the enemy's position; and having resolved to attack them, notwithstanding the strength of that position, and their superiority in numbers, his army was again put in motion, and the battle soon after began.(1) At half an hour past one, the head of the Prussian columns, both of infantry and cavalry, appeared opposite the Austrian army, which was prepared to receive them. And about two o'clock the grand attack, conducted by prince Ferdinand, of Brunswick, and supported by a powerful artillery, was pushed with resistless fury upon the Austrian right wing, which was at first thrown into disorder, but instantly recovered itself, and afterward behaved with equal firmness and gallantry. This conflict lasted about an hour and a half. Then the fire of the Prussian infantry began to slacken, and they were obliged to retire, in order to draw breath. They soon, however, renewed the combat; but were again compelled to yield to superior strength. Seven times did they return to the charge, from two till half past six o'clock. About that time, the last and most violent effort was made by the king in person, at the head of his cavalry. It was continued till after seven, when the Prussians, sinking under numbers and the disadvantage of ground, in which their cavalry could not properly act, were forced finally to relinquish the contest. But they remained on the field till nine, and retired without being pursued. The slaughter on both sides was great, and nearly equal. About twenty thousand men were left dead on the spot, or dying of mortal wounds.

In consequence of the loss of this memorable battle, one of the most obstinate and bloody of which there is any example in modern times, the king of Prussia was obliged immediately to raise the siege of Prague, and afterward to evacuate Bohemia.

General Lloyd's reflections on the siege of Prague, and the battle of Kolin, are too interesting to be here omitted. The siege of Prague, with about fifty thousand men in it, he observes, was an imprudent and dangerous measure, more especially as the king of Prussia was then in circumstances that required some decisive stroke, and that as soon as possible; that Prague covered no essential pass into that country, and contained no considerable magazine, neither was it necessary for the king to form one there, because the country itself furnished abundantly all kind of subsistence; that if, instead of besieging this town, his Prussian majesty had sent twenty thousand men, the morning after his victory, in pursuit of the Austrian right wing, which had fled to Beneschau, and marched with the main body of his army to Bohmisch Brodt, against mareschal Daun, it is more than probable he might have destroyed both; that they certainly could not have retired without losing their artillery and baggage, and must have fallen back with the utmost expedition on the Danube; that prince Charles of Lorraine must likewise have marched to the Danube, in order to join the remainder of the Austrian army, as he could not, in his then situation, have undertaken any thing of himself; that this would have given the king of Prussia all the time necessary to reduce Olmutz, and even Prague itself, which must have been left to a common garrison; but that, allured by the uncertain and vain, though flattering, hope of making fifty thousand men prisoners, he lost sight of Daun and the Austrian right wing, and with it an opportunity of giving some decisive blow; that, when informed of the enemy's approach, he had still time to repair the fault he had committed,—“ he might and ought to have raised the siege of Prague, and have marched with his whole forces against mareschal Daun;" and if he had succeeded, it is highly probable that he might also have routed prince Charles, before he could have reached the Danube.(2)

In regard to the battle of Kolin itself, this ingenious author very judiciously remarks, that as his Prussian majesty was in proportion much stronger in

(1) For the particulars of the battle of Kolin, and most of the other great actions between the Austrians and Prussians, the author is indebted to the late major-general Lloyd, whose excellent, but unfinished, Campaigns, must make his death sincerely lamented by all military men. Where this prime authority fails, recourse has been had to the accounts of the different actions published by the courts of Berlin and Vienna, as well as to those transmitted to the court of Versailles by French officers in the Austrian service, which seem in general more accurate and impartial, and form a kind of standard for judging of the two former. (2) Lloyd, vol. i.

cavalry than infantry, he ought to have chosen the most convenient ground on the enemy's front for that species of troops; and that, as he had given them an opportunity, by making his dispositions in open day, to reinforce their right and its flank, whither they had brought two-thirds of their army, he ought to have refused both his wings, and have made an effort with his cavalry, sustained by his infantry and artillery, on the enemy's centre, where they had only cavalry, and therefore most probably would have been forced to give way: whereas, by persisting to attack their right, he could bring only his infantry into action, the ground being very improper for cavalry, as well on account of the ravines and woods, as of the villages before the enemy's front; that, having resolved to attack the Austrian right wing, the king of Prussia should have brought thither all his infantry, leaving only a line of horse on his right, which would have been sufficient, as the enemy's left could never quit its advantageous position, and descend into the plain; that this would have enabled him to sustain properly his van-guard, which was left exposed, to have taken the enemy in flank, and to have gained the battle.(1) In a word, it appears from these reflections, that the king of Prussia erred, in forming an attack where he could not conveniently combine the different species of arms; whereas the enemy had both infantry and cavalry, with a great artillery, to sustain the points attacked; in letting his van-guard advance so far, that it could not be supported by the line, and in attacking with too little infantry, considering the nature of the ground. Hence the loss of the battle.

Nor were the arms of his Prussian majesty, or those of his allies more fortunate in other quarters. No sooner did the Russians, who had hovered long on the frontiers, enter the kingdom of Prussia, than general Lewhald was ordered to oppose their progress. He accordingly assembled an army of thirty thousand men, in the month of June, and took post at Insterburgh, in order to observe the motions of the enemy. Meanwhile, general Fermor, with one division of the Russian army, assisted by a fleet from Revel, carrying nine thousand land-forces, invested Memel; and, after a short siege, made himself master of that important place, which was of infinite consequence to the Russians, as they could make it a military station, and a magazine of provisions and stores, that might be constantly supplied by means of their navy.

This enterprise being successfully executed, the whole Russian army, consisting of sixty-two thousand foot, and nineteen thousand horse, with near twenty thousand Tartars, Calmucks, and Cossacks, united under mareschal Apraxin on the river Russ, and advanced towards the Pregel. General Lewhaid, on the approach of the enemy, quitted his camp at Insterburgh, and retired to Wehlaw, where he continued until he received positive orders to hazard a battle. Having reconnoitred the position of the Russians, who had passed the Pregel, and were encamped at Gross Jagersdorff, near Norkitten, he accordingly attacked them unexpectedly at five o'clock in the morning, with great fury. Though thus in a manner surprised, they received the shock with a firmness that astonished him; and after a warm and general action of three hours, during which victory remained doubtful, and every possible exertion had been made, he was forced to retreat, with the loss of two thousand men. (2)

Unacquainted with the valour and discipline of the Russian infantry, since found to be the best in Europe, Lewhald deprived himself of the power of making a vigorous or successful effort in any one point, by extending his little army in a line opposed to that of the enemy, which he in vain endeavoured to break, as they had every where, through this mistaken disposition, a much greater number of men in action, than he could possibly present. (3) In vain did he attempt to cut their army in two, and take them in flank, by penetrating through certain openings. They received the Prus

(1) Lloyd, vol. i.

(2) Prussian account of the battle. The Russian account is imperfect and contradictory
(3) Lloyd, vol. i. p. 145.

sians on the point of the bayonet, and forced them to give way. He drew off his army, however, in good order, and re-occupied his former camp at Wehlaw.

While the Russians, now victorious, were ravaging the king of Prussia's dominions on one side of Germany, the French were stripping him of his possessions on the other, and laying the electorate of Hanover under con tribution. After the duke of Cumberland passed the Weser, he continued to retreat before mareschal d'Etrees, until he reached the village of Hasten beck. Having chosen an advantageous post, he there attempted to make a stand, on the 25th of July, but being worsted, after a vigorous resistance, he was obliged to quit his station. Instead, however, of marching immediately after the action, as prudence seemed to dictate, towards Wolfenbuttle, Hal berstadt, and Magdeburg, where he might have formed a junction with the Prussian forces, his royal highness reured to Hoya, under pretence of covering Bremen and Verden; though, in reality, in order to keep up a communication with Stade, whither had been removed the archives and most valuable effects of Hanover.

In the mean time, that electorate, abandoned to the enemy, was laid under contribution. And the duke de Richelieu, the celebrated conqueror of Minorca, having succeeded to the chief command of the French army, soon saw himself master of Bremen and Verden, and obliged the duke of Cumberland to take refuge under the cannon of Stade. There, encamped between the Aller and the Elbe, it was supposed his royal highness would be able to maintain his ground till the close of the campaign, as the season was already far in the decline. But the enemy having taken effectual measures for cutting off his communication with the Elbe, he was under the necessity of signing the singular convention of Closter-seven; by which an army of thirty. eight thousand Hanoverians, Hessians, and other troops in the pay of his Britannic majesty, was dissolved and distributed into different quarters of cantonment, without being disarmed,(1) or considered as prisoners of war. The French were left, "till the definitive reconciliation of the two sove reigns,"(2) in full possession of the countries they had conquered, though under the express condition of abstaining from future violences, hostilities being immediately to cease on both sides.

Having thus subdued the German dominions of his Britannic majesty, the French were now at liberty to turn their whole forces against those of the king of Prussia. Mareschal Richelieu accordingly made his way into Halberstadt and the Old Marche of Brandenburg; first exacting contributions, and then plundering the towns. The army of the empire, under the prince

(1) The court of France afterward insisted on the disarming of the troops, though the convention had observed a profound silence on that head. It only stipulated, That on the cessation of hostilities, the auxiliary troops should be sent home, and that such part of the Hanoverian army as the duke of Cumberland could not place in the city of Stade, should go and take quarters in the country beyond the Elbe, and not be recruited. (See the Articles of the Convention itself and the Vindication of the King of England's Conduct as the Elector of Hanover, published by authority.) Notwithstanding the notoriety of this fact, two contemporary authors have affirmed, That in consequence of the convention of Closter-seven, "thirty-eight thousand Hanoverians laid down their arms!" Contin. Hist. Eng. vol. ii. Annual Reg. 1758.

(2) This indefinite mode of expression gave rise to one of the most intricate disputes that ever employed the pens of political writers; and as self-interest dictated the arguments on both sides of the question, much ingenuity and force of reasoning were displayed. The French with great plausibility maintained, that no other meaning could reasonably be affixed to the words of the convention (which however they attempted to mend by certain jesuitical explications) than that which was natural and obvious: That the suspension of arms was to continue, and they consequently in possession of their conquests, till a general pacification. (Parallel of the Conduct of the King of France with that of the King of England.) The English ministry, on the other hand, affirmed, That the suspension of arms was a mere military regulation, which was to continue in force only till the issue of a negotiation, then depending, begun by his Britannic majesty, in quality of elector of Hanover, and the suddenly expected declaration of the courts of Vienna and Versailles relative to such negotiation; that this was the reason why it was not thought necessary to fix the time the suspension of arms was to last. It was drawn up, they said, by the generals of the two armies, who mutually agreed that it should be of force without the ratification of the two courts; a thing impossible, if it is supposed the king of England's German dominions were to be delivered up into the hands of foreigners till a general peace, of which there was not the least prospect. But it is evident," added they, "that France herself did not understand the hands of the Hanoverians to be tied up till a general peace, by the suspension of arms concluded at Closter-seven, from her insisting on having that stipulated, as an express condition, in her artful scheme of explication, proposed by the count de Lynar, the Danish minister," Vindication of the King of England's Conduct as Elector of Hanaper.

of Hildburghausen, reinforced by that under the prince de Soubise, was on full march to enter Saxony. Twenty thousand Swedes, commanded by general Ungern Stornberg, had already entered Prussian Pomerania, under pretence of guaranteeing the treaty of Westphalia; and having taken the towns of Demmin and Anclam, and reduced the islands of Usedom and Wollin, they laid the whole country under contribution, without meeting with the smallest resistance, as the garrison of Stettin, consisting of ten thousand men, could not leave that important fortress, in order to oppose their progress. The kingdom of Prussia was still a prey to the barbarities of the Russians. One Austrian army had entered Silesia, and laid siege to Schweidnitz; while another, penetrating through Lusatia, passed the Prussian armies, and suddenly presenting itself before Berlin, laid that capital under contribution. The ruin of his Prussian majesty seemed inevitable.

This illustrious prince, driven out of Bohemia, was on all sides surrounded by powerful armies; and, in consequence of the convention of Closter-seven, he seemed to be deserted by the only ally on whom he could place any dependence. In what manner he extricated himself out of these difficulties, and what line of policy was pursued, in such delicate circumstances, by his Britannic majesty, we shall afterward have occasion to see.

LETTER XXXIII.

State of Europe, and the History of the general War, continued from the Convention of Closter-seven, to the Battle of Minden or Thornhausen, in 1759.

THE affairs of England, where tumult, clamour, and discontent had long prevailed, were still in disorder, when intelligence arrived of the humiliating convention of Closter-seven, which overwhelmed the court with shame and confusion. Pitt and Legge, the two popular ministers, had been restored to their respective offices, in compliance with the general wish of the nation, expressed in many warm addresses to the throne. But they had not yet had time to plan any regular system of measures; and the first enterprise they hazarded miscarried to the no small mortification of their friends, and to the severe disappointment, sorrow, and surprise of the whole kingdom.

This was an expedition to the coast of France, in order to raise the drooping spirits of the people by an appearance of vigour, and the credit of the British arms, so sunk in the eyes of all Europe, by some great blow; and to induce, if possible, the French monarch to withdraw part of his troops from Germany, for the defence of his own dominions, instead of prosecuting foreign conquests. Its ultimate purpose was the relief of the electorate of Hanover, and its immediate object the destruction of the French shipping and naval stores at Rochefort. The destination of the armament, however, was kept a profound secret. But the highest expectations of success were formed from the magnitude of the preparations, and the confidence which the public had in the abilities of Mr. secretary Pitt, by whom the enterprise was said to have been planned.

Happily these expectations began in some measure to abate, in consequence of certain unforeseen delays, before the sailing of the fleet. At length, on the ill-omened day that the duke of Cumberland signed the convention of Closter-seven, the formidable armament put to sea. It consisted of eighteen ships of the line, under sir Edward Hawke, besides frigates, fireships, bombketches, and a number of transports, carrying ten regiments of land-forces, commanded by sir John Mordaunt. The hopes of the people were again revived; their petitions to heaven were fervent; and imagination, warmed by vows and wishes, looked fondly forward to some important conquest. What then was the astonishment of the nation, when this mighty fleet, which had cost the government almost a million of money, after beating off the coast of France for three weeks, and filling the inhabitants of the seaports with

terror, returned to England without having taken so much as a fishing town; -without having attempted or effected any thing! except destroying some half-finished fortifications on the little island of Aix, situated at the mouth of the river Charente, which leads up to Rochefort,

Language cannot paint the expressions of disappointment that appeared in every countenance. Every heart seemed to feel the national disgrace, and every eye to lighten with indignation at the officers employed in the expedition. The officers endeavoured to throw the blame of their miscarriage on the ministry, in planning an impracticable enterprise. The ministry, supported by the voice of the people, retorted the charge, by accusing the officers of cowardice or incapacity. A court of inquiry, appointed by his majesty, censured the conduct of sir John Mordaunt, the commander-in-chief; and a court-martial, composed of officers of reputation, acquitted him of the charge of disobeying his instructions. The public opinion remained the same.

In the course of this trial and inquest it appeared, that the ministry had reason to believe, on good information, that an attempt upon Rochefort would be very practicable. Nor was there any thing offered to prove the impracticability of such attempt, if it had been made when the fleet first arrived before that place. But it was proved, to the satisfaction of every unprejudiced mind, and to the severe regret of all lovers of their king and country, of every man who had any pride in the military glory of England, that the time which ought to have been employed in action was spent in consultations and councils of war, and the purposed descent finally relinquished without any sufficient cause.(1) In a word, the principal officers, admiral Hawke excepted, seemed mutually desirous to avoid a landing. And their frequent consultations, notwithstanding the ardour of the troops, who were impatient to retrieve the honour of their country, seemed to have more in view than a common excuse for inaction; a concerted apology for not making a descent, than any hostile purpose against the enemy.

While the people of Great Britain were mourning over this shameful miscarriage, which, joined to the accumulating misfortunes of the king of Prussia, and the mortifying convention of Closter-seven, exhibited a most melancholy picture of their affairs in Europe, those in America did not afford a more flattering prospect. Although a large reinforcement of troops had been sent thither, and a vast supply of warlike stores, the third campaign served only to swell the triumphs of the enemy.

The attack upon Crown Point, so long meditated, was laid aside for an expedition against Louisburg. Lord Loudon, who in person was to command the land-forces, accordingly left New-York on the ninth of July, with a body of six thousand men, and sailed for Halifax; where he was joined by admiral Holbourn with a considerable fleet, and about five thousand landforces. But when the fleet and army were almost ready to proceed for Cape Breton, information was brought to Halifax, that the Brest fleet, consisting of seventeen ships of the line, besides frigates, with a reinforcement of troops, and an abundant supply of ammunition and provisions, was arrived at Louisburg. This intelligence immediately suspended the preparations, and damped the ardour of the British officers. Councils of war were held, one after another; and the result of the whole was, that as the place which had been the object of their armament was so strongly reinforced, the French fleet rather superior to the English, and the season of the year so far advanced, it was advisable to defer the enterprise till a more favourable opportunity.

Thus terminated the projected expedition against Louisburg, like that against Rochefort, in a manner inglorious to the British arms, and disgraceful to the spirit of the British officers. But those were not the worst consequences that attended it.

Since the taking of Oswego, the French had remained masters of the great lakes: nor could the British forces prevent their collecting the Indians

(1) See the printed Evidence in the publications of the times.