Whipping, among the antient Jews Women, Disorderly, how punished in China Writs ib. CRIMINAL OFFENCES, &c. &c. A ACCOMPLICES. CCOMPLICES ought not to suffer so severe a punishment as the immediate perpetrator of the crime; but this for a different reason. When a number of men unite to run a common risk, the greater the danger the more they endea vour to distribute it equally. Now, if the principals be punished more severely than the accessaries, it will prevent the danger from being equally divided and will increase the difficulty of finding a person to execute the crime, as his danger is greater by the difference of the punishment. There can be but one exception to this rule, and that is, when the principal receives a reward from the accomplices. In that case, as the difference of the danger is compensated, the punishment should be equal. These reflections may appear too refined to those who do not consider, that it is of great importance that the laws should leave the associates as few means as possible of agreeing among themselves. In some tribunals a pardon is offered to an accomplice in a great crime, if he discover his asssociates. This expedient has its advantages and disadvantages. The disadvantages are, that the law authorizes treachery, which is detested even by the villains them- themselves, and introduces crimes of cowardice, which are much more pernicious to a nation than crimes of courage. Courage is not common, and only wants a benevolent power to direct it to the public good. Cowardice, on the contrary, is a frequent, self-interested, and contagious evil, which can never be improved into a virtue. Besides, the tribunal which has recourse to this method betrays its fallibility, and the laws their weakness, by imploring the assistance of those by whom they are violated. The advantages are, that it prevents great crimes, the effects of which being public, and the perpetrators concealed, terrify the people. It also contributes to prove that he who violates the laws, which are public conventions, will also violate private compacts. It appears, that a general law, promising a reward to every accomplice, who discovers his ascociates, would be better than a special declaration in every particular case; because it would prevent a union of those villains, as it would inspire a mutual distrust, and each would be afraid of exposing himself alone to danger. The accomplice, however, should be pardoned, on condition of transportation. Beccaria. The laws of England very justly deem both accomplices and accessaries equally guilty: if a man be murdered in a riot all the rioters as well as the actual perpetrator of the crime are accounted murderers: royal mercy, however, is generally extended to such as may be thought less blameable. As no man according, to our excellent Constitution, can be convicted of a crime, except it can be proved; it has been found necessary, occasionally, to admit accomplices as evidence for the Crown. Such accomplices who voluntarily come forward for this this purpose and are admitted as such, always receive his Majesty's pardon to render them capable of becoming witnesses. As the characters of such witnesses, however, have been pollutted by their former connection with the prisoners against whom they are to appear, and from which stain no pardon can clear them, it remains for the jury seriously to consider within themselves what credit may be due to their declarations; and, whether or not such witnesses have not been greater rogues than the prisoners. In case of murder, the actual offender cannot be admitted as evidence for the crown: this, however, was overlooked in the case of Fitzgerald, in Ireland, who hired men to shoot another, to whom he owed a grudge (1787): the man who actually fired, as afterwards appeared, was the evidence admitted; consequently, Fitzgerald, though he richly deserved his fate, should not have suffered on such evidence. Offences of a hidden nature could never be brought to light, without the law had this recourse; therefore it is just, because expedient for the sake of justice, sometimes to pardon an accomplice. Editor. ACCUSATIONS, SECRET AND PUBLIC. Secret accusations are a manifest abuse, but consecrated by custom in many nations, where, from the weakness of the government, they are necessary. This custom makes men false and treacherous. Whoever suspects another to be an informer, beholds in him an enemy; and from thence mankind are accustomed to disguise their real sentiments; and, from the habit of concealing them from others, they at last even hide them from themselves. Unhappy are those who have arrived at this point! Without B 2 Without any certain and fixed principles to guide them, they fluctuate in the vast sea of opinion, and are busy only in escaping the monsters which surround them to those the present is always embitterred by the uncertainty of the future; deprived of the pleasures of tranquility and security, some fleeting moments of happiness, scattered thinly through their wretched lives, console them for the misery of existing. Shall we, among such men, find intrepid soldiers, to defend their king and Country? Among such men shall we find incorruptible magistrates, who, with the spirit of freedom and patriotic eloquence, will support and explain the true interest of their sovereign: who, with the tributes, offer up at the throne the love and blessing of the people, and thus bestow on the palaces of the great and the humble cottage peace and security, and to the industrious a prospect of bettering their lot, that useful ferment and vital principle of states. Who can defend himself from calumny, armed with that impenetrable shield of tyranny, secresy? What a miserable government must that be where the sovereign suspects an enemy in every subject, and, to secure the tranquility of the public, is obliged to sacrifice the repose of every individual! By what arguments is it pretended that secret accusations may be justified? The public safety, say they, and the security and maintenance of the established form of government. But what a strange constitution is that where the government, which hath in its favour not only power, but opinion, still more efficacious, yet fear its own subjects? The indemnity of the informer: Do not the laws defend him sufficiently? and are there subjects more powerful than the laws? The necessity of pro tecting |