into Saxony, where he joined the Prussian parties under Finck and Wunch. This rapid march obliged mareschal Daun also to quit his camp in Lusatia, and separate his army from that of count Soltikow, in order to protect Dresden. And the Prussian monarch, thus freed from the presence of his most dangerous enemy, having put himself between the Russians and Great Glogaw, obliged them to relinquish an enterprise which they had formed against that place, and return into Poland.

Fortune, in a word, seemed yet to be preparing triumphs for the intrepid Frederick, after all his disasters; and if he had placed less confidence in her flattering promises, which he had so frequently found to be delusive, he might have closed the campaign with equal glory and success. But his enterprising spirit induced him once more to trust the deceiver, and attempt a great line of action, while prudence, reason, experience, and even self-preservation dictated a sure one.

No sooner did his Prussian majesty find himself disengaged, in consequence of the retreat of the Russians, than he marched into Saxony; and there joined his brother Henry near Torgau, on the 2d of November, in spite of all the efforts of the Austrian generals. On this junction, the army of the empire retired. Mareschal Daun, who had threatened prince Henry, fell back upon Dresden. And the king of Prussia saw himself once more at the head of a gallant army of sixty thousand men, in high spirits, and still ready to execute any bold enterprise, under the eye of their sovereign and commander, so lately reduced to the brink of despair. But as the season was already far in the decline, and remarkably severe, his most able generals were of opinion, that no important enterprise could be undertaken with any probability of success, and that his wisest conduct would be to watch the motions of the Austrians, and cut off the provisions of mareschal Daun; who must, by these means, infallibly be obliged to abandon Dresden, and retire into Bohemia, leaving to the Prussians, as hitherto, the entire possession of Saxony.

The king's views, however, extended to greater and more decisive advantages. He knew that the passes into Bohemia were so difficult, that, by seizing certain posts, the subsistence of the Austrians might not only be cut off, but their retreat rendered impracticable. Having obliged mareschal Daun to retreat as far as Plawen, and advanced himself to Kesseldorff, he accordingly ordered general Finck, with nineteen battalions and thirty-five squadrons, to occupy the defiles of Maxen and Ottendorff, through which alone he thought it possible for the enemy to communicate with Bohemia. This service was successfully executed; and no doubt was entertained that mareschal Daun would be obliged to hazard a battle, or to surrender at discretion, as he seemed now to have no resource left but in victory.

Meanwhile, that sagacious general, sensible of his danger, sent experienced officers to reconnoitre the position of the Prussian detachment; and finding the commander lulled into the most fatal security, he took possession of the neighbouring eminences, and surrounding the enemy on all sides, precluded the possibility of escape. The Prussians defended themselves gallantly for one day, and made several vigorous efforts to disentangle themselves from the net in which they were caught, but in vain: they were foiled in every attempt to force those defiles which they had been appointed to guard. Night put an end to the struggle, and to the effusion of blood. Next morning general Finck, seeing his situation desperate, as every avenue through which a retreat could be made was planted with bayonets, judged it more prudent to submit to necessity, than wantonly to throw away the lives of so many brave men, who might serve their king on some more promising occasion. He therefore endeavoured, though ineffectually, to obtain terms. They were sternly denied him. And he was ultimately forced to surrender at discretion, on the 26th of November; he himself with eight other generals, and near twenty thousand men, being made prisoners of war. (1)

(1) Compared Relations, ubi sup.

This was a mortifying blow to the hopes of the Prussian monarch, and must have made him severely sensible of his too common error, in placing all his attention on the possible advantage, and overlooking the probable danger. Nor did that evil come alone. He sustained another heavy stroke in the capture and destruction of a rear-guard consisting of three thousand men, under general Diercke. Yet, after all these losses, he was still so formidable, that the cautious and moderate-minded Daun, instead of attacking him, took shelter in the strong camp of Pirna, and kept close within his intrenchments.

His Prussian majesty seemed also, at last, to have acquired a lesson of moderation. Though joined by twelve thousand men, under the hereditary prince of Brunswick, he put his army quietly into winter-quarters at Freyberg, without attempting any new enterprise; so that, the loss of men excepted, affairs in Germany were nearly in the same situation as at the opening of the campaign. The country had been desolated, and much blood spilled; but Dresden was the only place of any importance that had changed

masters.

In spite of all the eloquence and popularity of Mr. Pitt, so many indecisive campaigns began to cool the zeal of the English nation in the cause of their illustrious but burdensome ally, the king of Prussia, to whose wars they could see no end. And the success of the British arms in America and the West Indies opened the eyes of the people more fully to their true interests, and made them sensible of the folly of defending the electorate of Hanover at such a vast expense of blood and treasure.

Immediately after the taking of Louisburg, which had long been considered as the key of Canada, a plan was formed by the British ministry for the reduction of Quebec, and the entire conquest of New France, as soon as the season of action in those northern latitudes should return. In the mean time, an expedition was undertaken against the island of Martinico, the chief seat of the French government in the West Indies; a place of great importance by its position, and also by its produce.

It was known that Martinico, and all the sugar-islands belonging to France in the American Archipelago, were in great distress for want of provisions, and other necessaries; which it was not in her power to provide them with, by reason of the inferiority of her navy to that of England, and consequently her inability to protect her trade with them. It was therefore supposed they could make but a feeble resistance, and would surrender on the first

summons.

The armament destined for that service consisted of ten ships of the line under commodore More, and five thousand land-forces, commanded by general Hopson. The design upon Martinico, however, was abandoned as impracticable, after a slight attempt; though seemingly with little reason, as the French governor possessed neither courage nor conduct, and the distressed inhabitants appeared willing, it was said, to submit to a power that could more readily supply their wants, and afford them a better and more certain market for their produce. But, be the prospect of resistance small or great, it is certain that the British troops were re-embarked within twentyfour hours after their landing, and that the armament directed its course towards the island of Guadaloupe;(1) a less splendid object of conquest, though not a less valuable possession.

The British fleet appeared before the town of Basse Terre, the capital of the island, on the twenty-third of January; and next day it was taken, after a terrible cannonade, accompanied with incessant showers of bombs. Never did the commanders of the English navy exert themselves with more intrepidity and judgment than on this occasion. They left the land-forces nothing to do but take possession of the place, which was abandoned by the garrison.(2)

(1) Lond. Gazette, March 7, 1759. See also Capt. Gardner's Account of the Expedition against Martinico and Guadaloupe. (2) Id. ibid.

The reduction of the town of Basse Terre, however, was not immediately followed by the conquest of Guadaloupe. The slowness, timidity, and irresolution of the operations by land afforded the fugitive garrison leisure for recollection; and to fortify themselves, by the help of the inhabitants, in a strong post which obstructed all communication with the more fertile parts of the island. Despairing, therefore, of being able to subject Guadaloupe on that side, the invaders proceeded to attack it on another, known by the name of Grande Terre. Fort Lewis, the chief defence of this division of the island (which is separated from the other by a shallow strait), was taken, sword in hand, by the marines and royal Highlanders, after a short but vigorous cannonade from the fleet.(1)

But the conquerors were guilty of the same error as formerly. The did not take advantage of the enemy's terror: and they suffered the same inconveniences from their neglect. The fugitives found refuge in the mountains, where they became formidable; and the event of the expedition was even doubtful, when general Barrington, having succeeded to the command of the land-forces, in consequence of the death of Hopson, changed the plan of operations. Instead of attempting to penetrate into the country, which abounds with strong posts and dangerous defiles, he re-embarked the troops, and successively attacked the towns and villages upon the coast. By this mode of making war, every considerable place was soon reduced; and the governor and inhabitants, tired of their uncomfortable situation in the mountains, and seeing no prospect of relief, surrendered the island to his Britannie majesty. Marigalante, and some other small islands in the neighbourhood, also submitted. And the inhabitants obtained the same terms with those of Guadaloupe; namely, the undisturbed possession of their private property, and the enjoyment of their civil and religious privileges.(2)

This moderation was equally generous and political, and may be supposed to have had a serious influence upon the minds of the French colonists, even in North America; where the campaign was not yet begun, and where the plan of operations was as extensive as their objects were great. It was concerted to attack the French at all their strong holds at once;-that general Wolfe, who had so eminently distinguished himself at the siege of Louisburg, should proceed up the river St. Lawrence with a body of eight thousand men, and a stout fleet from England, and besiege the city of Quebec; that general Amherst, now commander-in-chief of the British forces in North America, should, with an army of twelve thousand men, reduce Ticonderoga and Crown Point; cross lake Champlain; and, proceeding by the way of Richelieu river to the banks of the St. Lawrence, join general Wolfe in his attempt upon the capital of Canada; and that brigadier-general Prideaux, with a third army, reinforced by a body of provincials and friendly Indians, under sir William Johnson, should invest the important fortress of Niagara, which in a manner commands the interior parts of the northern division of the New World. It was farther proposed, that the troops under brigadier Prideaux, after the reduction of Niagara, should embark on lake Ontario; fall down the river St. Lawrence; besiege and take Montreal; and then join or co-operate with the combined army, under Amherst and Wolfe.

A bolder system of war, it is owned, was never framed: but many doubts had been started in regard to its natural practicability, founded on the strength of the places to be attacked, the extent of the operations, and the disposition of the French forces. The marquis de Vaudreuil, governor of New France, lay in the neighbourhood of Montreal, with a body of five thousand veteran troops; while the marquis de Montcalm, his lieutenant-general, whose reputation was already high in the military world, took the field with an army of ten thousand Europeans and Canadians, for the defence of the capital; and M. de Levi, an active officer, was at the head of a flying detachment, which, as well as the army under Montcalm, was strengthened by a large body of

(1) Capt Gardner, ubi sup.

ond. Gazette, June 14, 1759

trained Indians, intimately acquainted with all the woods and defiles. The garrison of Niagara consisted of at least six hundred men; Ticonderoga and Crown Point were in a respectable condition; and the city of Quebec, naturally strong from its situation, the bravery of its inhabitants, and the number of its garrison, had received every additional fortification that the art of war could give it. All these obstacles, however, were surmounted, though not immediately, by a happy mixture of conduct and valour; the wonderful effects of which ignorant and credulous men ascribe to supernatural influence, and dull and timid men to chance.

The army under Amherst, by the progress of which the operations of the other two were supposed to be in some measure governed, was early in motion. But the season was far advanced before the general could pass lake George. He thence proceeded, with little opposition from the enemy, to Ticonderoga, so fatal to the British troops in a former campaign. The French seemed at first determined to defend the fort. But perceiving the English commander resolute, cautious, and well prepared for undertaking the siege, and having, besides, orders to retreat from place to place towards the centre of operations, rather than run the hazard of being made prisoners of war, they abandoned the works in the night, and retired to Crown Point.

To Crown Point Amherst advanced, after repairing the fortifications of Ticonderoga, which the enemy had damaged. But before his arrival, the garrison had retired to isle Aux Noix, at the lower end of lake Champlain. There the French had three thousand five hundred men, he was informed, under the command of M. de Burlemaque, with a numerous train of artillery, and that the lake was occupied by four large armed vessels. With a sloop and a radeau, which he had built with all possible despatch, he destroyed two of the enemy's vessels. But the declining season obliged him to postpone farther operations, and return to Crown Point, where the troops were put into winter-quarters about the end of October.(1)

General Amherst now saw himself in a very awkward situation for a commander-in-chief. Though his success was great, he had found it impossible to attain the prime object of his enterprise; a junction with general Wolfe, which was considered as essential to the fortunate issue of the campaign. And what was yet more disagreeable, he had not, during the whole summer, obtained the least intelligence of the condition of that commander, on the operations of whose slender and unsupported army so much depended; a few obscure and alarming hints excepted, of his having landed in the neighbourhood of Quebec, where he was in danger of being crushed by the whole force of Canada, under the marquis de Montcalm. Happily, he was not so ignorant of the fate of the expedition against Niagara. Having received an account of the progress of it before he left Ticonderoga, he had detached brigadiergeneral Gage, to assume the command of the troops in the room of general Prideaux, who was unfortunately killed by the bursting of a cohorn, while directing the operations against the fort, to which he had been suffered to advance without the least molestation.

Meanwhile, the command of that expedition devolved upon sir William Johnson; who prosecuted with equal judgment and vigour the plan of his predecessor. He pushed the attack of Niagara with such intrepidity, that the besiegers soon brought their approaches within a hundred yards of the covered way. Alarmed at the danger of losing this interior key of their empire in America, the French collected a large body of regular troops, drawn from the neighbouring garrisons, Detroit, Venango, and Presque isle, in order to raise the siege. With these and a party of savages they accordingly resolved to attempt the relief of the place, and put themselves in motion for that purpose. Apprized of their intention, general Johnson ordered his light infantry, supported by some grenadiers and regular foot, to take post between the cataract of Niagara and the fortress. He posted the auxiliary Indians on

(1) Letter from general Amherst to Mr. secretary Pitt, in Lond. Gazette, Nov. 27 1759. Knox's Cam paigus, vol. i. ii.

his flanks; and while he thus prepared himself for an engagement, he took effectual measures for securing his lines and bridling the garrison.

The enemy appeared about nine o'clock in the morning, and the battle was begun with a horrid scream from the hostile Indians, according to their barbarous custom. It was this scream, called the war-whoop, the most frightful sound which imagination can conceive, that struck a panic into the army under Braddock, and had on other occasions carried terror to the hearts of European soldiers. But having now lost its effect upon the British troops, it was heard with a contemptuous indifference. And the French regulars were so warmly received by the English grenadiers and light infantry, while their savages were encountered by other savages, that they were totally routed in less than an hour, and the place surrendered the same day.(1)

The taking of Niagara effectually cut off the communication between Canada and Louisiana, and consequently was a great step towards the conquest of both. But the reduction of Quebec was still a more important object; and if general Amherst had been able to form a junction with Wolfe, it would have been attended with equal certainty, as a proportional force would have been employed to accomplish it.

As events happened, the issue of this grand enterprise seemed very doubtful. The land-forces did not exceed seven thousand men. They were, however, in good health and spirits. Having been embarked at Louisburg, under convoy of the admirals Saunders and Holmes, they were safely landed, towards the end of June, on the isle of Orleans, formed by two branches of the river St. Lawrence, a few leagues below the city of Quebec. There the soldiers and sailors found every refreshment; and there general Wolfe, who was accompanied by the brigadier-generals Monckton, Townshend, and Murray, published a spirited but somewhat romantic manifesto, vindicating the conduct of the king his master, in making this hostile invasion, and offering protection to the inhabitants of Canada, with the entire possession of their property and the free exercise of their religion, provided they took no part in the dispute for dominion between the crowns of France and England. He represented to them the folly of resistance, as all hopes of relief were cut off, while the British fleet commanded, not only the navigation of the river St. Lawrence, but the empire of the sea; and he reminded them, that the cruelties, exercised by the French against the English subjects in America, would excuse the most severe retaliation. But Englishmen, he said, were too magnanimous to follow the barbarous example: and he concluded with extolling the generosity of Great Britain, in thus stretching out to them a hand of humanity, when it was in her power to compel their obedience.(2)

As that manifesto produced no immediate effect, Wolfe was under the necessity of considering the Canadians as enemies, and saw himself exposed to the difficulties of a general commanding an army in a country where every thing is hostile to him. These difficulties, on examination, appeared so great, that, although naturally of a sanguine temper and an adventurous spirit, he began to despair of success before the commencement of operations. "I could not flatter myself," says he, in his celebrated letter to Mr. Pitt, "that I should be able to reduce the place." Nor is this to be wondered at. Besides the natural and artificial strength of the city of Quebec, which is chiefly built upon a steep rock on the northern bank of the river St. Lawrence, and farther defended by the river St. Charles, which places it in a kind of peninsula, Montcalm, the French general, was advantageously posted in the neighbourhood, with a force superior to the English army. To undertake the siege of the town, in such circumstances, seemed contrary to all the established maxims of war.

Resolving, however, to make every possible exertion before he abandoned the enterprise committed to him by his sovereign, and the event of which was already determined in the fond imaginations of his admiring countrymen, Wolfe took possession of Point Levi, on the southern bank of the St. Lawrence, and there erected batteries against the town. But these batteries, by

(1) Lond. Gazette, Sept. 13, 1759. Knox, ubi sup.

(2) Printed Manifesto.