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the rising road between the rivulets of Diepenbeck | and Chobon. General Grimaldi, who led this attack, approached the brink of the stream; but finding that a mass of Prussian cavalry was prepared to receive him, and that a column of British infantry were fast approaching to their support, he drew off again and took post near the mill of Royegheni. Meanwhile, Vendome seeing the danger of bringing on an action at the point where the enemy would have most desired to be attacked, directed his left to advance; but the order being countermanded by Burgundy, no movement took place. It was now Marlborough's turn to change his ground. He had seen, not without divining its cause, the threatened attack by the right: he suspected that another and a more formidable would soon follow, and he resolved to meet it by making such dispositions as the nature of the ground would allow. Twelve battalions were promptly moved up from Eyne to support the light troops which lined the hedges about Groenevelde, while a further force of 20 battalions, under the duke of Argyle, threw itself upon Schaerken. It was high time that these corps should be at their posts. The enemy, strengthened by large drafts from the left, gradually prolonged the line to the right, till they completely outflanked the allies, and then advancing at quick time attacked every hedge, field, and farm-house with the utmost fury. A fierce and obstinate battle ensued. It was fought, too, either hand to hand, or by the fire of musketry alone; for such was the precipitancy with which both sides rushed into battle, that scarcely a fieldpiece could be brought to bear.

While this struggle was going on, Marlborough withdrew brigade after brigade from his right, and throwing each fresh division as it arrived to the left of those last formed, he gradually shifted his ground so as to render the point assailed not the centre, but almost the extreme right, of his line. His next measure was to keep the enemy's left in check, by drawing up along the edge of the morass which skirts the Norken, a body of Prussian horse, while with his own left he manoeuvred to overlap the enemy's right, and cut it off. Some desperate fighting attended the progress of this masterly evolution: a corps of cavalry which he sent forward to clear the plain about Royeghem, was annihilated by a fire of inusketry from the enclosures; in like manner his infantry suffered heavily while dislodging the French tirailleurs from the hedges and coppices about the castle of Bevere and Schaerken, yet was the design completely successful. Marshal Overkirk, pushing rapidly with his Dutch divisions round the slope of the Boser Cauter, gained the mill of Oycke, where he brought up his left shoulder till he had completely turned the enemy; while Argyle, carrying every thing before him, broke off all connexion between the troops at Groenevelde and those behind the mill. Thus was the right of the French army separated entirely from its centre and left; the

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only road of communication being by the mill of Royeghem, and the ravines and passes of Marolen.

Daylight, which had long been waning, now totally disappeared; yet the combat was sustained with a degree of obstinacy rarely equalled. The battalions fought singly, in open fields, behind hedges and ditches, or in gardens, barn-yards, and other enclosures; and the horizon seemed on fire with the ceaseless flashes of their musketry. But they fought by no means upon equal terms. The left of the enemy, encumbered by the morass, could bring no support to their comrades on the right; while the allies, doubling round that devoted wing, swept it on both flanks, in the rear and in front, with murderous volleys. As day closed in, however, the effects of the darkness were gradually experienced by themselves in a very awkward manner; they aimed their fury upon one another; and it required all the activity of the generals and other officers to check such a fire after it had once begun. To stop the carnage, indeed, it became necessary to cease firing altogether; and the enemy, gladly availing themselves of the pause, stole off as they best could from the field of battle. In this juncture, Eugene, with happy forethought, commanded the drums of his own battalions to beat the French assemblée; and instructed the refugee officers that served under him, to call aloud the numbers and titles of such regiments as they knew to be in the field. The measure was attended by the most successful result: multitudes of fugitives dropped in by ones and twos upon the Dutch and British line, and they were all, to the amount of some thousands, made prisoners. Nevertheless, the enemy's loss was both directly and proportionally less severe than might have been expected: Vendome, indeed, seeing that all was lost, withdrew his people with admirable coolness; and though he failed in collecting immediately about himself more than 20,000 men, his exertions undoubtedly saved the lives of three times that number. The total loss of the vanquished has been computed at 6000 killed and wounded, with 9000 prisoners; nor did that of the victors fall short of 5000.

The retreat of the enemy was disorderly in the extreme; for though the right had scarcely been engaged, a panic fell both upon men and officers, which Vendome found it impracticable to contred. Scarcely an effort was made to form a rear-guard; while the whole mass, joining the fugitives from the battle, fled pell-mell along the road to Ghent. It was impossible for Marlborough, so long as darkness endured, to attempt any pursuit; but on the first blush of dawn, forty squadrons were sent out, who hung upon the enemy's rear, cut off both stragglers and baggage, and created serious alarm throughout their ranks. It was of the utmost consequence, likewise, that an unfinished line of walls, which connected the Scheld with the Lys between Ypres and Warneton, should be

seized; and of these general Lottum, who commanded the detached corps, made himself master. Such was the state of affairs, when Eugene departed for Brussels, in order to hasten the march of his own army. Marlborough likewise, after seeing to the wounded and prisoners, broke up, and on the 16th of July established his head-quarters at Werwick, with his left at Comines, and his right extended towards Menin.

In the meanwhile, Vendome had fallen back behind the canal of Bruges, where he was joined by the duke of Berwick at the head of a large reinforcement; and his army again amounted, at a moderate computation, to 100,000 men. Here he made haste to entrench himself; for though France lay exposed to insult, almost to her very centre, it was scarcely to be feared that Marlborough, cut off from his supplies by way of Ghent, would venture to leave Lille and Tournay in his rear. Nor was Vendome deceived in his supposition. By Marlborough himself, indeed, the propriety of carrying the war into the enemy's country was strongly urged; and the practicability of doing so was fully demonstrated by the facility with which town after town submitted to the parties sent out for the purpose of levying contributions. Nevertheless, even Eugene considering the design as too hazardous, he abandoned it, and applied himself to the task of out-manoeuvring his opponents, and laying siege to Lille: and it was a task attended with difficulties of no ordinary magnitude. Not to mention that, in point of numbers, the enemy had in the field an army superior to his, Marlborough was cut off, by the occupation of Ghent and Bruges, from all water communication with Antwerp. Every gun, therefore, every wagon, every round of ammunition and entrenching tool, must of necessity be transported from Holland by land; and when the delay and inconvenience attending such a procedure is considered, it cannot surprise us to learn that the idea was held in utter ridicule by the French officers.

Lille, the capital of French Flanders, was, at the period of which we are writing, considered to be one of the strongest places in the world. Situated upon a swampy plain, it was begirt by works constructed under the eye of Vauban, who had added greatly to their defensibility by the erection of a citadel even more regular than the town itself. It was garrisoned by 15,000 excellent troops, under the command of marshal Boufflers, an officer conspicuous among his compeers for the talent and obstinacy with which he had defended more than one fortified place. It was against this city, covered by the field force of 100,000 men, that Marlborough and Eugene proposed to commence operations; and that, too, in the face of all the difficulties arising out of remote magazines, and the dangers likely to attend the transport of stores. When it is stated that the nearest depôt was Brussels, a city twenty-five leagues distant from the scene of action; that the VOL. V.-8

stores necessary at the very opening of the siege required 15,000 horses to convey them; and that the train, when in motion, covered fifteen miles of road, some notion will be formed of the risks attending its progress, through a country possessed chiefly by the enemy: and when it is further stated, that this prodigious train made good its journey without the loss of so much as one man or one horse, the genius of him who planned, not less than the vigilance of those who executed, the march, will, we presume, receive from every reader the highest commendation. Yet such is the fact. Though the enemy were well aware of the very day when it was intended that the whole should set out, and saw the train more than once during its progress, such was the accuracy of Marlborough's calculations, that they were never able so much as to hazard an attack. The convoy set out from Brussels on the 6th of August, and on the 12th came into the allied camp at Helchin, whither Marlborough had advanced to meet it the day before.

In no trifling degree influential towards the safe-conduct of this important convoy was prince Eugene. That gallant chief, after concerting matters with Marlborough, had rejoined his own army at Brussels, with which he manœuvred so as to distract the attention of the enemy; and he now arrived, to make final dispositions for the investment of the place. These were speedily accomplished. The prince of Orange having on the 11th surprised the abbey of Marquette, already occupied all the space between the Upper and the Lower Dyle; while Eugene, crossing the Marque to communicate with him, gradually drew on the circle till it became complete, and placed Lisle in a state of blockade. The conduct of the siege was thus entrusted to him, Marlborough taking upon himself the care of covering it; and he had under his command an army composed of 50 battalions of infantry, with a train of 120 battering guns, 40 mortars, 20 howitzers, and 400 ammunition wagons.

We left Marlborough, after the retreat of tho French beyond the canal of Bruges, encamped at Werwick. On the 15th of July, he moved to Menin, and, as we have just stated, again shifted his ground on the 12th of August, by marching upon Helchin. Here the great convoy from Brussels reached him; and here, for the double purpose of protecting Eugene's dispositions, and watching the progress of such fresh supplies as were approaching, he remained till the 23d. On the morning of that day, however, he passed the Scheld at Pottes, and fixing his head-quarters at Amougies, threw himself on the line of communication between the armies of the duke of Berwick and Vendome. But these generals, determined at all hazards to form a junction, marched by circuitous routes one towards the other; Vendome crossing the Scheld at Ninove, while Berwick moved from Mons through Herine. On the 30th

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they accordingly united in the plain between Gramont and Lessines, and on the 2d of September were in position between Blandin and Willemeau, with 140 battalions, and 250 squadrons, amounting in all to 110,000 men. A corps of 20,000 had been left, under the count de la Motte, to cover Ghent and Bruges.

Marlborough was soon made acquainted with this formation; and not doubting that the next movement would lead round the source of the Marque into the country between that river and the Dyle, he made dispositions to meet and avert the threatened danger. He recrossed the Scheld, marched in a direction nearly parallel to that followed by the enemy, and arrived on the 4th of September in a position which he had previously selected, having his right in the village of Noyelles, and his left in Peronne. Nor was he deceived in the notion which he had assumed as to the designs of Vendome; for that enterprising chief doubled round the Marque by the very route anticipated, and appeared in front of the allies within the space of two hours after they had taken up their ground. Here he halted; and here, for the space of twelve days, both armies continued stationary.

While these movements were in progress, Eugene was pressing the siege with all the diligence which an inadequate equipment, and an engineer department the reverse of perfect, would allow. On the 22d of August, about eight o'clock in the evening, the trenches were opened; on the following night, the chapel of St. Magdalen, which the garrison had converted into an outwork, was stormed and taken, and the parallel being extended, two batteries were thrown up, which opened their fire at daylight. The night between the 24th and 25th was spent in tracing out the second parallel, and obtaining such cover as would permit the men to work by day; and an additional battery of cannon, as well as several mortars and howitzers, began to play the same evening. On the 26th, soon after dark, the garrison made a desperate effort to recover the chapel; they succeeded, and razed it to the ground. But the progress of the several attacks was not interrupted for a moment. The third parallel was drawn to the river on the 27th, and fresh batteries being constructed and armed over night, the whole began to batter in breach at dawn, on the morning of the 28th. There was a fortified mill near the gate of St. Andrew, from the occupation of which the besiegers expected great advantages. It was gallantly carried on the 29th; but the fire from the town came so murderously upon it, that the assailants were compelled to retire. The same thing took place next day; upon which Eugene commanded that it should be burned, and the garrison could not hinder the order from being obeyed.

By this time, the whole of the battering guns were mounted; and their fire, besides subduing

that of the enemy, effected a wide breach in the salient angle of the counterscarp of one of the hornworks. It was stormed that night; and, in spite of a defence in the highest degree creditable to the garrison, a lodgment was effected. Fresh approaches were immediately pushed towards other portions of the works, which a vigorous sortie, exeouted on the 10th of September, seemed scarcely to retard; and new batteries being erected, a sap was at the same time run in the direction of the covered way. As, however, the latter occurrence did not befall till the 17th, Marlborough, who visited the trenches on the 18th, expressed himself grievously disappointed with the progress made; but on the 20th, the works being considerably advanced, another assault was hazarded. It put the besiegers in possession not only of part of the covered way, but of a demi-bastion, and several places of arms; though with a loss which, in the eyes of some, more than counterbalanced the advantage obtained, inasmuch as it fell not short of 2000 men.

We have already stated, that while the covering army under Marlborough occupied a position between Noyelles and Peronne, the combined forces of Berwick and Vendome took up a corresponding allignment in their front. The right of the enemy extended towards Ennevelin, and their left rested upon Gondecourt; and all their proceedings led to the belief that a desperate effort would be made to raise the siege. During the interval between the 5th and the 7th, for example, strong working parties were employed in clearing out the defiles and repairing the roads; and at an early hour in the morning of the 10th, their whole line was in motion. But Marlborough had not wasted the breathing space thus afforded to him. Besides moving up a considerable reinforcement from the besieging army, he had devoted night and day to the strengthening of his position, and now stood secure behind a chain of field-works, which it would have been nothing short of insanity to attempt. The village of Seclin, indeed, in advance of his extreme right, was attacked and taken; but no farther hostilities were hazarded. The same thing occurred more than once, from the 10th to the 15th; the French repeatedly reconnoitring Marlborough's lines, and, as it would appear, with little satisfaction to themselves; when they suddenly withdrew entirely from his presence, and fell back upon Bachy Berse. On the 16th they were encamped on the other side of the Marque, between the windmill of Pottes and Aubert la Trinité.

Accurately corresponding with these movements were the attitudes assumed by Marlborough. The 16th saw him thrown back upon his left, and occupying a new line between Peronne and Forest. He thus faced his adversaries, though on a new front; and when they again marched to their right, he likewise filed to the left, till, on the 20th, his camp extended from Leers to Treffry.

It was in the midst of these evolutions that the hornwork of Lille was assaulted and taken, as has just been described, after a severe struggle. Among the wounded on that occasion was Eugene himself; a misfortune which caused great regret to Marlborough, and imposed upon him a double load of care and anxiety. There was no officer, possessed at once of sufficient rank and talent, to whom the conduct of the siege could be entrusted; and hence he was called upon not only to observe Vendome, but likewise to keep the besieging corps to their duty. He was not inattentive to either class of these important trusts. Every morning saw him on horseback at the first blush of dawn: when all was quiet in front, he rode back to the lines; and he returned again every evening, that he might be at hand to observe such measures as his skilful antagonist might adopt. By thus appearing, as it were, at all points where danger threatened, or labour was to be endured, he infused so much of his own zeal and energy into those around him, that on the 23d the whole of the tenaillons fell, together with a large portion of the covered way.

We have had frequent occasions to point out, that Marlborough, like a master-spirit, not only managed the affairs of his own particular province, but in a great degree conducted the war, by his counsel and advice, on all points of the arena. The attack on Toulon having failed, and matters becoming daily less and less satisfactory in Spain, he had proposed that a diversion should be made in favour of the Netherlands, by landing a body of troops in Normandy. Unfortunately, the command of the expedition was entrusted to general Erle, an officer sufficiently intelligent and brave as a second, but quite incompetent to guide an independent force, by reason of his excessive dread of responsibility. The appearance of £& few bands of irregular troops along the beach served to alarm him into a persuasion that no good would accrue from the measure; he therefore refused to permit even an attempt at landing, and returned to the Downs, after a profitless absence of a few weeks. Marlborough was mortified at the occurrence; yet, with characteristic energy, he sought to turn even failure to account. He caused Erle's division to be landed at Ostend, whence alone it was now practicable to procure materials for the siege; and be found the general highly useful in collecting and forwarding stores, in spite both of the distance and the difficulties which attended their transport.

Though the siege proceeded more slowly than was expected, the enemy had not only suffered much in the loss of their outworks, but began to experience a deficiency of powder and other necessaries for a protracted defence. They found means to communicate their situation to Vendoine, who strained every nerve for their relief, till, perceiving that all other devices failed, he adopted the following bold but hazardous expedient. He

caused a body of cavalry to load their horses each man with a bag containing forty pounds of powder on the croup of the saddle. By following a circuitous route, they passed unperceived along the flank of Marlborough's army, and dashing at an interval in the lines of the besieging force, endeavoured to cut their way into the town. They were vigorously and promptly opposed; yet, though multitudes fell, the greater number contrived to made good their passage, amid the plaudits of the very men who strove to check them. The supply, which came very seasonably, was received with thankfulness by the governor; and the fire from the town, which had of late slackened, was renewed with fresh vigour.

The French generals, hopeless of raising the siege by violence, endeavoured now to place the besiegers in a state of blockade, by cutting the sluices of the canals, inundating the low lands, and closing up the several avenues which led to Brussels and to Antwerp. The road to Ostend alone remained open, yet even it was threatened; and it became a matter of the first consideration that an ample convoy should be sent up, while yet the means of so doing were within reach. Erle was accordingly instructed to prepare every disposable horse and wagon, and to load them all with such munitions as the place contained; while general Webb, at the head of 6000 men, was detached as an escort for their protection. The iumour of these proceedings no sooner went abroad, than Vendome and Berwick broke up from their oamp, and manœuvred to intercept the supply. Marlborough was not slow on his part in meeting them with counter-movements. Like the pieces upon a chess-board, these great armies shifted from post to post; while the leaders of each strove to conceal the real means by which the one sought to destroy, the other to secure, the valuable prize. On the one hand, the count de la Motte was commanded to march from his camp of observation at Brussels, and to lead 22,000 men upon the expected escort; on the other, Cadogan, with twelve battalions and 1500 chosen horse, marched by a parallel road to support it. On the 27th of September the convoy quitted Ostend; it crossed the canal of Nieuport at Lef. finghen the same night, and directing its course by Slype and Moerdyke, sought to defile through Cochlaer, under cover of the wood of Wynendale. From that moment the utmost vigilance was needed in every officer and man attached to the escort. Webb, with singular promptness, threw 1600 in. fantry into Oudenburg, just in time to save it from La Motte. Meanwhile the cavalry under Cadogan was at Hoghlede, sending out parties as far as Ichteghem, where some squadrons of French horse where seen, though they did not risk an encounter. Cadogan immediately hastened to Tourout, upon which Webb had commanded the escort to concentrate; and the whole being brought together, they marched upon Wynendale.

Here the heads of La Motte's columns became visible in a plain, through an opening between the wood and a low coppice. Webb instantly pushed forward his cavalry to occupy their attention, and, throwing two regiments into the woods on either flank, formed in two lines, so as to lean his right upon the castle of Wynendale. In this position he awaited La Motte, who came on with great show of resolution, in very superior numbers. The action was severe while it continued, but it was short. The corps stationed in the woods, as well as a cloud of skirmishers, whom Webb had disposed with admirable judgment among the brushwood, reserving their fire till the enemy's line was passed, opened, at a few yards' distance, with murderous effect upon the flank, and threw them into a state of disorder, from which they could not be recovered. They broke and fled, in spite of the exertions of their leader to rally them; and the convoy, which had passed in the interval by the rear of the wood, came in without the loss of a single wagon to Menin. Immediately the labours of the siege were resumed with fresh energy; and Eugene being now able to superintend them in person, hopes of a speedy and glorious termination were encouraged.

A new expedient was devised by Vendome for the purpose of averting the threatened danger. He moved with a considerable detachment from the Scheld; passed through Ghent; joined count de la Motte between Moerdyk and the canal which connects Bruges with Plassendael; opened the sluices there, as he had done elsewhere, and laid the whole country under water to the very border of the Dyke. He then reinforced the garrison of Nieuport; and establishing a post of 1000 foot and 600 horse in rear of Leffinghen, completely cut off all communication between Ostend and the lines. Marlborough no sooner heard of these designs, than he endeavoured to prevent them; but he was too late. The entire face of of the country resembled a large lake; and it was only by packing ammunition in skins, and conveying these in flat boats, that farther supplies could be sent up. A curious kind of warfare was the consequence, boat engaging boat, and wagon contending with wagon; nevertheless supplies were still procured, though with increased hazard and in diminished quantities.

Things were in this state, when marshal Overkirk, at once the ablest and the most tractable of the Dutch commanders, died. Marlborough lamented him both on public and private grounds, and obtained for his son a continuance of the pension which the father had received from the British government; but though naturally feeling, he was not in a situation to permit the indulgence of useless sorrow. Lille still held out; while the indefatigable Vendome, by surprising the important post of Leffinghen, cut off the last link which connected the besiegers with the depôts. Had Boufflers been aware of this circumstance, it is high

ly probable that he would have continued his defence; for though the body of the place was breached, and an assault threatened, the garrison was numerous, and the means of resistance ample; but he was not aware of it. On the 22d of October, therefore, after sixty days of open trenches, he proposed to capitulate; and, as an act of justice to his gallantry and skill, was permitted to name his own terms. He yielded up the town; and retired, to sustain a second siege with the remains of his garrison, into the citadel.

The French troops were scarcely withdrawn, and the allies put in possession of the town, ere the attack of the citadel began, with all the vigour which the exhausted state of the magazines would permit. To recruit these, moreover, numerous parties were from time to time sent into France, which swept away corn, cattle, and other necessaries, from the open country; while Marlborough, as he had previously done, maintained a commanding position, so as to cover both the besiegers and their foragers. As any direct effort to interrupt the siege was esteemed hopeless, Vendome and Berwick made haste to devise a new plan of operations. They determined to make a dash upon Brussels, where the principal magazines of the allies were deposited; and as a strong party among the inhabitants favoured their design, they entertained slender doubt of its accomplishment. While, therefore, they themselves continued to hold their entrenched camp along the course of the Scheld, thus separating the allied army from the point threatened, they directed the elector of Bavaria, who had recently returned from the Rhine, to march from Tournay, upon the capital of Brabant. The elector, at the head of 15,000 men, arrived before the place on the 24th of November, and immediately summoned the governor to open his gates. It was fortunate for the confederate cause that the command of a place so important had been entrusted to an officer of courage and experience. M. Paschal rejected the enemy's proposal with disdain; and though his garrison amounted to scarce 7000 men, at once maintained himself against their approaches, and overawed the disaffected among the burghers.

With the intuitive readiness of a great general, Marlborough had foreseen this attempt, and was prepared, so soon as the enemy's plans were developed, to counteract it. He had caused reports to be circulated of an intended breaking up of his own army for the winter; which were the more readily credited, in consequence of the removal of the field artillery to Menin, and the ostentatious selection of quarters for himself and his staff at Courtray. As his first march likewise led in the direction of the latter town, even his own people were deceived; while the enemy, secure as they imagined themselves to be, ceased to exercise even common vigilance. But in the midst of these false impressions, he suddenly bent his steps towards the Scheld, of which, under the very guns

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