science. There is, indeed, in this last prejudice, something peculiarly unfortunate, and that is, the more excellent the science, the more likely it will be found to produce this effect.

There are few sciences more intrinsically valuable than mathematics. It is hard, indeed, to say, to which they have more contributed, whether to the utilities of life, or to the sublimest parts of science. They are the noblest praxis of logic, or universal reasoning. It is through them we may perceive how the stated forms of syllogism are exemplified in one subject, namely, the predicament of quantity. By marking the force of these forms, as they are applied here, we may be enabled to apply them of ourselves elsewhere. Nay, further still, by viewing the mind, during its process in these syllogistic employments, we may come to know, in part, what kind of being it is; since mind, like other powers, can be only known from its operations. Whoever, therefore, will study mathematics in this view, will become not only by mathematics a more expert logician, and by logic a more rational mathematician, but a wiser philosopher, and an acuter reasoner, in all the possible subjects either of science or deliberation.

But when mathematics, instead of being applied to this excellent purpose, are used, not to exemplify logic, but to supply its place; no wonder if logic pass into contempt, and if mathematics, instead of furthering science, become in fact an obstacle. For when men, knowing nothing of that reasoning which is universal, come to attach themselves for years to a single species, a species wholly involved in lines and numbers only, they grow insensibly to believe these last as inseparable from all reasoning, as the poor Indians thought every horseman to be inseparable from his horse.

And thus we see the use, nay, the necessity of enlarging our literary views, lest even knowledge itself should obstruct its own growth, and perform in some measure the part of ignorance and barbarity.

Such, then, is the apology made by the author of this treatise, for the multiplicity of ancient quotations with which he has filled his book. If he can excite in his readers a proper spirit of curiosity; if he can help in the least degree to enlarge the bounds of science; to revive the decaying taste of ancient literature; to lessen the bigotted contempt of every thing not

modern; and to assert to authors of every age their just portion of esteem; if he can in the least degree contribute to these ends, he hopes it may be allowed that he has done a service to mankind. Should this service be a reason for his work to survive, he has confessed already it would be no unpleasing event. Should the contrary happen, he must acquiesce in its fate, and let it peaceably pass to those destined regions, whither the productions of modern wit are every day passing,

In vicum vendentem thus et odores.

HERMES:

OR

A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY CONCERNING

UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.-DESIGN OF THE WHOLE.

IF men by nature had been framed for solitude, they had never felt an impulse to converse one with another; and if, like lower animals, they had been by nature irrational, they could not have recognised the proper subjects of discourse. Since speech, then, is the joint energy of our best and noblest faculties," (that is to say, of our reason, and our social affection,) being withal our peculiar ornament and distinction, as men; those inquiries may surely be deemed interesting, as well as liberal, which either search how speech may be naturally resolved, or how, when resolved, it may be again combined.

Here a large field for speculating opens before us. We may either behold speech, as divided into its constituent parts, as a statue may be divided into its several limbs; or else, as resolved into its matter and form, as the same statue may be resolved into its marble and figure.

These different analysings or resolutions constitute what we call "philosophical or universal grammar."

When we have viewed speech thus analyzed, we may then consider it as compounded. And here, in the first place, we may contemplate that synthesis, which, by combining simple

a See p. 58 to 66. See also note z, p. 61, and note d, p. 66.

b Grammaticam etiam bipartitam ponemus, ut alia sit literaria, alia philosophica, etc. Bacon, de Augm. Scient. vi. 1. And soon after he adds, Verumtamen hac ipsa re moniti, cogitatione complexi sumus grammaticam quandam, quæ non analogiam verborum ad invicem, sed analogiam inter verba et res sive rationem sedulo inquirat.

• Aristotle says, Τῶν δὲ κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψευδές ἐστιν· οἷον ἄνθρωπος, λεύκος, Tpéxei, vika: “Of those words which are spoken without connexion, there is no one either true or false; as, for instance, man, white, runneth, conquereth." Cat. c. iv. So again, in the beginning of his treatise De Interpretatione: Пepl yàp σúvbeσiv kai diαίρεσιν ἔστι τὸ ψευδός τε καὶ τὰ ἀληθές:

terms, produces a truth; then, by combining two truths, produces a third; and thus others, and others, in continued demonstration, till we are led, as by a road, into the regions of science.

Now this is that superior and most excellent synthesis which alone applies itself to our intellect or reason; and which, to conduct according to rule, constitutes the art of logic.

d After this we may turn to those inferior compositions, which are productive of the pathetic and the pleasant, in all their kinds. These latter compositions aspire not to the intellect; but being addressed to the imagination, the affections, and the sense, become, from their different heightenings, either rhetoric or poetry.

Nor need we necessarily view these arts distinctly and apart; we may observe, if we please, how perfectly they coincide. Grammar is equally requisite to every one of the rest and though logic may, indeed, subsist without rhetoric or poetry, yet so necessary to these last is a sound and correct logic, that without it they are no better than warbling trifles.

Now all these inquiries, (as we have said already,) and such others arising from them as are of still sublimer contemplations, (of which, in the sequel, there may be possibly not a few,) may with justice be deemed inquiries, both interesting and liberal.

"True and false are seen in composition and division." Composition makes affirmative truth, division makes negative; yet both alike bring terms together, and so far, therefore, may be called synthetical.

d Ammonius, in his comment on the treatise Пepl 'Epunveías, p. 53, gives the following extract from Theophrastus; which is here inserted at length, as well for the excellence of the matter, as because it is not (I believe) elsewhere extant.

Διττῆς γὰρ οὔσης τοῦ λόγου σχέσεως, (καθ' ἃ διώρισεν ὁ φιλόσοφος Θεόφραστος) τῆς τε πρὸς τοὺς ἀκροωμένους, οἷς καὶ σημαίνει τι, καὶ τῆς πρὸς τὰ πράγματα, ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ λέγων πεῖσαι προτίθηται τοὺς ἀκροωμένους, περὶ μὲν οὖν τὴν σχέσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀκροατὰς καταγίνονται ποιητικὴ καὶ ῥητορικὴ, διότι ἔργον αὐταῖς ἐκλέγεσθαι τὰ σεμνότερα τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ δεδημευμένα, καὶ ταῦτα ἐναρμονίως συμπλέκειν ἀλλήλοις, ὥστε διὰ τούτων καὶ τῶν τούτοις ἑπομένων, οἷον σαφηνείας, γλυκύτητος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἰδεῶν, ἔτι τε μακρολογίας, καὶ βραχυλογίας, κατὰ καιρὸν πάντων παραλαμβανομένων, οἶσαι τε τὸν ἀκροατὴν, καὶ ἐκπλῆξαι. καὶ πρὸς τὴν πείθω χειρωθέντα ἔχειν· τῆς δέ γε πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῦ λόγου σχέσεως ὁ φιλόσοφος προηγουμένως ἐπιμελήσεται, τό τε ψεῦδος διελέγχων, καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀποδεικνύς. "The relation of speech being twofold, (as the philosopher Theophrastus hath

settled it,) one to the hearers, to whom it explains something, and one to the things, concerning which the speaker proposes to persuade his hearers; with respect to the first relation, that which regards the hearers, are employed poetry and rhetoric. Thus it becomes the business of these two, to select the most respectable words, and not those that are common, and of vulgar use, and to connect such words harmoniously one with another; so as through these things and their consequences, such as perspicuity, delicacy, and the other forms of eloquence, together with copiousness and brevity, all employed in their proper season, to lead the hearer, and strike him, and hold him vanquished by the power of persuasion. Οπ the contrary, as to the relation of speech to things, here the philosopher will be found to have a principal employ, as well in re futing the false, as in demonstrating the true.”

Sanctius speaks elegantly on the same subject: Creavit Deus hominem rationis participem ; cui, quia sociabilem esse voluit, magno pro munere dedit sermonem. Sermoni autem perficiendo tres opifices adhibuit. Prima est grammatica, quæ ab oratione solæcismos et barbarismos expellit ; secunda dialectica, quæ in sermonis veritate versatur; tertia rhetorica, quæ ornatum ser monis tantum exquirit. Min. 1. i. c. 2.