engagement, though without capturing any ships. Surat, a place of great consequence on the coast of Malabar, was taken by a detachment from the English settlement of Bombay. The French factory there was destroyed; and, on the opposite side of the peninsula, the Dutch were chastised for attempting to acquire an ascendancy in Bengal.

These avaricious republicans, whose grasping spirit no principles can 'moderate, no treaties restrain, become jealous of the growth of the English power in the East Indies, and enraged at the loss of certain branches of trade which they had been accustomed to monopolize, formed a conspiracy for the extirpation of their rivals, as atrocious as that of Amboyna. In consequence of this conspiracy (in which the French and the nabob of Bengal are supposed to have been engaged), the government of Batavia, under pretence of reinforcing their settlement at Chinsura, sent an armament of seven ships, and thirteen hundred land-forces, up the river Hoogly. The troops were landed near Tannah Forte, and a detachment from Chinsura advanced to meet them. Meantime, colonel Forde, who had been appointed to watch their motions, at the head of the troops of the English East India company, gave battle, first to the detachment, and afterward to the main body; defeated both; killed four hundred and forty men, and made all the fugitives prisoners. About the same time, three English East India ships (armed and manned for desperate service) gave battle to the Dutch squadron, and obliged the whole to strike, after an obstinate engagement.(1)

Seeing their armament thus humbled, the factory at Chinsura agreed to such conditions as the government of Calcutta thought proper to impose, disclaiming all knowledge of hostile intentions. Similar protestations were made by the states-general in Europe; and the British ministry, though by no means convinced of their good faith, seemed to admit their apology. The chastisement inflicted, though necessary for self-defence, was thought sufficiently severe to operate as a correction.

Every where victorious by land, and crowned with conquest at both extremities of the earth, the success of the British arms in Europe was no less splendid by sea. Elated with their advantages at St. Cas, the French talked loudly of retaliating the insults on their coasts, by invading, at the same time, Great Britain and Ireland in three different places. Their ministry, embarrassed by the failure of public credit, were happy to indulge the national vanity. Large bodies of troops were accordingly assembled on the coasts of the Channel; men-of-war and transports were collected, and flatbottomed boats prepared at the principal seaports. A small armament, said to be destined for the invasion of Scotland, was to sail from Dunkirk, under the conduct of M. Thurot, who had greatly distinguished himself as the commander of a privateer; that supposed to be designed against Ireland was to sail from Vannes, in Lower Brittany; the land-forces to be commanded by the duke d'Aguillon, and the fleet, which was preparing at Brest, by M. de Conflans; while the troops intended for the invasion of England, if any such intention ever existed, were to sail from Havre-de-Grace, and other ports on the coast of Normandy, in flat-bottomed boats, and land in the night, under able commanders, on the opposite shore.

In order to defeat the purpose of these boasted armaments, an English squadron under commodore Boys was stationed off Dunkirk; the port of Havre-de-Grace was guarded, and the town successfully bombarded, by rearadmiral Rodney; sir Edward Hawke, with a formidable force, blocked up the harbour of Brest, where the French fleet, under Conflans, lay in readiness to conduct, as was supposed, the transports and flat-bottomed boats belonging to the grand armament; and a small squadron, detached from that under Hawke, hovered on the coast of Brittany. These precautions were continued during the whole summer. All the ports of France in the Channel were under an actual blockade; and the projected invasions, in conse

(1) Compared Relations of the hostile attempt of the Dutch in Bengal, transmitted to the East India House.

quence of this restraint, seemed to be laid aside by the French ministry, till the month of August, when, the battle of Minden having baffled all their designs upon Hanover, they turned their attention seriously towards their

naval armaments.

In the mean time, admiral Boscawen, who commanded the British fleet in the Mediterranean, was employed in blocking up, in the harbour of Toulon, a French squadron under M. de la Clue, designed to assist, as was believed, in the descents upon the coasts of Great Britain and Ireland. But Boscawen finding it necessary to return to Gibraltar to careen, M. de la Clue took that opportunity to attempt to pass the straits, and had nearly accomplished his purpose, when he was discovered by the English admiral; pursued, and overtaken, on August 18, off Cape Lagos, on the coast of Portugal. The squadrons were nearly equal in force; the French consisted of twelve, and the English of fourteen ships of the line. The French, however, made but a feeble resistance. The admiral's ship, named the Ocean, of eighty guns, and the Redoubtable, of seventy-four guns, were destroyed; and the Temeraire of twenty-four, and the Modeste of sixty-four guns, were taken.(1)

This disaster did not discourage the French ministry from their projected invasions. The greatest preparations were made at Brest and Rochefort; and the long-neglected pretender, again flattered and caressed, is said to have remained in the neighbourhood of Vannes, in disguise, in order once more to hazard his person, and countenance a revolt in the dominions of his ancestors, to serve the ambitious purposes of France. Happily, the execution of that scheme, which might have produced much confusion, was prevented, by the vigilance of sir Edward Hawke, till the season of action was past. But the French, in their ardour, seemed to disregard the course of the seasons and the rage of the elements. The English fleet being driven off the coast of France by a violent storm, Conflans put to sea with twenty-one sail of the line and four frigates, and threw the inhabitants of Great Britain and Ireland into the utmost terror and consternation. But their alarm was only for a moment.

Sir Edward Hawke, who had taken shelter in Torbay, also put to sea with twenty-two ships of the line, and came up with the enemy between Belleiste and Cape Quiberon. The French admiral, being on his own coast, with which he was perfectly well acquainted, and not choosing openly to hazard a battle, or expose himself to the disgrace of a retreat, attempted to take advantage of a lee-shore, sown thick with rocks and shoals. Among these he hoped to remain secure, or to profit by the temerity of his antagonist. He accordingly collected his fleet under the land. Hawke saw the danger, and determined to brave it; though, in so doing, he perhaps obeyed the dictates of his own impetuous courage rather than those of a prudent foresight. While his fleet remained entire, he was at all times equal to the important charge with which he was intrusted by his sovereign, the protection of the British kingdoms; but should it be destroyed by fortuitous means, the consequences might prove very distressing to his country. Happily, on this occasion, the English admiral, whose honest mind was not the most enlightened, and whose lion-heart had never listened to the cautious suggestions of fear, being little acquainted with consequential reasoning, paid less regard to the possible disaster, than to the probability of acquiring a complete victory, and essentially serving his country, by the destruction of the French fleet. Regardless of every peril, he bore down with full sail upon the enemy, about two o'clock in the afternoon, and ordered the pilot to lay his own ship, the Royal George, along-side of that of the French admiral, named the Royal Sun.

The pilot represented the danger of the coast. "By this remonstrance," said Hawke, "you have done your duty: now execute my orders, and I will endeavour to do mine." He reluctantly obeyed. Conflans did not decline the combat; but a French captain, with the gallantry peculiar to his nation,

(1) Boscawen's Letter, in London Gazette, Sept 7 1759.

threw himself between the two admirals. One broadside from the Royal George, and a high sea, sent his noble ship, called the Thesée, with him and all his crew, to the bottom. The Superbe shared the same fate. The Formidable struck her colours. The Royal Sun drove ashore, and was burnt by her own people, as was the Hero by the British seamen. The Juste sunk at the mouth of the Loire. Unfortunately, however, a tempestuous night, which saved the French fleet from utter ruin, proved fatal to two English ships of the line. They ran upon a sand-bank, and were irretrievably lost. But all the men, and part of the stores, were saved.(1)

This justly celebrated victory, which broke the boasted effort of the naval power of France, freed the inhabitants of South Britain from all the apprehensions of an invasion. But the people of North Britain were still kept under alarm. The famous adventurer Thurot had got out of Dunkirk a little before Conflans left Brest. His squadron consisted of one ship of forty-four guns, named the Belleisle, in honour of the French minister; three frigates of thirty guns each, and one of twenty-four; the whole carrying about twelve hundred land-forces.

With this force Thurot sailed into the North Sea, and showed a disposition to land on the coast of Scotland, in the neighbourhood of Aberdeen: but being pursued by commodore Boys, he was obliged to take shelter in Gottenburg in Sweden, and afterward in Bergen in Norway. During these voyages, in an inclement season, his men became sickly, his ships were greatly shattered, and he lost company with one of them. He determined, however, to attempt something worthy of his former exploits, before he returned to France. Nor was he void of hopes of yet co-operating with Conflans, with whose defeat he was unacquainted. He accordingly sailed for the coast of Ireland, and made himself master of Carrickfergus. Having there victualled his ships, pillaged the town, and got certain intelligence of the ruin of the French fleet, he again put to sea, and steered his course homeward. But he was swiftly pursued by captain Elliot, in the Eolus frigate of thirty-six guns, accompanied by the Pallas and Brilliant, of thirty-two guns each, and overtaken near the Isle of Man The force on both sides was nearly equal; the commanders were rivals in valour and naval skill; the crews were tried; and the engagement that took place was obstinate and bloody. The death of the gallant Thurot determined the contest. The Belleisle struck her colours, and the whole French squadron instantly followed her example.(2)

These naval victories, with the conquests acquired by the British arms in North America, and in the East and West Indies, in a word, wherever shipping could give a superiority, sufficiently pointed out to the intelligent part of the nation the true line of future hostilities, and the madness of persisting in the prosecution of a ruinous German war. Yet was it resolved, by the popular administration, not only to prosecute that war, but to make it the supreme object during the ensuing campaign. Three millions sterling were accordingly granted, by parliament, in subsidies, to German princes, besides the enormous supplies demanded for maintaining twenty-five thousand British troops in Westphalia. And all these troops and subsidies, it must be owned, were necessary for the defence of the electorate of Hanover, and in order to enable the king of Prussia to support his declining fortune against the Austrians, Russians, Swedes, and the army of the empire. But why the people of Great Britain should burden themselves, for such purposes, with between five and six millions of debt annually, was a question that no good citizen could answer with temper, and which a quiet subject would not choose to investigate. It will therefore be enough to say, that such was the wish of the monarch, and the will of the minister, who governed the populace and the parliament with absolute sway; and who had the address to convince both, that it would be ungenerous in Great Britain, and unworthy of her glory, to desert an illustrious ally in distress, after having encouraged him to engage in so arduous a struggle; or to permit the electoral dominions of her sove(1) Sir Edward Hawke's Letter, in London Gazette, Nov. 1759, and information afterward received relative to the action. (2) London Gazette, March 3, 1760.

reign, how small soever their value, to fall into the hands of an enemy whom she had vanquished in every other part of the world.

The people of France were no less generous to their king. As the ordinary resources of the state had failed, the principal nobility and gentry, in imitation of his example, threw their plate into the public treasury, in order to enable him to support with vigour the war in Germany; conscious that the strength of the kingdom could there, on its own frontier, be exerted to the greatest advantage, and that of Great Britain with the least effect. The French army in Westphalia was accordingly augmented to one hundred thousand men, under the duke de Broglio, now honoured with a mareschal's staff, and intrusted with the chief command: while an inferior army, consisting of near thirty thousand good troops, was formed upon the Rhine, under the count de St. Germain.

The allied army, under prince Ferdinand, was less numerous than that under Broglio, but the troops were in better condition. The allies, however, very prudently acted chiefly on the defensive. Yet if Broglio and St. Germain had not quarrelled, and come to an open rupture, in consequence of which the latter left the service, prince Ferdinand would have found himself under the necessity of hazarding a general action, or of suffering himself to be surrounded. Before this quarrel, which happened about the middle of the campaign, and disconcerted all their plan of operations, the progress of the French arms had been very rapid. Broglio, paying no regard to the places of strength possessed by the allies in his front, pushed into the landgravate of Hesse with the grand army, leaving detachments to reduce the castles of Marpurg and Dillenburg; while St. Germain penetrated through the dutchy of Westphalia, and the two armies formed a junction near a place called Corbach, on the tenth of July.

Ignorant of this junction, and desirous to prevent it, prince Ferdinand, who had fallen back with the allied army from Fitzlar, and was retreating towards the river Dymel, sent the hereditary prince, with a strong detachment, before him to Saxenhausen, where he meant to encamp. Continuing to advance, that gallant youth found a body of French troops formed near Corbach; and concluding them to be St. Germain's van-guard, as they did not seem to exceed ten battalions and fifteen squadrons, he attacked them with great fury. But the French stood their ground with firmness; and being continually reinforced with fresh troops from the main army, the hereditary prince was obliged to retire in some disorder, and with considerable loss. (1) A few days after, however, he severely retaliated upon the enemy, by surprising a French detachment, under M. Glaubitz, at Emsdorff. Besides killing a great number of all ranks, and taking their artillery and baggage, he made the commander-in-chief, with one hundred and seventy-seven officers, and two thousand two hundred and eighty-two private men, prisoners of war.(2)

During these transactions, the duke de Broglio remained encamped on the heights of Corbach. And the chevalier de Muy, who had succeeded the count de St. Germain, as second in command, having passed the Dymel at Stadtberg, with thirty-five thousand men (being the reserve of the French army), and extended this body along the banks of that river, in order to cut off the communication of the allies with Westphalia, prince Ferdinand also passed the Dymel to give him battle. He accordingly ordered the hereditary prince and general Sporcken, who had reconnoitred the position of the enemy, advantageously posted near Warburg, to turn their left wing, while he himself advanced against their centre, on the 31st day of July, with the main body of the allied army. Thus attacked in flank and rear, and in danger of being surrounded, the French, after a smart engagement, retired with precipitation towards Stadtberg, leaving on the field about fifteen hundred men dead or dangerously wounded. About an equal number were made prisoners in the pursuit, by the British cavalry. The loss of the allies was very inconsiderable.(3)

(1) Lond. Gazette, July 22, 1760. VOL. II.-M m

(2) Ibid. July 20.

(3) Ibid. Aug. 9

By this advantage, which ensured him the command of the Weser and the Dymel, prince Ferdinand was enabled to maintain his communication with Westphalia, and to prevent the French from penetrating deeply into the electorate of Hanover. But in order to obtain these important ends, he was under the necessity, notwithstanding his success, of sacrificing the whole landgravate of Hesse. The enemy even reduced Gottingen and Munden, in the dominions of his Britannic majesty, while the people of England were celebrating with bonfires and illuminations the victory obtained by their arms, which was immediately followed by all the apparent consequences of a defeat.

Prince Ferdinand, however, regardless of appearances, continued to occupy Warburg, for more than a month after the battle; and the duc de Broglio, overawed by so commanding a position, attempted nothing farther of any consequence during the campaign. In the mean time, the hereditary prince undertook a rambling expedition to the Lower Rhine, and laid siege to Wesel. But he was defeated near the convent of Campen, on the 16th of October, by a body of French troops, under M. de Castries, and obliged to return with the loss of near two thousand brave men; including killed, wounded, prisoners, and those who died of fatigue.(1) Soon after this severe check, both armies went into winter-quarters; the French being left in possession of Hesse, and of the whole country eastward of the Weser, to the frontiers of the electorate of Hanover. The British troops were cantoned in the bishoprick of Paterborn, where they suffered great hardships from scarcity of forage, and provisions. Few campaigns, between armies so numerous and well appointed, have been more barren of memorable events.

The king of Prussia, as usual, was more active than the general of the allies; and the desperate state of his affairs required the most vigorous exertions. He began the campaign, however, on a defensive plan. Having passed the winter in Saxony, he took possession of a very strong camp, between the Elbe and the Muldau, in the month of April. This camp he fortified in every place that was accessible, and mounted the works with two hundred and fifty pieces of cannon. By these means he was enabled to maintain his ground against the grand Austrian army, under mareschal Daun, whose whole attention he engaged, and at the same time to send a strong reinforcement to his brother Henry, without exposing himself to any danger. Prince Henry had assembled an army near Frankfort on the Oder, where he took various positions, in order to oppose the Russians, and to protect Silesia and the New Marche of Brandenburg, which were threatened by different bodies of the enemy. Fouquet, another Prussian general, had established his quarters in the neighbourhood of Glatz. And while he covered Silesia on that side, he kept up a communication with prince Henry, and was so posted as to send to or receive succours from him, as either party should happen to be pressed.

Military science could not, perhaps, have devised a more complete defensive system. But the wisest precautions may be eluded by cunning, or disconcerted by enterprise. General Laudohn, the most enterprising of all the Austrian commanders, having quitted his camp in Bohemia (where he had passed the winter) with a strong but light and disencumbered army, threatened alternately Silesia and the New Marche of Brandenburg; Breslaw, Berlin, and Schweidnitz. At length he seemed to fix upon the latter; and general Fouquet, deceived by the artful feint, marched to Schweidnitz with the main body of his troops, and left Glatz uncovered.

No sooner did Laudohn perceive that this stratagem had succeeded, than he made use of another, and with equal success. He took possession of Landshut, which he discovered a design of securing, and left there a small hody of troops. Fouquet, alarmed at so unexpected a movement, quitted Schweidnitz with precipitation, and drove the Austrians from Landshut with great ease. Meanwhile, Laudohn had made himself master of several im

(1) Lond. Gazette, Oct. 28, 1760, et seq.,