diseased persons, or, in fact, any persons whose living or sojourning within the boundaries of the State, might disturb its tranquillity'. By the same authority it regulates the professions, occupations and callings of its inhabitants. "The nature and extent of such legislation will necessarily depend upon the judgment of the legislature as to the security needed by society; when the calling, profession and business of parties, is unattended with danger to others, little legislation will be necessary respecting them. Thus, in the sale and purchase of most articles of general use, persons may be left to exercise their own good sense and judgment; but when the calling or profession or business is attended with danger or requires a certain degree of scientific knowledge upon which others must rely, then legislation properly steps in to impose conditions upon its exercise. Thus, if one is engaged in the manufacture or sale of explosives or inflammable articles or in the preparation or sale of medicinal drugs, legislation, for the security of society, may prescribe the terms on which he will be allowed to carry on the business and the liabilities he will incur from neglecting them." 2 Police regulations may forbid the introduction and sale of goods and merchandise prejudicial to the health, morals and safety of the people, and inspection laws serve to determine whether or not the goods belong to the forbidden class. It has been said that the recognized elements of inspection laws. have always been quality of the article, form, capacity, dimensions, and weight of package, mode of putting up, and marking and branding of various kinds-all these matters being supervised by a public officer having author

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1 Every State possesses the right to determine who shall compose its members and it is exercised by all nations, both in war and peace. Fong Yue Ting v. U. S., 149 U. S. 698. Also Vattel lib. 1, c. 19, secs. 230-231; Ortolan Dip. de la Mer. lib. 2, c. 14, p. 297; Phillimore's Int. Law (3d ed.), c. 19, sec. 220.

2 Minneapolis Railroad Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. p. 26.

ity to pass or not pass the article as lawful merchandise, as it did or did not answer the prescribed requirements. It has never been regarded as necessary and it is manifestly not necessary, that all of these elements should coexist in order to make a valid inspection law. Quality alone may be the subject of inspection, without other requirements, or the inspection may be made to extend to all of the above matters."1 Police laws may and should

1" As was said in Turner v. Maryland, 107 U. S. 38, 55: 'Recognized elements of inspection laws have always been-quality of the article, form, capacity, dimensions, and weight of package, mode of putting up, and marking and branding of various kinds—all these matters being supervised by a public officer having authority to pass or not pass the article as lawful merchandise, if it did not answer the prescribed requirements. It has never been regarded as necessary and it is manifestly not necessary, that all of these elements should co-exist in order to make a valid inspection law. Quality alone may be the subject of inspection, without other requirements or the inspection may be made to extend to all of the above matters.' It has never been regarded as within a legitimate scope of inspection laws to forbid trade in respect to any known article of commerce, irrespective of its condition and quality, merely on account of its intrinsic nature and the injurious consequence of its use or abuse.

"For similar reasons, the Statute of Iowa under consideration cannot be regarded as a regulation of quarantine or a sanitary provision for the purpose of protecting the physical health of a community, or a law to prevent the introduction into the State of disease, contagious, infectious or otherwise. Doubtless the States have power to provide by law suitable measures to prevent the introduction into the State of articles of trade, which, on account of their existing condition, would bring in and spread disease, pestilence and death, such as rags or other substances infected with the germs of yellow fever or the virus of small pox, or cattle or meat or other provisions that are diseased or decayed, or otherwise, from their condition and quality, unfit for human use or consumption. Such articles are not merchantable, they are not legitimate subjects of trade and commerce. They may be rightly outlawed as intrinsically and directly the immediate sources and causes of destruction to human health and life. The self-protecting power of each State, therefore, may be rightly exerted against their introduction, and such exercises of power cannot be considered regulations of commerce prohibited by the Constitution. The License Cases, 5 How. 504-599, are very much to the point, and the fact must find its support in this, whether the prohibited article belongs to, and is subject to be regulated as part of, foreign commerce or of commerce among the States. If, from its nature, it does not belong to commerce, if its condition, from putrescence or other cause is such, when it is about to enter the State,

exclude from the territory of the State all articles which are per se, noxious to public health or morals. In this

that it no longer belongs to commerce, or, in other words, is not a commercial article, then the State may exclude its introduction. And as an incident to this power, a State may use means to ascertain the fact. And here is the limit between the sovereign power of the State and the federal power, that is to say, that which does not belong to commerce is within the police power of the jurisdiction of the State; and that which does belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the United States. 'The object

of inspection laws' said Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 203, 'is to improve the quality of articles produced by the labor of a country; to fit them for exportation; or, it may be for domestic use. They act upon the subject, before it becomes an article of foreign commerce, or of commerce among the States, and prepare it for that purpose.' They are confined to such particulars as, in the estimation of the legislature, and according to the customs of trade, are deemed necessary to fit the inspected article for the market, by giving to the purchaser public assurance that the article is in that condition, and of that quality, which makes it merchantable and fit for use and consumption. They are not founded on the idea that the things, in respect to which inspection is required, are dangerous or noxious in themselves. It may be said, however, that the right of the State to restrict or prohibit sales of intoxicating liquor within its limits conceded to exist as a part of its police power, implies the right to prohibit its importation, because the latter is necessary to the effectual exercise of the former. The argument is that a prohibition of the sale cannot be made effective, except by preventing the introduction of the subject of sale; that if its entrance into the State is permitted, the traffic in it cannot be suppressed. But the right to prohibit sales, so far as is conceded to the States, arises only after the act of transportation has terminated, because the sales which the State may forbid are things within its jurisdiction. Its power over them, does not begin to operate until they are brought within a territorial limit which circumscribe it. . . It is enough to say, that the power to regulate or forbid the sale of a commodity, after it has been brought into the State, does not carry with it the right and power to prevent its introduction by transportation from another State." Dissenting opinion:

"In Brown v. Maryland it was insisted that the Constitutional prohibition of State imposts or duties on imports ceased the instant the goods entered the country; otherwise, it was argued, the importer may introduce articles, as gunpowder, which endanger a city, into the midst of its population; he may introduce articles which injure the public health, and the power of self-preservation is denied." To this argument Chief Justice Marshall replied: "The power to direct the removal of gunpowder is a branch of the police power, which unquestionably remains, and ought to remain, with the State. If the possessor himself stores it himself out of town, the removal cannot be a duty on imports, because it contributes nothing to the revenue. If he prefers placing it in a public magazine, it is

category belongs diseased meats, rags infected with disease and obscene books and pictures. Such articles from their condition and quality are unfit for human use and consumption; they are not merchantable nor legitimate subjects of trade and commerce. "They may be rightly outlawed as intrinsically and directly the immediate sources and causes of destruction to human health, life" and morals; and the regulations excluding them cannot be considered regulations of commerce. While the police power of the State may with fairness impose such restrictions as are necessary upon the sale of. any commodity within its borders "it has never been regarded as within the legitimate scope of inspection laws to forbid trade in respect to any article of commerce irrespective of its condition and quality, merely on account of its intrinsic nature and the injurious consequences of its use or abuse." Thus alcoholic liquors, opium and other drugs may, through their abuse, prove injurious to a people, and a State has a perfect right to control their sale and possession. Thus far such regulations do not concern commerce, but a sweeping order forbidding their introduction into the State as imports takes the form of a commercial regulation.1 The test of a police regulation

because he stores it there, in his opinion, more advantageously than elsewhere. (Chief Justice Wait, Justice Harlan and Justice Gray dissented.)" Bowman v. Chicago, etc., Railway Co., 125 U. S. p. 465. (There seems no doubt that the State in exercise of its police power may supervise or prohibit the sale of an article or the possession of such article if injurious to public health or morals, and may even seize such articles at the borders of the State. The difficulty arises in determining what is a dangerous, noxious or offensive article. The above case shows the Court could not agree on the question of alcoholic liquors.)

1The Court decided that a State has the right to prohibit or restrict the manufacture of intoxicating liquors within her limits; to prohibit all sale and traffic in them in said State, to inflict penalties for such manufacture and sale, and to provide regulations for the abatement of a common nuisance of property used for such forbidden purposes; and that such legislation by a State is a clear exercise of her undisputed police power.”

or an inspection law lies in its object and in the uniformity with which it is applied. It should have for its object the preservation of the life, health and morals of the people, to prevent their being imposed upon by adulterated, counterfeit1 or fictitious articles, or articles underweight or undermeasure, and should apply equally to domestic goods and those of foreign origin.2

(Court held in this case that the State could not prevent the importation into that State nor the sale therein by persons outside thereof of intoxicating liquors in the original packages and in sufficient quantities to make them fall under the head of interstate or foreign commerce. In all these cases a careful distinction must be made between the right of the police power to seize or prohibit the sale of articles noxious, per se, and those which are only harmful through abuse or improper handling.) Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. p. 1.

While a State may enact sanitary laws, and for the purpose of self-protection, establish quarantine and reasonable inspection regulations, and prevent persons and animals having contagious or infectious diseases from entering the State, it cannot, beyond what is absolutely necessary for selfprotection, interfere with transportation into or through its territory. Railroad Company v. Husen, 95 U. S. p. 465.

1 Police laws may prevent the sale of an article under a false name, i. e. oleomargarine as butter. Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. p. 461.

2 Inspection laws must not in their enforcement or objects discriminate unfavorably against goods of other States. Brimmer v. Redman, 138 U. S. p. 78. A law providing for inspection of animals, whose meats are designed for human food, cannot be regarded as a rightful exertion of the police power of the State, if the inspection was of such a character, or is burdened with such conditions, as will prevent the introduction into the State of sound meat, the product of animals slaughtered in another State. Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. p. 314.

A tax imposed by a State upon an occupation, which necessarily discriminates against the introduction and sale of the products of another State is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.

A police power of a State to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors and preserve the public health and morals does not warrant the enactment of laws infringing positive provisions of the Constitution of the United States. A State Statute which imposes a tax upon persons who, not residing or having their principal place of business within the State, engage there in the business of selling or soliciting the sale of intoxicating liquors to be shipped into the State from places without it, but does not impose a similar tax upon persons selling or soliciting the sale of intoxicating liquors manufactured in the State, is a regulation in restraint of commerce, and repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. p. 446.