i open to French ambition at the very same vices are committed generation after generation by individuals. Joseph assigned as his reason for dismantling the fortresses of Flanders, that they were "too expensive to be upheld, and that he could not rely on the fidelity of the Flemish garrisons after the contagion of the first French revolution had reached the Low Countries."* He in consequence dismantled them. Flanders was instantly overrun by France. Revolutionary energy was in consequence of that success converted into military passion, and every monarchy in Europe was successively overturned from the impetus thus communicated to French ambition, and the vantage-ground thus gained by French ability. With infinite difficulty, after a war of twenty years duration, and the expenditure of 800 millions, England regains the barrier, and perfect security to Europe is the consequence. A second French Revolution occurs, Belgium is again convulsed by the democratic fever, and Earl Grey again declares that they must be demolished, "because their maintenance is too expensive, and the fidelity of the Belgian garrisons is doubtful." The same statesman who had witnessed the march of Pichegru and Dumourier, throws open the gates of Flanders to Marshal Soult! Videte quam parva sapientiaregitur mundus. It won't do to say, that Prussia and Austria, who are more interest It is in vain to say, that these fortresses are too costly for Belgium, disunited from Holland. It is not the barrier of the Netherlands which was there constructed, but the barrier of Europe. If Belgium could not maintain the line alone, the burden should have been shared by the states who participated in the security which it afforded: England, Prussia and Austria, who contributed to its formation, for whose joint behoof it was constructed, should have contributed to its maintenance. If the Belgian troops could not be trusted, the imperial garrisons should have been charged with their defence. Belgium should have been made a part of the Germanic confederation. France should have been made to feel that if she invaded one village in the Need than we are in the preservation therlands, 300,000 armed men would voured. a It is most extraordinary to see how the same absurdities are committed age after age by nations, just as the of the barrier, have consented to its demolition. We can judge of consequences as well as the Austrians: the history of Eugene and Marlborough, of Pichegruand Wellington, is as familiar to us as to the statesmen on the continent. Because they have been guilty of an absurdity, is that any reason why we should be the same? because they repeat a former error, is that an excuse for our fall. ing into the same mistake? This is not the first occasion, on which the shortsighted or niggardly policy of those very powers has blinded them to the consequences of their actions, and brought unheard of disasters on Europe. Because the Emperor Francis renews the fatal policy of the Emperor Joseph, is that an excuse for our forgetting the conse Jomini, 1. 237. quences of the first disastrous act? Because Prussia, intent on the first Polish insurrection, withdrew in 1794 from the first contest with France, and, in consequence, suffered a power to grow up, which repaid its retirement by the battle of Jena and the treaty of Tilsit, is that any reason why, on the breaking out of a second Polish war, we should follow its bad example? Because Prussia looked on, with sullen apathy, while Austria and Russia fought the last battle of European freedom on the field of Austerlitz, is that a sufficient ground for our adopting a similar course? Because Austria refused to move when Prussia fearlessly advanced to Jena, or the balance of fate hung even between Alexander and Napoleon after the carnage of Eylaw, is that any excuse for our blindly attaching ourselves to the policy of such shortsighted poten tates? But, in truth, it is quite clear that England has been the prime mover in this enormous error, and that it is because England consented to the demolition of the fortresses, that Prussia and Austria deemed it unavailing to make any opposition. In truth, there is no state to which the maintenance of the barrier is of such importance as Great Britain, because there is none which is so immediately and vitally threatened by its demolition. Antwerp is far nearer London than it is either to Berlin or Vienna: the hatred at England more deeply rooted in France, than either that at Austria or Prussia. The immense importance attached by Napoleon to the possession of the Low Countries; the vast efforts which he made for the construction of a naval depot at Antwerp, proves what, in his estimation, was the point from whence the naval supremacy of England could be successfully assailed. It is never to be forgotten, that the only naval disasters of England proceeded from the Belgian shores; that it was Van Tromp who affixed a broom to his mast-head to sweep the Channel, when the English navy was crowding into its harbours; that it was from Dutch ports that the fleet issued which fired the English guardships in the Medway, and made the citizens of London tremble for their capital; and that, in the last war, no such worthy antagonists of English valour were to be found, as those which De Winter led from the Texel. A long and weary march awaits the French armies on the Rhine, before they reach the centre of Austrian or Prussian power; how many rivers to be passed-how many mountains crossed-how many armies encountered; but in twelve hours they may reach the coasts of Kent or Essex from Dunkirk or Ostend; and the same wind which confines the English fleet in their harbours, may waft to the centre of British greatness the concentrated armies of the half of Europe. When England sees the whole powers of Europe, from the Pyrenees to the Texel, arrayed in fierce hostility against this country; when, with diminished resources, probably without the strength derived from her colonial empire, she is driven to fight for her independence on the shores of Kent, or on the German ocean-then she will recollect what she owes to those who, at the same time that they deprived her of her internal strength and probably in the end her colonial possessions, by exciting the democratic passions of the people, demolished the barrier she had won by the triumph of Waterloo, and left the road open for the French battalions to resume their threatening position on the Dutch shores. But rapid as are the changes we have been contemplating, others still more appalling are in the hand of fate. Hardly was the mandate for the destruction of the Belgian fortresses issued from London, when new events succeed: the French are called in by Leopold I. to aid them in their contest with the Dutch: fifty thousand men have already crossed the frontier: before this they have probably passed the plain of Waterloo; and a British fleet is perhaps about to unite with the French army in wresting Antwerp from the House of Orange. We shall perhaps see the standard of England unite with the Eagles of France in combating its oldest allies; the plain of Waterloo may behold the English battalions, united with the French, crushing the Dutch and Prussian forces; and the tricolour flag, amidst the cannon of the French army and the British navy, re-hoisted on the walls of Antwerp. It is not time yet to enquire into the causes of these stupendous events the necessary papers have not yet been laid before the public, and the peculiar share which our government had in the transaction cannot with certainty be ascertained. We shall revert to the all-important subject, big with the future fate of England, in our next number; in the meantime certain points appear to be fixed in the long pending negotiation between Belgium and Holland, from which the general character of the transaction may be gathered. 1. When the Belgian revolution broke out, and the King of Holland, in consequence of the failure of the attack on Brussels, was unable to resume his authority over Belgium, the five great powers assumed to themselves the office of mediators and arbiters to settle the affairs of the Netherlands, and prevent their leading to a general war in Europe. The King of Holland was, by threats of instant war, forced to submit to their arbitration. In this proceeding there was, to say the least, a very violent stretch, and such powerful states should have been, in an especial manner, careful that they committed no injustice in the course of their forcible mediation. 2. The five powers recognised, it would appear, the right of the King of Holland to Limburg and Luxembourg, but they insisted on his accepting compensation for that part of his dominions. They could not have done otherwise, for Luxembourg is the hereditary property of the house of Nassau, and Limburg part of the old Seven United Provinces. The King of Holland has now refused to do so, in other words, he refused to accede to the partition of his admitted dominions. 3. The crown was given to Leopold, and the integrity of his territories, including Limburg and Luxembourg, guaranteed by the five powers before they knew whether or not the Dutch would agree to their cession to the Belgians. Leopold set off for Brussels while as yet the extent of his dominions was unfired, before the answer of the King of Holland to that project for dismembering his territories had been re ceived. 4. The Dutch, determined not to admit this partition of their territory, resolve to resist, and invade the Belrian dominions; Leopold invokes the aid of the French, and Soult gives orders to 50,000 men to follow the footsteps of Pichegru, amidst the acclamations of the populace, who foresee in this event the restoration of the Rhenish frontier, and the revival of the triumphs of the great nation. 5. What step England has taken, or is about to take in this coalition, for the partition of its oldest ally, or forwarding of the French standards to the Scheldt, is not yet apparent, but one thing is clear, that without being confident of the concurrence of the British Cabinet the French Government would never have ventured on such a step; and that if once they regain the Rhine, their arms, or, what is the same thing, their paramount influence, will never, but by another convulsion in Europe similar to that which occurred in 1814, be brought to recede from that menacing line. Thus a general war is threatened in Europe, for no other purpose but to dismember the kingdom of the Netherlands, which the five powers had guaranteed to their sovereign; and establish a revolutionary power, the outwork of France, on the Belgian plains. What right had the great powers to compel King William to part with Limburg or Luxembourg? What right had they to debar him from endeavouring to regain his dominion over the revolted inhabitants of Belgium? What right had they to declare that any act of hostility committed by him against the revolutionary forces of Belgium would be considered by them as a declaration of war against themselves? Evidently the same right which the parties to the partition of Poland had to effect the division of that unhappy kingdom-the right of the strongest, the title flowing from the possession of absolute and resistless power. Admitting that the guarantee which the great powers gave to the dominions of the King of the Netherlands did not call upon them to interfere in the disputes between him and his subjects, the question remains, did it authorize or justify them in debarring him from interfering; in permitting the revolted subjects to elect a new king, and declaring war against him because he attempts to preserve his kingdom from a farther partition at the command of the allied powers. Ireland revolts from England, and the British forces are repulsed in an attempt to regain possession of Dublin; immediately the four great powers declare that the contest must cease, and that they will consider any act of hostility committed by England against Ireland as a declaration of war against themselves. Overawed by so formidable a coalition, the English desist from hostilities; negotiations are conducted at Paris, and the high and resistless mediating powers insist that Ireland shall be separated from England, and that in addition the British government shall accept a compensation for Ireland and Scotland, which shall be annexed to the nascent Irish kingdom. Indignant at such atrocious proceedings, the English have recourse to arms to prevent the partition of their territory, and instantly the newly elected King of Ireland invokes the aid of the French government, and a hundred thousand men are immediately transported to Ireland to aid him in beating down the efforts of England. Divested of diplomatic phraseology, this is precisely the case which has now occurred in the Low Countries. We exclaim, and history will never cease to exclaim, against the partition of Poland; and our sympathies are strongly excited in favour of a gallant people struggling to preserve their national independence. But what will history say to the partition of the Netherlands, by the very sovereigns who had erected that kingdom, in violation of their solemn guarantee for its integrity? What shall we say to England permitting France to invade and crush its ancient allies the Dutch, because they were bravely struggling to regain those dominions which the honour of England was pledged to maintain for them? It won't do to wrap up this flagrant instance of allied oppression under the fine words that the Belgian question was complicated; that the peace of Europe was at stake; that Holland could not regain Belgium, or such diplomatic evasions. The question which posterity will ask is, What right had the allies to prevent King William from striving to regain his dominions? and what title had they to compel him to accept YOL. XXX, NO, CLXXXV. a compensation for an important territory, to which they admitted his right? Till a satisfactory answer is given to these questions, the voice of ages will class this usurpation with the partition of Poland; and history will record that, in betraying its oldest allies, and abandoning the trophies of Waterloo, England surrendered not only its public faith, but, in the end, its national independence. There was one occasion, and but one, in which, for a few years, the arms of England were united with those of France in an attack on the United Provinces. During the corrupt and disgraceful reign of Charles II., the Leopards of England and the Lilies of France, joined in a crusade against Dutch independence. The arbitrary government of Charles Coalesced with with the the despotic Ministers of Louis XIV. to break down that last hold of civil liberty. The ancestor of the present King William gloriously resisted the disgraceful union; and England expiated, by the triumphs of Marlborough, the foul blot on her national character. The events of the present time demonstrate, that there are passions as fatal to national interests, as blinding to the sense of national honour, as those which made the Ministers of Charles II. swerve from the policy of their ancestors, and that the passion for innovation may produce alliances as extraordinary, and lead to acts of usurpation as violent, as those which flow from the cabinets of Kings. In making these observations we disclaim imputing any improper or unworthy motives to Administration; we do not say they act from any motive unworthy of a British cabinet: what we say is, that the passion for innovation has blinded their judgment as well as that of a great part of our people. It is of no importance whether the Flemish fortresses are occupied by French or Belgian troops; whether the French have stipulated to retire after they have chastised the King of Holland, or have made no such agreement. In either view the effect will be the same; substantially and really, if not formally, French power and influence will be advanced to the Rhine, and the equilibrium of Europe destroyed. Belgium will be 2 K the outwork of France; the secondborn of the revolutionary monarchies will inseparably depend on its elder sister. Opposed in its infancy to Prussia, Austria, and Holland, it will depend for its existence on its alliance with France. England has contrived, by its unjust severity towards Holland, to throw Belgium, with all its magnificent fortresses and opulent territory, for ever into the arms of the ancient enemy of European freedom. Leopold I. will be to Louis Philip what Jerome, or the Rhenish Confederation, was to Napoleon, if his dominions are not swallowed up by that ambitious power. The resources, the wealth, the power of his kingdom, will be as effectually at the command of the cabinet of the Tuileries, as if it formed part of the soil of France. The time will come when the passions and illusions which have produced these extraordinary events will be no more. Interest and reason will at length restore the ancient divisions of France and England, whatever may be the government which ultimately obtains in both countries. The march of intellect will not alter these relations; Republican France will be as much an object of jealousy to Republican England, as ever was the ambition of Louis XIV. or the power of Napoleon. The time will come when the ruling power in France, by whatever name it is called, will direct the forces of that powerful state, then advanced to the Rhine, against this country; when the rivalry of five hundred years will be revived, and the never to be forgiven triumph of Waterloo avenged. Then will England feel the want of that firmally, which she would have found in the King of the Netherlands; then will she feel what it was to yield up Belgium to French domination; then will she discover what she has lost in the eyes of the world, what is her national security when the barrier of Marlborough and Wellington was abandoned. To support Poland against Russia, and the Netherlands against France, is the clear and obvious policy of all the other European powers. To prevent Russia from advancing to the Vistula, and France to the Rhine, is equally the part of a real friend to freedom. The establishment of either of these powers on these rivers is fatal to the independence of the intermediate states, and leaves only one field of conflict between equally despotic masters. The principles of justice are here clearly in unison with the dictates of policy; to do so is to support the weak against the e strong, and prevent national independence from being sacrificed at the shrine of military ambition. We have done the reverse of both; we have suffered Russia to bring, it is to be feared, irresistible forces to the Vistula, and ourselves aided in bringing the French standards to the Rhine! The first was perhaps beyond our power to prevent; the second was mainly owing to our instrumentality, and could not have occurred without our consent. The two most deplorable events to European freedom are taking place at the same time. Despotic power is crushing the efforts of independence in the east, while democratic ambition is commencing its career of tyrannic conquest in the west. Declining to stem the first, we actually support the last; and that at a time when the language of freedom is in every mouth, and the principles of justice are said to rule the regenerated empire of the country. We have no doubt that the French Government have pledged themselves to withdraw their troops after the independence of Belgium is secured: we have as little, that Louis Philip is at present sincere in that declaration, and that our Government have given faith to these assurances, and would not have sanctioned the march of the French troops on any other condition. All that does not in the least alter the nature of the case, or furnish any excuse for the great error which we have committed. Still the facts remain that the French armies are advanced to the Rhine; that Belgium is placed under their grasp; that it is made the outwork of the revolutionary system. The barrier of Europe is not only lost, but it is placed in the enemy's hands. Who can foresee that in the numerous chances of war likely to follow that event, an excuse will not remain for their permanently garrisoning their allies' fortresses? That a subsidiary force will not be stationed at Brussels, giving to the cabinet of Versailles the complete command of the Ne |