mate consequences, tends to diminish the susceptibility to pain or suffering, no less than to sear the conscience, and, in a degree, to destroy the moral sense. Consequently, on this scheme, the more an individual sins, the less he is punished. He may sin a little, and be punishable to a certain extent; but if he chooses to become an adept in sin, his punishment is graduated on the inverse ratio of his sin. Again we ask, is the government of God such a baseless fabric as this? Can the determined transgressor thus succeed in annihilating guilt, shake off responsibility, and break up the deep foundations of the judgment to come? But is it claimed, that there is moral law and penalty embodied in the threatenings of his displeasure? What is that threatening, we ask, which is the necessary means of the individual's highest good? Moral evil, on such a supposition, is nothing more than the misery which it causes to the individual himself. Sin has no relation to a moral law, diminishes not the influence of its sanctions over others, prostrates not authority, and thus destroys no good; no direct affront is given to the infinite majesty of the universe, waking his holy displeasure; no effect flows from it, reaching the character and destiny of others by example and influence. Nothing of all this, in which the malignity of sin especially consists, is admitted. Such a theory, we are bold to affirm, subverts the foundations of moral government, by a denial of the essential relations of moral action. Its tendency to fatalism is direct and powerful. On the principles of our author it can never be shown, that God is just when he judges, or clear when he condemns, or that he has established and upholds a moral administration.

We may also ask, why men who talk so much of the dignity of man, deny to him indirectly, if not directly, those powers and liabilities which elevate him in the scale of being? Alas! these his noble privileges are denied him, that he may be in no danger of committing that sin whose just desert is endless punishment; since the same estimate of his powers, and relations, of accountableness which fixes his station in the scale of being only a little lower than the angels of heaven, gives so much the more fearful significance to the demerit of his voluntary apostacy, making it the signal of everlasting sin unto death. Why, too, is the extent of the divine moral government limited to this earth? Why is our relationship to other worlds denied? Is there no distinct utterance, on this point, in revelation? Why, except that transgression may not go out, in its consequences over the mighty systein, and call for that punishment and those measures which show, that to violate its common-law is treason against a universe of accountable subjects?

Another objection, and we are not surprised at it, occurs to our author, as to the course of reasoning which he has adopted. He VOL. VIII.

12

says, "Were there no evil in the world, there could be no possible objection to this view of the subject. Were every one virtuous and happy, every heart would rejoice to trace to the Deity its excellencies and its pleasures." p. 43.

This is indeed quite safe, if it is not most logical. Our author has been instructing us how the Deity will proceed in the ultimate removal of all evil from the world; and now he informs us, that if there were no evil in the world, there could be no sort of objection to his theory of removing it; and of course no objection to the doctrine of universal salvation. No, none at all. We are agreed here. But there is evil in the world; and, as we shall attempt to show, it may have come in, in a way too that does not implicate the benevolence or power of God, or lay him under any obligation to remove it. Our author continues:

But how can he who is perfect in benignity be the author of evil? It is this which perplexes the mind, and the answer to the question involves the great inquiry, about which intelligent and pious persons have, in all ages, exercised their most anxious thoughts, and leads directly to the consideration of the design of the Deity in the administration of the world.' p. 43.

If we may believe Dr. Smith, then, the subject of moral evil is one that has perplexed inquiring minds in all ages. Certain we are, that it lies at the foundation (so far as false reasonings have influence) of all his scepticism. This, it would seem, led him to those false assumptions and specious reasonings, which he employs to establish the doctrine of the final restoration of all mankind to felicity. In explanation of his theory of moral evil, he seems to have taken no other view of the subject than the sole alternative, that the Deity must purpose evil as an ultimate end, a good in itself, or as the necessary indispensable means of greater good than could be reached by the prevalence of universal holiness. This led him to extend the design of the Deity, in his government, so as to compass the final purity and happiness of all intelligent creatures, as a preliminary, and next to suppose him to appoint the necessary conduct in creatures, and so arrange the measures of his administration, that there should be no failure in the case.

A few extracts, in addition to those already given, will show that we do not mistake Dr. Smith's views.

No one can believe that the Deity has chosen evil for its own sake. Were this the case he would not be good; were he to cause the least degree of suffering, merely for the sake of producing pain, it would be utterly incompatible with benevolence. Evil in his hands, therefore, can only be the instrument of good. Nothing can have induced him to permit its existence but the perception, that under his administration it

will terminate in the production of greater good than could have been enjoyed without it.' p. 46.

If, then, the existence of moral evil must be referred ultimately to the Deity, one of two things necessarily follows, either that he appointed it as a final end, or that he appointed it for some farther end. If he appointed it as an ultimate end, he has rested in the production of misery as an ultimate object, a purpose which is not only not consistent with benevolence, but which could have been devised only by a being purely malignant.' p. 50.

It deserves to be well considered, that the hypothesis, that evil is the appointment of the Deity for the promotion of greater ultimate good, is adequate to remove every difficulty, while the doctrine that he partially counteracts its operation is extremely imperfect.' p. 56.

The essential difference between God's benevolent counteraction of evil, and his benevolent causation of it, is, that according to the former hypothesis, the beneficial effect of his interference is partial and imperfect: according to the latter, it is universal and complete.

Upon the whole, then, it is perfectly evident, that neither the nature nor the government of the Deity can be benevolent, unless evil be in every instance and every measure in which it prevails through the vast system which he at first constituted, and which he constantly superintends, not an end, but the means to some further end; namely, that of promoting ultimate good: good higher in nature and greater in degree than could have been produced without it.' p. 57.

The wisdom and goodness of the Deity in the permission of natural and moral evil may be perfectly vindicated, and can be perfectly vindicated only on the supposition, that considered in relation to the entire period of his being, it increases the sum of happiness to every individual.' p. 59.

From the whole of what has been said, then, it appears, that we may without presumption, with the full concurrence of reason, and on the clear warrant of scripture, affirm, that when the Deity placed man in such circumstances as he foresaw would be attended with the production and indulgence of evil passions, he at the same time perceived, that under his direction these passions would produce to mankind collectively, and to every individual particularly, a greater sum of happiness than I could have existed without them.' p. 60.

As to this theory, upon which he founds the design of the Deity to bring all mankind to a state of final happiness, our author further remarks:

'The believer in the doctrine of final restoration, can have no other wish than that it should be considered as just or fallacious, as this position is established or refuted. Without doubt, this is the point on which the controversy chiefly depends.' p. 48.

Thus it appears, that Dr. Smith rests his cause on a hypothe

sis, respecting the design of moral evil, and that hypothesis one confessedly needing proof. Is not our philosopher in the condition of an ancient sage, who fain would move the material world, but lacked a foothold? Give now this moral Archimedes his ws, and he would at once elevate the moral world to heavenly purity and happiness.

We are unwilling to risk our salvation upon any mere hypothesis whatever. We have a better foundation. But when those who, as we think, virtually subvert the authority of revelation, do rest their faith upon theories, we are ready to test their conjectural reasonings, by examining the validity of their premises.

We have already attempted to show, that Dr. Smith dispenses with free-agency, annihilates the distinction between right and wrong, excludes the possibility of guiltiness, and virtually reduces the moral administration of the Deity to a mere superintendence of the material world. We now propose to show, that his theory of the origin and results of moral evil, is a baseless assumption, and can form no solid foundation on which to rest the doctrine of universal restoration.

That God purposes the existence of all events, sin not excepted, is a proposition which lies at the foundation of all true piety. We give it our most cordial assent. The only point at issue is, for what reason does he purpose the existence of moral evil? Here is Dr. Smith's difficulty,-a difficulty which he seems not to have mastered, even in his own estimation; for he inquires, "How can be who is perfect in benignity, be the author of evil? This is what perplexes the mind," etc.

Dr. Smith, as it will be seen by the quotations which we have given, assumes the point, that a world, with sin and its consequences, is happier than a world, of the same number and order of beings, created and kept holy and happy, to the extent of their capacities. He says:

When the Deity placed man in such circumstances, as he foreknew would be attended with the production and indulgence of evil passions, he at the same time perceived, that, under his direction, these passions would produce to mankind collectively, and to every individual particularly, a greater sum of happiness than could have existed without them.'

Dr. Smith's view is, not that God may overrule sin, when it has taken place, for good,-for greater good than would exist without any such interference; but, that he chooses it, prospectively as the necessary means of a good, "higher in kind and greater in degree" than could be, did universal holiness prevail. In this he agrees with those theologians who hold not only that God has rejected a holy universe, and chosen one of sin, but secured the sin that exists in it, by a direct divine efficiency. Discarding the idea of a direct

divine efficiency, and the doctrine of reprobation, as exhibiting the justice of God, Dr. S. maintains, as we have shown, the certainty of events, secured by a mediate objective causation of sin, equally efficient, as we must feel, and as dishonorable to God. He seemingly conceals the acts of the Deity behind the external objects of his creation. His scheme no more than that of a direct divine efficiency, exonerates God from the charge of being the designer and contriver of sin for a specific purpose.

With his ideas of justice and corrective punishment as before given, our author proceeds to argue, from analogy, that God will secure the final purity and happiness of all our race.

But we ask, is there evidence from the limited counteraction of evil in this life, such as warrants the belief, that it will not only be counteracted, but absolutely and universally extirpated in the world to come? Would not he, who should venture his salvation upon the best analogical argument which the facts in this case allow him, make a dangerous experiment of his immortality? Dr. Smith has inferred with much confidence, that there will be a final cessation of evil, from its very limited counteraction in the present world. He is satisfied with the principle conceded, that evil is overruled for good,-with even one instance, in which evil terminates in good. But is a hypothesis, leading to such broad results, to be reared on a few instances of sin overruled for less evil than it would have otherwise occasioned, and made the basis of a theological system? No wonder that in order to get over his difficulty, our author was obliged to force himself into the belief, that there was but little evil, compared with the good, in the world. Of natural, physical evil, this may be true, but not of moral.

Granting however, God's counteraction of evil in the world, to be far more extensive than it is, of what use would this admission be, but on the assumption that the world to come is a state of probation and not of retribution? Because God, in a world of probationary means and ends, is engaged in counteracting evil and reducing it even to the lowest limits possible to him, does it follow that he will do the same in a world of retribution? Does it hence follow, that he will wholly exterminate evil? What avails all the parade of reasoning on this subject, without the known certainty that the world to come is probationary? Just nothing at all. The mere possibility, that the world to come is one of retribution rather than of probation, destroys, without remedy, the whole force of the analogical argument on this subject.

Yet admitting, (what is by no means to be admitted,) that there should be a state or states of probation after death, and making the most of the benevolence and power of God in the work of man's moral renovation; again we ask, what facts are there to uphold a rational argument, for the extermination of all evil in the