INTRODUCTION.

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O those who love learning and mankind, and who are more ambitious to distinguish themselves as men, than as difputants, it is matter of humiliation and regret, that names and things have fo oft been mistaken for each other; that fo much of the philofopher's time must be employed in ascertaining the fignification of words; and that fo many doctrines, of high renown, and of ancient date, when traced to their firft principles, have been found to arife from verbal ambiguity. If I have any knowledge of my own heart, or of the fubject I intend to examine, I may venture to affure the reader, that it is no part of the defign of this book, to encourage verbal difputation. On the contrary, it is my fincere purpose to avoid, and to do every thing in my power to check it; convinced as I am, that it never can do any good, and that it has been the cause of much evil, both in philofophy and in common life. And I hope I have a fairer chance to escape it, than fome who have gone before me in this part of fcience. I aim at no paradoxes; my prejudices (if certain inftinctive fuggestions of the understanding may be fo called) A 2

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are all in favour of truth, virtue, and Christianity; and I have no principles to fupport, but fuch as feem to me to have influenced the judgement of the rationaf of mankind in all ages of the world.

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Some readers may think, that there is but little merit in this declaration; it being as much for my own credit, as for the intereft of mankind, that I guard against a practice, which is acknowledged to be always unprofitable, and generally pernicious. A verbal difputant! what claim can he have to the title of Philofopher! what has he to do with. the laws of nature, with the obfervation of facts, with life and manners! Let him not intrude upon the company of men of science; but repofe, with his brethren Aquinas and Suares, in the corner of fome Gothic cloifter, dark as his understanding, and cold as his heart. Men are now become too wife to be amufed with words, and too firm-minded to be confuted with quibbles. Many of my contemporaries would join in this apoftrophe, who yet are themfelves the dupes of the most egregious dealers in logomachy that ever perverted the faculty of speech. In fact, from fome inftances that have occurred to my own obfervation, I have reafon to believe, that verbal controverfy has not always, even in this age, been accounted a contemptible thing: and the reader, when he comes to be better acquainted with my fentiments, will perhaps think the foregoing declaration

declaration more difinterefted than at first fight it may appear.

They who form opinions concerning the manners and principles of the times, may be divided into three claffes. Some will tell us, that the present age tranfcends all that have gone before it, in politenefs, learning, and good fenfe; will thank Providence (or their ftars) that their lot of life has been caft in fo glorious a period; and wonder how men could fupport existence amidst the ignorance and barbarifm of former days. By others we are accounted a generation of triflers and profligates; fciolifts in learning, hypocrites in virtue, and formalifts in good-breeding; wife only when we follow the ancients, and foolish whenever we deviate from them. Sentiments fo violent are generally wrong: and therefore I am difpofed to adopt the notions of those who may be confidered as forming an intermediate clafs; who, though not blind to the follies, are yet willing to acknowledge the virtues, both of paft ages, and of the prefent. And furely, in every age, and in every man, there is fomething to praise, as well as fomething to blame.

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When I furvey the philofophy of the prefent age, I find much matter of applause and admiration. Mathematics, Natural Philofophy, and Natural History, in all their branches, have rifen to a pitch of perfection, that does fignal honour to human capacity, and far furpaffes what the most fanguine projectors

projectors of former times had any reafon to look for and the paths to further improvement in thofe fciences are fo clearly marked out, that nothing but honefty and attention feems requifite to enfure the fuccefs of future adventurers. Moral Philofophy and Logic have not been fo fortunate. Yet, even here, we have happily got rid of much pedantry and jargon; our fyftems have more the appearance of liberal fentiments, good taste, and correct compofition, than those of the schoolmen; we disclaim (at least in words) all attachment to hypothesis and party; profefs to study men and things, as well as books and words; and affert, with the utmost vehemence of proteftation, our love of truth, of candour, and of found philofophy. But let us not be deceived by appearances. Neither Moral Philofophy, nor the kindred fciences of Logic and Criticifm, are at prefent upon the most desirable footing. The rage of paradox and fyftem has transformed thefe, which of all fciences ought to be the fimpleft and the cleareft, into a mass of confufion, darkness, and abfurdity. One kind of jargon is laid afide; but another has been adopted, more fafhionable indeed, but not lefs frivolous. Hypothefis, though verbally difclaimed, is really adhered to with as much obftinacy as ever. Words have been defined; but their meaning ftill remains indefinite. Appeals have been made to experience; but with fuch mifreprefentation of

fact,

fact, and in fuch equivocal language, as plainly fhow the authors to have been more concerned for their theory, than for the truth. All fciences, and especially Moral Philofophy, ought to regulate human practice: practice is regulated by principles, and all principles fuppofe conviction: yet the aim of fome of our celebrated moral fystems is, to divest the mind of every principle, and of all conviction; and, confequently, to difqualify man for action, and to render him ufelefs, and wretched. In a word, SCEPTICISM is now the profeffion of our fashionable inquirers into human nature; a fcepticism that is not confined to points of mere fpeculation, but has been extended to practical truths of the highest importance, even to those of morality and religion.

I faid, that my prejudices are all in favour of truth and virtue. To avow any fort of prejudice, may perhaps ftartle fome readers. If it fhould, I must here intreat all fuch to pause a moment, and ask of their own hearts these simple questions. —Are virtue and truth useful to mankind ? Are they matters of indifference? Or are they pernicious? - If any one finds himself difpofed to think them pernicious, or matters of indifference, I would advise him to lay my book afide; for it does not contain one fentiment in which he can be interested; nor one expreffion with which he can be pleased. But he who believes that virtue and truth are of

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