and, which is ftill more difficult, to believe whatever it cannot confute: but this apology may be perfectly confiftent with fincerity and candour; and with that principle of which Pope fays, that "though no fcience it is fairly worth the feven. Thus far I have endeavoured to distinguish those two powers of our rational nature, to which I give the names Reafon and Common Senfe. Their connection and mutual dependence, and the extent of their respective jurifdictions, I now proceed more particularly to investigate. I ought perhaps to make an apology for these, and fome other metaphorical expreffions. And indeed it were to be wifhed, that in all matters of fcience, they could be laid afide; for the indifcreet ufe of metaphor has done great harm, by leading philofophers to mistake verbal analogies for real ones; and often, too, by giving plaufibility to nonfenfe, as well as by difguifing very plain doctrines with an affected pomp of high-founding words and gaudy images. But in the philofophy of the human mind, it is impoffible to keep clear of metaphor; because we cannot fpeak intelligibly of immaterial things, without continual allufions to matter, and its qualities. All I need to fay further on this head is, that I mean not by these metaphors to impofe upon the reader; and that I fhall do my utmost to prevent their impofing upon myself. It is ftrange to obferve, with what reluctance luctance fome people acknowledge the power of inftinct. That man is governed by reafon, and the brutes by inftinct, is a favourite topic with certain philofophers; who, like other froward children, spurn the hand that leads them; and defire, above all things, to be left at their own difpofal. Were this boast founded on truth, it might be fuppofed to mean little more, than that man is governed by himself, and the brutes by their Maker *. But, luckily for man, it is not founded in truth, but in ignorance and inattention. Our instincts, as well as our rational powers, are far fuperior, both in number and dignity, to those which the brutes enjoy; and it were well for us, on many occafions, if we laid our systems afide, and were more attentive to these impulfes of nature wherein reafon has no part. Far be it from me to fpeak with disrespect of any of the gifts of God; every work of his is good; but the best things, when abused, may become pernicious. Reafon is a noble faculty, and, when kept within its proper fphere, and applied to useful purposes, proves a means of exalting human creatures almoft to the rank of fuperior beings. But this faculty has been much perverted, often to vile, and often to infignificant purposes; fometimes chained * And Reafon raife o'er Inftinct as you can, Pope's Efay on Man, Ep. 3. ver. 99. like a flave or malefactor, and fometimes foaring in forbidden and unknown regions. No wonder, then, if it has been frequently made the inftrument of feducing and bewildering mankind, and of rendering philofophy contemptible. In the science of body, glorious discoveries have been made by a right ufe of reason. When men are once fatisfied to take things as they find them; when they believe Nature upon her bare declaration, without fufpecting her of any defign to impose upon them; when their utmost ambition is to be her fervants and interpreters; then, and not till then, will philofophy profper. But of those who have applied themselves to the fcience of human nature, it may truly be faid, (of many of them at least), that too much reafoning hath made them mad. Nature fpeaks to us by our external, as well as by our internal, fenfes; it is ftrange, that we fhould believe her in the one cafe, and not in the other; it is most strange, that fuppofing her fallacious, we fhould think ourfelves capable of detecting the cheat. Common fenfe tells me, that the ground on which I stand is hard, material, and folid, and has a real, feparate, independent existence. BERKELEY and HUME tell me, that I am imposed upon in this matter: for that the ground under my feet is really an idea in my mind; that its very effence confifts in being perceived; and that the fame inftant it ceases to be perceived, it must also cease to exist in a word, that to be, and to be perceived, when predicated of the ground, the fun, the starry heavens, or any corporeal object, fignify precifely the fame thing. Now, if my common fenfe be mistaken, who fhall afcertain and correct the mistake? Our reafon, it is faid. Are then the inferences of reafon in this inftance clearer, and more decifive, than the dictates of common fenfe? By no means I ftill truft to my common fenfe as before; and I feel that I must do so. But fuppofing the inferences of the one faculty as clear and decifive as the dictates of the other; yet who will affure me, that my reafon is lefs liable to mistake than my common fenfe? And if reason "be mistaken, what shall we fay? Is this mistake to be rectified by a fecond reasoning, as liable to mistake as the first? In a word, we must deny the diftinction between truth and falfehood, adopt univerfal fcepticifin, and wander without end from one maze of uncertainty to another; a ftate of mind fo miferable, that Milton makes it one of the torments of the damned; else we must suppose, that one of these faculties is of higher authority than the other; and that either reafon ought to fubmit to common sense, or common fense to reafon, whenever a variance happens between them : — in other words, that no doctrine ought to be admitted as true that exceeds belief, and contradicts a first principle. or It that It has been faid, that every inquiry in philofophy ought to begin with doubt;nothing is to be taken for granted, and nothing believed, without proof. If this be admitted, it must also be admitted, that reafon is the ultimate judge of truth, to which common sense must continually act in fubordination. But this I cannot admit; because I am able to prove the contrary by incontestable evidence. I am able to prove, that " except we believe many things without proof, we never can believe any thing all; for "that all found reafoning muft ultimately "reft on the principles of common sense; "that is, on principles intuitively certain, or intuitively probable; and, confequently, that common fenfe is the ultimate judge of truth, to which reafon must continually act in fubordination.” This I mean to prove by a fair induction of particulars. 66 CHA P. II. All reafoning terminates in first principles. All evidence ultimately intuitive. the Standard of Truth to Man. IN Common Senfe N this induction, we cannot comprehend all forts of evidence, and modes of reafoning; but we fhall endeavour to invefti gate |