Here, let us paufe awhile.-This curious, and inftructive, table, furnifhes important facts, which inculcate useful inftruction. Lord Kaims could. have calculated the amount of our commerce, at any given epoch in it, from the number of bankruptcies. And, indeed, it is apparent, that in the exact proportion, as our traffic increafed, from its infancy to manhood, the number of bankruptcies, at every period, bore a juft proportion to the amount of our trade, and the frequency of our commercial dealings. The traders continually adventured out upon the uncertain ocean of commerce, though they did not all return, with happy gales, and equal fuccefs, into port. And, the nation, which beheld the fhipwreck of their fortunes, grew rich from their enterprizes, while fhe pitied the unhappiness of their fate.

If this table be a faithful mirror of our commercial misfortunes, we may fee, that the commencement of Queen Anne's war did not greatly incommode our traders. The buftle, and bufinefs, of her hoftilities appear to have increased the number of bankrupts. The rebellion of 1715 feems to have made none. The South-fea year, 1720, appears to have involved our merchants in the burit of bubbles, though it was public, rather than private, credit, which was chiefly affected, during this unhappy year of projects. Our bankruptcies now regularly increased with the augmentation of our trade. The rebellion of 1745 overturned none of our commercial houfes. The war of 1756 feems to have

done

done a little more mischief, though that mischief feems to have decreafed, as hoftilities went on. The peace of 1763 augmented the number of bankruptcies, though the commercial diftreffes of that period feem to have been more in found, than in reality. With our traffic, and bufinefs, our bankruptcies continued to increase in number and magnitude. We perceive how many they were augmented, during 1772 and 1773, when our circulation was impeded, at a moment of uncommon profperity. We fee a fmaller number of bankruptcies, in 1781, when our trade was the most depreffed, during the American war, than in 1772, and 1773. The two moft profperous years, which this nation ever knew, were 1791, and 1792: yet, ftrange to behold, the number of our bankruptcies was larger than the amount of 1781, the most difaftrous year of the late war; fo different are the informations of fact from the deductions of theory.

We might learn from experience, that profperity generally leads on to adverfity, as the highest health is often the forerunner of the worft difeafes; the chills of ague, or the flames of calenture. We perceive, through the feveral months of 1791, and ftill more, in 1792, that there lurked, in our commercial habit, the predifpofing caufes of our commercial maladies, which broke out into fuch a paroxyfm, during 1793. Owing to causes, that the faculty have not explained, this influenza appears to have raged uncommonly in the month

of November 1792. Hiftory. will record the month of November 1792, as a memorable epoch, in our annals. It was peculiarly unfortunate to our traders. Yet, was it a month propitious to our conftitution. I was not inattentive, as you may fuppofe, to the paffages of that month. I knew that the violence of the republicans, and levellers, had by its action and reaction spread terror far and wide. I was acquainted with perfons, who feared the lofs of their lands, from the tumults of the Jacobins at Sheffield. I was acquainted with perfons, who fold their stock in the British funds, in order to inveft it, where they fuppofed it would be more fafe. I was acquainted with those, who difpofed, at an under value, of moveable property, which they imagined was most likely to be destroyed by innovation and tumult. Yet, whether those appre hensions produced any of the numerous bankruptcies of November 1792, I pretend not to know. I believe, that all terrors disappeared, when the parliament was called, the militia were embodied, and, above all, when the nation, with an overpowering voice, avowed her attachment to the conftitution, and promised her fupport of the laws. : Our domestic quiet was, by these means, scarcely fecured, when the French, after various threats, declared war against Great Britain, and Holland, on the first of February 1793. The unusual bankruptcies, in the month of January preceding, can hardly be attributed to this fubfequent measure. The first bankruptcy, which created fufpicion, from

The

its amount, was the failure of Donald and Burton, on the 15th of February 1793. I wished them fo well as to drop a tear, when I heard of their fall. They were engaged in the most uncertain of all traffic; in the trade of corn; in fpeculations on American corn: but, they had fuftained no lofs from the war. On Tuesday evening, the 19th of February, the Bank of England threw out the paper of Lane, Son, and Frafer, who had never - recovered the fhocks of the American war. Bank did them a damage, without an injury, as the lawyers would fay. The Bank was under no obligation to discount difcredited paper. And, next morning, the house of Lane, Son, and Frafer, stopt payment, to the amount of almoft a million of money. This great failure involved the fate of -feveral very fubftantial traders. But, none of those houfes had fuftained any damage from the war. Sufpicion was now carried up to alarm, and, every merchant, and every banker, who was concerned, in the circulation of negotiable paper, met with - unusual obstructions in their daily bufinefs. Yet, it was not till the 16th of March, that the long established house of Burton, Forbes, and Gregory, ftopt, which was followed, on the 18th, by the failure of their correfpondents, Caldwell and Company, of Liverpool, to the amount of nearly a million. Still, neither of these great circulators of paper had fuftained any lofs from the war. And, as fufpicion had been carried up to alarm, alarm was now magnified into panic.

In

In the midst of this terror, the whole city of London was frightened at the rule of three. It was an eafy calculation, by which it was demonftrated, that, if one house failed for a million, ten houses might fail for ten millions. In my time, I have known feveral calculators of great note impofe upon themselves, and the world, by working the rule of three, without taking in collateral circumstances. Neither these calculators, in their closets, nor those traders, in their counting-houses, ever reflected, that one bankrupt might pay five fhillings in the pound, a fecond ten fhillings, a third fifteen fhillings, a fourth twenty fhillings, and a fifth fiveand-twenty fhillings, in the pound. In fact, feveral bankers, during that panic terror, paused in their payments, who immediately went on as ufual with their business, and fome great traders, who were obliged to stop, foon paid twenty fhillings in the pound. Yet, all this while, we had not felt the ftroke of an enemy. In this manner, terror created diftruft, distrust impeded circulation, and an impeded circulation is the greatest misfortune, that can afflict a commercial nation.

"Impatience changeth fmoake to flame, but jealoufie to hell.”

Such, then, were the real caufes of our commercial diftreffes! And, fuch was the fad termination of seven years of the greateft profperity, both public, and private, which this nation had ever enjoyed! In the midft of this prosperity, a bank was erected, in every market-town, I was going to fay, in every village. The vaft bufinefs in the d 2

country