which gives dignity, uniformity, and spirit, to human conduct, and without which our happiness can neither be lasting nor fincere. It conftitutes, as it were, the vital ftamina of a great and manly character whereas fcepticifm betrays a fickly understanding, and a levity of mind, from which nothing can be expected but inconsistence and folly. In conjunction with ill-nature, bad tafte, and a hard heart, fteadiness and strong conviction will doubtlefs make a bad man, and fcepticifm will make a worfe: but good-nature, elegant taste, and fenfibility of heart, when united with firmnefs of mind, become doubly refpectable; whereas no man can act on the principles of fcepticifm, without incurring univerfal contempt.

But to return :

Mathematicians, and natural philofophers, do in effect admit the diftinction between common fenfe and reafon, as illuftrated above; for they are content to reft their sciences either on felf-evident axioms, or on experiments warranted by the evidence of external fenfe. The philofophers who treat of the mind, do alfo fometimes profefs to found their doctrines on the evidence of fense: but this profeffion is merely verbal; for whenever experience contradicts the system, they queftion the authenticity of that experience, and fhow you, by a most elaborate investigation, that it is all a cheat. For it is eafy to write plaufibly on any fubject, and in vindication of any doctrine, when either the

2

indolence

indolence of the reader, or the nature of the compofition, gives the writer an opportunity to avail himself of the ambiguity of language. It is not often that men attend to the operations of the mind; and when they do, it is perhaps with fome metaphyfical book in their hands, which they read with a refolution to admire or defpife, according as the fashion or their humour directs them. In this fituation, or even when they are difpofed to judge impartially of the writer, their attention to what paffes in their own mind is but fuperficial, and is very apt to be fwayed by a fecret bias in favour of fome theory. And then, it is fometimes difficult to diftinguish between a natural feeling and a prejudice of education; and our deference to the opinion of a favourite author, makes us think it more difficult than it really is, and often leads us to mistake the one for the other. Nay, the very act of studying difcompofes our minds a little, and prevents that free play of the faculties from which alone we can judge with accuracy of their real nature. Befides, language, being originally intended to answer the obvious exigencies of life, and exprefs the qualities of matter, becomes metaphorical when applied to the operations of mind. Thus we talk metaphorically, when we speak of a warm imagination, a found judgement, a tenacious memory, an enlarged understanding; thefe epithets being originally and properly expreflive of material VOL. I. qualities.

R

qualities. This circumftance, however obvious, is not always attended to; and hence we are apt to mistake verbal analogies for real ones, and to apply the laws of matter to the operations of mind; and thus, by the mere delufion of words, are led into error before we are aware, and while our premises seem to be altogether unexceptionable. It is a favourite maxim with LOCKE, as it was with fome ancient philofophers, that the human foul, previous to education, is like a piece of white paper, or tabula rafa; and this fimile, harmless as it may appear, betrays our great modern into feveral important mistakes. It is indeed one of the most unlucky allusions that could have been chofen. The human foul, when it begins to think, is not extended, nor of a white colour, nor incapable of energy, nor wholly unfurnifhed with ideas, (for, if it think at all, it must have some ideas, according to LOCKE's definition of the word *), nor as fufceptible of any one impreffion or character as of any other.- Even when the terms we ufe are not metaphorical, the natural abstrufeness of the fubject makes them appear fomewhat mysterious; and we are apt to confider them as of more fignifi

The word idea ferves beft to ftand for whatfoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks.— I have used it to exprefs whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking.

Introduction to Effay on Human Understanding, fect. 8.

I

cancy

Had Mr HUME

cancy than they really are. told the world in plain terms, that virtue is a fpecies of vice, darkness a fort of light, and existence a kind of non-existence, I know not what metaphyficians might have thought of the discovery; but fure I am, no reader of tolerable understanding would have paid him any compliments upon it *. But when he fays, that contrariety is a mixture of caufation and refemblance; and, ftill more, when he brings a formal proof of this most fage remark, he impofes on us by the folem

Mr HU ME had faid, that the only principles of connection among ideas are three, to wit, refemblance, contiguity in time or place, and caufe or effect; Inquiry concerning Human Understanding, fect. 3. It afterwards occurred to him, that contrary ideas have a tendency to introduce one another into the mind. But instead of adding contrariety to the lift of connecting principles, which he ought to have done, and which would have been philofophical, he affumes the metaphyfician, and endeavours to prove his enumeration right, by refolving contrariety, as a fpecies, into refemblance and caufation, as genera. "Contrast, or contrariety," fays he," is a "connection among ideas, which may perhaps be confi"dered as a mixture of caufation and refemblance. "Where two objects are contrary, the one destroys the "other, i. e. is the cause of its annihilation; and the "idea of the annihilation of an object implies the idea "of its former exiftence." Is it poffible to make any fense of this? Darkness and light are contrary; the one deftroys the other, or is the caufe of its annihilation; and the idea of the annihilation of darknefs implies the idea of its former exiftence. This is given as a proof, that darkness partly refembles light, and partly is the caufe of light. Indeed! But, Ŏ fi fic omnia dixiffet! This is a harmless abfurdity.

nity of the expreffion; we conclude, that more is meant than meets the ear;" and begin to fancy, not that the author is abfurd or unintelligible, but that we have not fagacity enough to discover his meaning. It were tedious to reckon up one half of the improprieties and errors which have been introduced into the philofophy of human nature, by the indefinite application of the words, idea, impreffion, perception, fenfation, &c. Nay, it is well known, that BERKELEY'S pretended proof of the non-existence of matter, at which common fenfe ftood aghaft for many years, has no better foundation, than the ambiguous ufe of a word. He who confiders these things, will not be much difpofed to overvalue metaphyfical truth, (as it is called), when it happens to contradict any of the natural fentiments of mankind.

In the laws of nature, when thoroughly understood, there appear no contradictions: it is only in the fyftems of philofophers that reafon and common fenfe are at variance. No man of common fenfe ever did or could believe, that the horse he faw coming toward him at full gallop, was an idea in his mind, and nothing elfe; no thief was ever fuch a fool as to plead in his own defence, that his crime was neceffary and unavoidable, for that man is born to pick pockets as the fparks fly upward. When Reafon invades the rights of Common Senfe, and prefumes to arraign that authority by which she herself acts,