the highest importance, that in them is laid the foundation of human happiness, and that them depends the very existence of human ociety, and of human creatures, that per on and I are of the fame mind; I have no prejudices that he would wish me not to have: he may proceed; and I hope he will proceed with pleasure, and encourage, by his approbation, this honeft attempt to vindicate truth and virtue; and to overturn that pretended philofophy, which fuppofes, or which may lead us to fuppofe, every dictate of confcience, every impulfe of underftanding, and every information of fenfe, questionable and doubtful. This fceptical philofophy (as it is called) seems to me to be dangerous, not because it is ingenious, but because it is fubtle and obfcure. Were it rightly understood, no confutation would be neceffary; for it does, in fact, confute itself, as I hope to demonftrate, But many, to my certain knowledge, have read it, and admitted its tenets, who do not understand the grounds of them; and many more, fwayed by the fashion of the times, have greedily adopted its conclufions, without any knowledge of the premises, or any concern about them. An attempt therefore to expofe this pretended philofophy to public view, in its proper colours, will not, I hope, be cenfured as impertinent by any whofe opinion I value: if it fhould, I fhall be fatisfied with the approbation of my own confcience, 2 fcience, which will never reproach me for intending to do good. I am forry, that in the course of this inquiry, it will not always be in my power to fpeak of fome celebrated names with that deference, to which fuperior talents, and fuperior virtue, are always intitled. Every friend to civil and religious liberty, every lover of mankind, every admirer of fincerity and fimple manners, every heart that warms at the recollection of diftinguished virtue, must confider LOCKE as one of the most amiable, and most illuftrious men, that ever our nation produced. Such he is, fuch he ever will be, in my eftimation. The parts of his philofophy to which truth obliges me to object, are but few, and, compared with the extent and importance of his other writings, extremely inconfiderable, I object to them, because I think them erroneous and dangerous; and I am convinced, that their author, if he had lived to fee the inferences that have been drawn from them, would have been the first to declare them abfurd, and would have expunged them from his. works with indignation. BERKELEY was equally amiable in his life, and equally a friend to truth and virtue, In elegance of compofition he was perhaps fuperior. I admire his virtues: I can never fufficiently applaud his zeal in the cause of religion: but fome of his reasonings on the subject of human nature I cannot admit, without renounVOL. I. cing B cing my claim to rationality.-There is a writer now alive, of whofe philofophy I have much to fay. By his philofophy, I mean the fentiments he has published in a book called, A Treatife of Human Nature, in three volumes, printed in the year 1739; the principal doctrines of which he has fince republished again and again, under the title of, Effays Moral and Political, &c. Of his other works I fay nothing; nor have I at present any concern with them. Virgil is faid to have been a bad profe-writer; Cicero was certainly a bad poet and this author, though his philofophy of human nature be in many things exceedingly reprehenfible, may yet be a profound politician, and a learned, elegant, and accurate historian. His high merit in these characters is indeed generally allowed: and if my fuffrage could add any thing to the luftre of his reputation, I fhould here, with great fincerity and pleasure, join my voice to that of the public, and make fuch an encomium on the author of the Hiftory of England as would not offend any of his rational admirers. But why is this author's character fo replete with inconfiftency! why should his principles and his talents extort at once our efteem and deteftation, our applause and contempt! That he, whofe manners in private life are faid to be fo agreeable, fhould yet, in the public capacity of an author, have given fo much cause of just offence to all the friends of virtue and mankind, is to me matter of aftonishment aftonishment and forrow, as well as of indignation. That he, who fucceeds fo well in defcribing the fates of nations, fhould yet have failed fo egregiously in explaining the operations of the mind, is one of thofe incongruities in human genius, for which perhaps philosophy will never be able fully to account. That he, who has fo impartially ftated the oppofite pleas and principles of our political factions, fhould yet have adopted the most illiberal prejudices against natural and revealed religion: that he, who on many occafions has difplayed a profound erudition, fhould fometimes, when intoxicated. with a favourite theory, have suffered affirmations to escape him, which men of no great learning might perceive to be ill founded: and, finally, that a moral philofopher, who seems to have exerted his utmost ingenuity in searching after paradoxes, fhould yet happen to light on none but fuch as are on the fide of licentioufnefs and fcepticism: these are inconfiftencies equally inexplicable. And yet, that this author is chargeable with all these inconfiftencies, will not, I think, be denied by any person of sense and candour, who has read his writings with attention. His philofophy has done great harm. Its admirers, I know, are numerous; but I have not as yet met with one perfon, who both admired and understood it. We are prone to believe what we wish to be true: and most of this author's philofophical tenets are - fo well adapted to what I fear I may call the fashionable notions of the times, that those who are ambitious to conform to the latter, will hardly be difpofed to examine fcrupuloufly the evidence of the former. - Having made this declaration, which I do in the fpirit of an honeft man, I must take the liberty to treat this author with that plainness, which the cause of truth, and the interefts of fociety, feem to me to require. The fame candour that prompts me to praise, will also oblige me to blame. The inconfiftency is not in me, but in him. Had I done but half as much as he, in labouring to fubvert principles which ought ever to be held facred, I know not whether the friends of truth would have granted me any indulgence; I am fure they ought not. If it shall be acknowledged by the candid and intelligent reader, that I have in this book contributed fomething to the establishment of old truths, I fhall not be much offended, though others fhould pretend to dif cover, that I have advanced nothing new. Indeed I would not wish to say any thing on thefe fubjects, that has not often occurred to the rational part of mankind. In Logic and Ethics, we may have new treatises, and new theories; but we are not now to expect new difcoveries. The principles of moral duty have long been understood in thefe enlightened parts of the world; and mankind, in the time that is paft, have had more truth under |