reccived orders to attempt its relief. The French general accordingly put his army in motion, as if he meant to give battle to the main body of the confederates; but, after making a feint of advancing towards their right, he turned suddenly off to the left, and marching all night, attacked unexpectedly a detachment of fourteen thousand men, which had been placed at Denain, under the earl of Albemarle, in order to favour the passage of the convoys from Marchiennes. This detachment was quickly routed, and almost utterly destroyed. Four thousand fugitives only escaped to the principal army.(1) Besides the loss sustained in the action, fifteen hundred men were drowned in the Scheldt, and two thousand fell into the hands of the victors; among whom was the earl of Albemarle, with many other officers of distinction.(2)

Prince Eugene, who was marching to the assistance of Albemarle, in order to prevent this disaster, had the mortification to arrive when his aid could be of no use to his friends. In a fit of despair, he ordered the bridges on the Scheldt, near Denain, to be attacked, and wantonly threw away the lives of a thousand men; for had the bridges been abandoned to him, he would not have been able to cross the river, in the face of the French army.(3) failed, however, in the attempt. Yet would he have continued the sie Landrecy, and might perhaps have become master of the place, notwith standing this check; but the field-deputies of the states obliged him to relinquish the enterprise, and retire to Mons.(4) Meanwhile, Villars, having taken Marchiennes, where the principal magazines of the confederates were deposited, and being now uncontrolled master of the field, reduced successively Douay, Quesnoy, and Bouchain.(5) These conquests closed the operations in Flanders. No enterprise of consequence was undertaken, during the campaign, in any other quarter.

The court of Versailles was highly elated by a success so unexpected and extraordinary. Nor was the joy of the British ministry, at the change of affairs in Flanders, less sincere, though less public. They were sensible that the body of the confederates, unless lost to all sense of prudence, would no longer attempt to continue the war, should Great Britain desert the grand alliance; and consequently the whigs, their political enemies, already humbled, would become still less formidable. In this conjecture they were not deceived. The eyes of the Dutch, who had most to apprehend, were first opened to their own perilous situation, and to the necessity of renewing the conferences at Utrecht, which had been for some time interrupted. Instead of prescribing terms to the house of Bourbon, they now acceded to the plan of pacification settled between Great Britain and France. Their example was followed by the duke of Savoy and the king of Portugal. And the emperor, though resolute to continue the war, finding himself unable to support any military operations in Spain, agreed to the evacuation of Catalonia;(6) and, by that measure, indirectly acknowledged the title of Philip V.

During these approaches towards a general pacification, queen Anne was eagerly solicited by the jacobites, to take some step in favour of the pretender. In order to quiet the fears of the English nation, excited by his connexion with France, he had left St. Germains the preceding summer, and now resided at the Bar, in the territories of the duke of Lorrain. And although the queen's jealousy of her own authority, and perhaps her natural timidity, heightened by the insinuations of Oxford, made her decline all proposals for calling her brother into the kingdom, or repealing the act of settlement, she was very anxious to concert with Lewis XIV. some plan for his accession to the throne, after her death.(7) What measures were taken for that purpose, and how they were frustated, I shall afterward have occasion

(1) Relation, sent by the earl of Albemarle to the states, and other papers in the Monthly Mercury for July, August, and September, 1712.

(3) Duke of Berwick's Mem. vol. ii.

(6) Id. ibid. Duke of Berwick's Mem. vol. ii.

(4) Id. ibid.

(7) Stuart Papers, 1712, 1713. Duke of Berwick's Mem. vol. ii.

(2) Ibid.

(5) Gen. Hist. of Europe, 1712.

to notice. It will, therefore, be sufficient at present to observe, that the earl of Oxford artfully broke the designs of the queen, and rendered abortive the schemes of the jacobites, by dividing their councils.

Oxford, however, continued to forward the negotiations for peace as necessary to the security of his own power, which he hoped to preserve during the life of his mistress; and, as the declining health of the queen left room to believe that her death could be no distant event, it is not impossible but the lord-treasurer, in secretly supporting the parliamentary settlement of the crown, might flatter himself with the prospect of extending his administration even into the reign of her successor. From these, or similar motives, he defeated the intrigues of the jacobites, at the same time that he hastened the restoration of tranquillity to Europe. And the treaties between the different powers, so long negotiated, were at last signed at Utrecht, on the 31st day of March, in the year 1713, by the plenipotentiaries of France, England, Portugal, Prussia, Savoy, and the United Provinces; the emperor resolving to continue the war, and the king of Spain refusing to sign the stipulations until a principality should be provided, in the Low Countries, for the princess Orsini, the favourite of his queen. (1)

The chief articles of this famous pacification were to the following purport: That, whereas the security and liberties of Europe can by no means bear the union of the crowns of France and Spain under one and the same prince, Philip V., now established on the Spanish throne, shall renounce all right to the crown of France; that the dukes of Berry and Orleans, the next heirs to the French monarchy after the infant dauphin, shall, in like manner, renounce all right to the crown of Spain, in the event of their accession to the crown of France: that, in default of Philip V. and his male issue, the succession of Spain and the Indies shall be secured to the duke of Savoy; that the island of Sicily shall be instantly ceded, by his Catholic majesty, to the same prince, with the title of king; that France shall also cede to him the valleys of Pragels, Oulx, Sezenne, Bardonache, and Chateau-Dauphin, with the forts of Exilles and Fenestrelles, and restore to him the dutchy of Savoy and the country of Nice, with their dependencies: that the full property and sovereignty of both banks and the navigation of the Maragnon, or river of Amazons, in South America, shall belong to the king of Portugal: that Spanish Guelderland, with the sovereignty of Neufchatel and Valengin, shall be ceded to the king of Prussia, in exchange for the principality of Orange, and the lordships of Chalons and Chatelbelin, in the kingdom of France and country of Burgundy, and that his regal title shall be acknowledged: that the Rhine shall form the boundary of the German empire on the side of France; and that all fortifications, beyond that river, claimed by France, or in the possession of his most Christian majesty, shall either be relinquished to the emperor or destroyed: that in Italy, the kingdom of Naples, the dutchy of Milan, and the Spanish territories on the Tuscan shore, shall be ceded to the house of Austria; that the sovereignty of the Spanish Netherlands shall likewise be secured to the house of Austria; but that the elector of Bavaria (to whom they had been granted by Philip V.) shall retain the sovereignty of such places as are still in his possession, until he shall be reinstated in all his German dominions except the Upper Palatinate, and also be put in possession of the island of Sardinia, with the title of king: that Luxemburg, Namur, and Charleroy shall be given to the states-general of the United Provinces, as a barrier, together with Mons, Menin, Tournay, and other places already in their possession: that Lisle, Aire, Bethune, and St. Venant, shall be restored to France: that, on the part of Great Britain, the French monarch shall acknowledge the title of queen Anne, and the eventual succession of the family of Hanover to the British throne; that the fortifications of Dunkirk (the cause of much jealousy to England, and raised at vast expense to France) shall be demolished, and the harbour filled up; that certain places in North America and the West Indies

shall be ceded or restored by France to Great Britain; namely, the island of St. Christopher (which had long been possessed jointly by the French and English, but from which the French had been expelled, in 1702); Hudson's Bay and Straits (where the French had founded a settlement, but without dispossessing the English, and carried on a rival trade during the war); the town of Placentia, in the island of Newfoundland (where the French had been suffered to establish themselves, through the negligence of government); and the long disputed province of Nova Scotia (into which the French had early intruded themselves, out of which they had been frequently driven, and which had been finally conquered by an army from New-England in 1710): that the island of Minorca and the fortress of Gibraltar (conquered from Spain) shall remain in the possession of Great Britain; and that the Assiento, or contract for furnishing the Spanish colonies in South America with negroes, shall belong to the subjects of Great Britain, for the term of thirty years.(1)

That these conditions, especially on the part of Great Britain, were very inadequate to the success and expense of the war, will be denied by no intelligent man, whose understanding is not warped by political prejudices; and the commercial treaty, which was concluded at the same time, between France and England, was evidently, as I shall afterward have occasion to show, to the disadvantage of the latter kingdom. The other confederates had more cause to be satisfied, and the emperor Charles VI. as much as any of them: yet was he obstinate in refusing to sign the general pacification, though two months were allowed him to deliberate on the terms. But he had soon reason to repent his rashness in resolving to continue the war alone: for although he had prudently concluded a treaty with the Hungarian malecontents, in consequence of which twenty-two regiments of his rebel subjects entered into his service, the imperial army on the Rhine, commanded by prince Eugene, was never in a condition to face the French under Villars, who took successively Worms, Spire, Keiserlautern, and the important fortress of Landau. He forced the passage of the Rhine; attacked and defeated general Vaubonne in his intrenchments, and reduced Friburg, the capital of Brisgaw, before the close of the campaign.(2)

Unwilling to prosecute a disastrous war, the emperor began seriously to think of peace; and conferences, which afterward terminated in a pacific treaty, were opened, between prince Eugene and mareschal Villars, at Rastadt. The terms of this treaty, which was concluded on the 6th of March, 1714, were less favourable to the emperor than those offered at Utrecht. The king of France retained Landau, which he had formerly proposed to cede, together with several fortresses beyond the Rhine, which he had agreed to demolish. He got the electors of Bavaria and Cologne fully re-established in their dominions and dignities; the elector of Bavaria consenting to relinquish the island of Sardinia to the emperor, in return for the Upper Palatinate, and the king of France to acknowledge, in form, the electoral dignity of the duke of Hanover.(3) The principal articles, in regard to Italy and the Low Countries, were the same with those settled at Utrecht.

About the time that the treaty of Rastadt was concluded, the king of Spain acceded to the general pacification; being persuaded by his grandfather, Lewis XIV. to forego his absurd demand in favour of the princess of Orsini. But Philip V., although now freed from all apprehensions on the part of the confederates, was by no means in quiet possession of his kingdom. The Catalans were still in arms, and the inhabitants of Barcelona had come to a resolution of defending themselves to the last extremity; not, however, as has been represented by some historians, from any romantic idea of esta

(1) Printed Treaties, in the Monthly Mercury. Tindal's Contin. of Rapin, &c. The Assiento, which led to a lucrative contraband trade to the Spanish main, proved the most advantageous article in favour of Great Britain. It was, however, no sacrifice on the part of Spain, the same privilege having been for merly enjoyed by France.

(2) Voltaire, Siècle, chap. xxii. State of Europe, 1713. (3) Printed Treaty in the Monthly Mercury, &c.

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blishing an independent republic, but with a view of preserving their lives [PART II. and their civil rights, all who had revolted being threatened with the justice of the sword. Had the court of Madrid used a more moderate language, Barcelona would have capitulated immediately after the departure of the imperialists. But as nothing was talked of by the Spanish ministers and generals but severe retribution, the people became furious and desperate.(1)

Vast preparations were made for the reduction of this important place. And the duke of Berwick, being a third time invested with the chief command 'n Spain, sat down before it with an army composed of fifty battalions of French, and twenty of Spanish foot, together with fifty-one squadrons of horse; while another army, divided into different bodies, kept the country in awe, and a French and Spanish fleet cut off all communication with the town by sea. He had eighty-seven pieces of heavy cannon, fifteen hundred thousand weight of powder, and every thing else in profusion, that could be thought of for facilitating a siege. The garrison of Barcelona consisted of sixteen thousand men, and the fortifications were formidable, especially on the side towards, the land. The duke of Berwick made his attack on the side next the sea, where the operations were more easy, by reason of certain eminences, behind which several battalions might be placed under cover; and where the curtains of the bastions being much raised, offered a fair mark for the cannon of the besiegers.(2)

After the trenches had been opened about a month, a breach was made in the bastion of St. Clara, and a lodgement effected; but the assailants were suddenly driven from their post, with the loss of a thousand men. This misfortune, and the vigorous resistance of the besieged, determined the duke of Berwick to hazard no more partial attacks. He resolved to lay the front of the place so completely level, that he might enter it, as it were, in line of battle. And he accomplished his purpose, by patience and perseverance. But before he ordered the general assault, he summoned the town to surrender. So great, however, was the obstinacy of the citizens, that, although their provisions were almost exhausted, though seven breaches had been made in the body of the place, and no probability remained of their receiving either aid or supply, they hung out a flag of defiance, and refused to listen to any terms of capitulation!-The assault was made and repelled with fury. At length, after struggling from daybreak till three in the afternoon, and being driven from most of their works, the inhabitants demanded a parley. It was granted them. But they could obtain no conditions, except a promise that their lives should be safe, and that the town should not be plundered. That promise was religiously observed by the duke of Berwick, who had lost ten thousand men during the siege, and the citizens about six thousand. (3) All Catalonia submitted; and the Catalans were disarmed, and stripped of their ancient privileges.

This, my dear Philip, to use the language of an elegant historian, was the last flame of that great fire, kindled by the will of Charles II. of Spain, which had so long laid waste the finest countries in Europe. (4) I ought now to carry forward the adventures of Charles XII. and the affairs of the north; but perspicuity requires, that I first elucidate those intrigues, which we have seen gathering in the court of England.

(1) Duke of Berwick's Mem. vol. ii.

(3) Ibid. ubi sup.

(2) Id. ibid.
(4) Voltaire, Siècle, chap. xxii.

LETTER XXIV.

Great Britain, from the Peace of Utrecht, to the Suppression of the Rebellion, in 1715, with some Account of the Affairs of France, and the Intrigues of the Court of St. Germains.

THE peace of Utrecht, though in itself an unpopular measure, afforded the English ministry a momentary triumph over their political adversaries, and highly raised the hopes of the jacobites, who flattered themselves that the restoration of general tranquillity would enable the queen to take some effectual step in favour of the pretender, whose interest she seemed now to have sincerely at heart. But it will be necessary, my dear Philip, the better to illustrate this matter, to go a few years back, and collect such particulars relative to the court of St. Germains, as could not readily enter into the general narration.

In the beginning of the year 1711, the abbé Gaultier, who was employed in the secret negotiations between France and England, waited upon the duke of Berwick, at St. Germains, with proposals from the earl of Oxford, for the restoration of the pretender. These proposals were in substance, That provided queen Anne should be permitted to enjoy the crown in tranquillity during her life, she would secure to her brother the possession of it after her death; and that sufficient stipulations should be signed, on his side, for the preservation of the church of England and the liberties of the kingdom.(1) These preliminaries being settled, says the duke of Berwick, who conducted the affairs of the pretender, we consulted on the means of executing the business; but the abbé could not, at that time, enter into any particulars, as the lord-treasurer had not yet fully explained to him his intentions. It was necessary, Oxford said, that the peace should be concluded before the English ministry could venture upon so delicate a measure.(2)

Meanwhile such of the jacobites as were nearest the person of the queen, perceiving her inclinations, urged her perpetually to concert some plan for the restoration of the pretender. Sincere in her own attachment to the church of England, she signified her desire that he should abjure popery, and place himself in a capacity of being served. But finding him obstinate, she replied, when urged by the duke of Buckingham to alter the succession in his favour, "How can I serve him? He takes not the least step to oblige me, in what ĺ most desire. You know a papist cannot enjoy this crown in peace. But the example of the father has no weight with the son; he prefers his religious errors to the throne of a great kingdom. How, therefore, can I undo what I have already done! He may thank himself for his exclusion. He knows I love my own family better than any other. All would be easy, if he would enter the pale of the church of England. Advise him to change his religion; as that only can turn the opinion of the people in his favour."(3)

The duke of Buckingham conveyed this answer to the court of St. Germains: and, at the same time, seconded the request of the queen. But his arguments were all lost on the pretender, who was a zealous Catholic, and made a matter of conscience in adhering to his religion, in defiance of all prudential considerations;(4) an irrefragable proof of the most incurable and dangerous weakness in a prince, however commendable in a private person. For, as a sensible writer observes, if a king is not willing to go to heaven in

(1) Duke of Berwick's Mem. vol. ii.

(2) Id. ibid. "Though it appeared to me," adds the duke of Berwick, "that one of these points was no hindrance to the other; yet, in order to show that we would omit nothing to promote the interest of the pretender, and to give proofs of our sincerity, we wrote to all the jacobites to join with the court And their influence contributed greatly to make the queen's party so superior in the house of commons, that every thing was carried there according to her wishes." This information is confirmed by the Stuart and Hanover papers.

(3) Stuart papers, 1712.

(4) Id. ibid.