigere. Atque hac quidem de causa medicinæ ars nunc est inventa, quoniam corpus per se profligatum est, neque ipsi satis est, ut sit hujusmodi." So, likewise, the acute Scaliger: "Motionis enim appetentia causa est; appetentia, privatio." De Caus. L. Lat. L. xv. c. 114. suppose, that not only things merely necessary, but that those also conducive to elegance and enjoyment, were, of course, all implied in the constitution of human nature; that they were all steady, constant, and independent from without, and as inseparable from our being, as perspiring, or circulation: in such case, would not the arts of music, painting, and poetry, with every other art passing under the denomination of elegant, have been as useless as we have held those others of medicine, clothing, and architecture?—I replied, it seemed they would.—It was, then, the absence of joys, elegancies, and amusements from our constitution, as left by nature, which induced us to seek them in these arts of elegance and entertainment.-It was.-And what, said he, are joys, elegancies, amusements, health, robustness, with those several other objects of desire, whose absence leads to art, but so many different names of that complex being called “Good,” under its various, and multiform, and popular appearances?-I replied, it seemed so. If this, then, said he, be granted, it should seem that the beginning, or principle of art, was the absence of something thought good; because it has appeared that it is for the sake of some such absent good that every art operates; and because, if we suppose no such absence to have been, we should never have known any art.-I confess, said I, it seems so. But how, then, continued he, if it be true that all art implies such principle, is it reciprocally true that every such principle should imply art?—I see no reason, said I, why not.— Consider, said he. It might be thought a good by some, perhaps, to be as strong as those horses which are ploughing yonder field; to be as tall as those elms, and of a nature as durable yet would the absence of goods, like these, lead to art? Or is it not absurd to suppose there should be an art of impossibilities?*-Absurd, said I, certainly. If so, said he, when we define the beginning or principle of art, it is not enough to call it the absence of something thought good, unless we add, that the good be a good possible; "a thing attainable by man; a thing relative to human life, and consistent with human nature:" or does not this, also, appear a requisite ?—I replied, I thought it did. But still, continued he, is it a sufficient motive to art, that the good desired should be attainable? In other words, does every absence of good attainable lead to art? or is our account What is here said concerning the difference between those things for which we may possibly wish, and those which we actually pursue, is expressed in the Ethics of Aristotle, l. iii. c. 2. Пpoaípeσis μèv yàp οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἴ τις φαίη προαιρεῖσθαι, δοκοίη ἂν ἠλίθιος εἶναι. βούλησις δ ̓ ἐστὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον ἀθανασίας. "There is, indeed, no determined choice of action with respect to things impossible; and if any one should say he had so determined, he would appear to be a fool. But there may be a willing, or longing after things impossible; as, for instance, never to die.” still too loose, and in need of stricter determination ?-Of none, said I, which appears to me.-Reflect, said he; there are some of the possible goods so obvious and easy, that every man, in an ordinary state of common natural perfection, is able to acquire them, without labour or application. You will hardly deny, but that a fair apple, tempting to eat, may be gathered; or a clear spring, tempting to drink, may be drank at, by the mere suggestions of will and uninstructed instinct.-I granted, they might. It would be therefore impertinent, said he, to suppose that goods, like these, should lead to art, because art would be superfluous, and in no respect necessary. Indeed, said I, it seems so. If, therefore, said he, neither impossibles lead to art, because of such there can be no art; nor things easily possible, because in such nature can do without art: what is it we have left, to which we may refer it? Or can it indeed be to any other than to that middle class of things, which, however possible, are still not so easy, but to be beyond the powers of will, and instinct uninstructed?-I replied, it seemed so.-That there are many such things, said he, is evident, past doubt. For what man would pay artists so largely for their arts, were he enabled by nature to obtain whatever he desired? Or who would study to be skilled in arts, were nature's original powers to be of themselves alone sufficient?-I told him, it was not likely. It should seem, then, said he, according to this reasoning, that the beginning, motive, or principle of art; that cause, which first moves it to action, and for the sake of which its several operations are exerted, is "the want or absence of something appearing good; relative to human life, and attainable by man, but superior to his natural and uninstructed faculties.""_I 1 “ Will,” βούλησις, οι ὄρεξις λογισTIK: "uninstructed instinct," "pegis àλóγιστος. See before, note c. The cause here described is the To o Eveka, or "final."—Aristotle, in his Physics, 1. ii. c. 3. in enumerating the various sorts of causes, reckons amongst the rest, Tò 8' ὡς τὸ τέλος, καὶ τ ̓ ἀγαθὸν τῶν ἄλλων. τὸ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα βέλτιστον, καὶ τέλος τῶν ἄλλων ἐθέλει είναι : “ to these may be added that cause, which is considered as the end and good of all the rest. For that, for whose sake all the others are deemed necessary, has just pretensions to be best, and to be the end of them all." To this he subjoins, consonant to what is said in the Dialogue, διαφερέτω δὲ μηδὲν αὐτὸ εἰπεῖν ἀγαθὸν ἢ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν: “let it make no difference whether we call this end, real good, or only apparent good." So in the beginning of his Ethics: Πᾶσα τέχνη, καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξις τε καὶ προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ. Διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφῄναντο τ ̓ ἀγαθὸν, οὗ πάντα épietai: “every art, and every orderly speculation, so likewise every action, and determined choice of pursuit, appear all of them to tend toward some good. Well therefore have they pronounced 'good' to be that toward which all things tend." See also Plat. in Gorg. vol. i. p. 499. Ε. edit. Serrani. In the definition here treated, the words "relative to human life" express that part of the Stoic definition of art [πpòs ti téλos εὔχρηστον τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ.] They were omitted in the definition, pages 8, 9, as more properly belonging to the present definition, which respects art in its final cause. See note f That what is perfect and self-sufficient is above the secondary helps of art; that our own weakness and insufficiency, and the prospect of procuring that absent good, by which we all hope to supply ourselves, where deficient ; that this is the source not replied, I could not deny, but that the account appeared probable. IV. Let this, then, said he, suffice, as to the beginning of art. But how shall we describe its end? What is it we shall pronounce this? My answer, I replied, must be the same as often already; which was, indeed, that I could not resolve the question. It should seem, said he, not so difficult, now we have discovered what beginning is. For if beginning and end are contraries and opposed, it is but to invert, as it were, the notion of beginning, and we gain of course the notion of end. I asked him, in what manner?-Thus, said he, the beginning of art has been held to be something, which, if supposed away, men would be never moved to apply to art. By inversion, therefore, the end of art must be something, which, while supposed away, men will never cease applying to art; because, were they to cease, while the end was wanting, they would cease with imperfection, and their performance would be incomplete.-To this I answered, That the account, however true, was by far too general, to give me much intelligence. He replied, If it was, he would endeavour to be more particular. And what, continued he, should we say, that every art, according to its genius, will of course be accomplished either in some energy, or in some work; that, besides these two, it can be accomplished in nothing else; and consequently that one of these must of necessity be its end?—I could not here but answer him, with a smile, that the matter was now much obscurer than ever. I find, then, said he, it is proper we should be more explicit in our inquiries, and deduce our reasonings from some clearer point of view.-I told him, it was quite necessary, if he intended to be intelligible. Thus, then, said he, You will grant, that every art, being a cause, must be productive of some effect: for instance, music, of a tune; dancing, of a dance; architecture, of a palace; and sculpture, of a statue. It is allowed, said I.-You will grant also, said he, that in these productions they are all accomplished only of all arts, but (joined to social affection) is the origin and cement of human society; see (besides the place here treated) page 4; and of the third treatise, s. 12. Thus the poet in Stobæus, p. 515. Need all things taught: what cannot need Agreeably also to this, Virgil, in his first Georgic, having told us of the various changes to the worse which happened in the natural world immediately subsequent to the golden age, goes on to enumerate the several inventions of men, which were the natural result of this their newly indigent state. He at last sums up the whole by saying, Tum variæ venere artes: labor omnia vicit Where (according to the doctrine in the Dialogue) want is made the beginning or origin of arts. The poet even refers this dispensation, this introduction of indigence, care, and solicitude, to the immediate will of Providence, acting for the good of mankind; lest plenty should lull them into slothful lethargy, so as to forget their noblest and most active faculties. Pater ipse colendi Haud facilem esse viam voluit, primusque per artem Movit agros, curis acuens mortalia corda, C 18 and ended; or, in other words, that as music produces a tune, so it is ended and accomplished in a tune; and as sculpture produces a statue, so is it ended and accomplished in a statue.— It is admitted, said I.-Now these productions, continued he, if you will examine, are not like units or mathematical points; but, on the contrary, all consist of a certain number of parts, from whose accurate order is derived their beauty and perfection. For example: notes, ranged after such a manner, make a tune in music; and limbs, ranged after such a manner, make a statue or a picture.-I replied, they did. If then the productions, continued he, of every art thus consist of certain parts, it will follow, that these parts will be either co-existent, or not; and if not co-existent, then of course successive.-Assist me, said I, by another instance, for you are growing again obscure.-Coexistent, replied he, as in a statue, where arms, legs, body, and head all subsist together at one individual instant: successive, as in a tune or dance, where there is no such co-existence, but where some parts are ever passing away, and others are ever succeeding them." Can any thing be said to exist, said I, whose parts are ever passing away?-Surely, replied he; or how else exist years and seasons, months and days, with their common parent, time itself? Or, indeed, what is human life, but a compound of parts thus fleeting; a compound of various and multiform actions, which succeed each other in a certain order?"-The fact, said I, appears so. This then, continued he, being the case, and there being this difference in productions, call every production, the parts of which exist successively, and whose nature hath its being or essence in a transition, call it, what it really is, a motion or an energy: thus a tune and a dance are energies; thus riding and n This division of beings or productions we find mentioned by Aristotle in his Physics, (1. iii. c. 8.) where, explaining his doctrine concerning infinite, he says, 'A^^' uépa ἐπεὶ πολλάκις τὸ εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ ἀγὼν, τῷ ἀεὶ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο γίνεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον. “ Inasmuch as being is manifold, such as is the being of a day, or public festival, (which exist by continually becoming something further,) such also is the being and nature of infnite.” The same sentiment soon after is more fully explained and opened: “Ωστε τὸ ἄπειρον οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνειν, ὡς τόδε τι, οἷον ἄνθρωπον, ἢ οἰκίαν· ἀλλ' ὡς ἡμέρα λέγεται, καὶ ὁ ἀγὼν οἷς τὸ εἶναι, οὐκ ὡς οὐσία τὶς γέγονεν, ἀλλ ̓ ἀεὶ ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ. "We are not to conceive of infinite, as of a positive particular substance, like a man or a house; but rather as we pronounce existence of a day, or public festival, which have their essence, not as sensible, individual substances, but by a continued procedure of being and ceasing to be." Vid. Scalig. de Caus. Ling. Lat. 1. iii. c. 72. p. 124. Aristot. Categ. c. 6. Ammon. Com. eis Kar. p. 82. b. Scal. Poetic. l. iii. c. 1. p. 82. • It is not inelegantly said in the Ethics, so often referred to, 'H dè (wǹ èvépyeid Tís ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστος περὶ ταῦτα καὶ τούτοις ἐνεργεῖ ἃ καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαπᾷ οἷον ὁ μὲν μουσικὸς, τῇ ἀκοῇ περὶ τὰ μέλη, ὁ δὲ φιλο μαθής, τῇ διανοία περὶ τὰ θεωρήματα· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἕκαστος. “Life is a certain energy, and each man energizes about those subjects, and with those faculties, for which he hath the greatest affection: the musician, with his hearing, about sounds harmonious ; the studions, with his intellect, about matters of speculation: and, in like manner, each man else of the various sorts beside." Ethic. l. x. c. 4. |