ART. VI.

PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND.

BY LEONARD WOODS, D. D.

NUMBER III.

THE language sometimes used in books and in common discourse implies, that man is entirely under the control of his will; that his volitions guide and regulate all his bodily and mental powers. According to this representation, the will possesses the chief attribute of a despot, and man is very much in the condition of a slave. Be it so, that the master that governs him is his own will. If the power of that will is absolute, and subject to no limitation or check from truth or reason, who can be sure that it will not exercise as severe and merciless a despotism over him, as any power extraneous to his mind? And would not any man think it a less calamity to be subject to an absolute despotism that is distant, than to one that is always near; to a despotism without, than to one that is within?

Instead, however, of enlarging upon this point, I shall make it my object for the present, to ascertain what is the fact respecting the power of the will, in regard both to the body and the mind. The office of the will must be considered an important subject in the theory of mental philosophy; it is important too in a practical view. For if any one attributes to his will an agency, either more or less extensive than actually belongs to it, he will be liable to hurtful mistakes in the regulation of his own mind and conduct.

But how is the kind and extent of power belonging to the will to be determined? Clearly, by an appeal to our own experience and consciousness. No hypothetical or a priori reasoning can be relied upon. We ought never to inquire what power we should suppose the will would have, or what power it must have, in order to make man a responsible agent. Any such inquiry might lead us to conclusions materially at variance with the truth. Our whole inquiry is, what do we learn from consciousness and experience? Accordingly, every man is qualified to investigate the subject under consideration as far as his own experience extends.

There may be questions relative to the power of the will, on which a person of little experience, or one who has not been duly attentive to the operations of his own mind, will not have the means of forming a correct judgment; as a man having only a partial acquaintance with the phenomena of magnetism or electricity, is incompetent to judge respecting the operations of the magnetic or the electrical power, in any cases which have not fallen under his notice, and if he should attempt to judge, he would in all probability mistake. Suppose now a question arises respecting the power of the will in cases in which I have had no experience, or in which I have neglected to learn the proper lessons of experience. Here I am an incompetent judge; and if I would form a just opinion, I must avail myself of the requisite knowledge of facts by referring to the experience of others. This view of the subject is of special importance, and is suited to check the overweening confidence of some who have had but a very limited experience, and have withal been too little observant of the operations of their own minds.

I will endeavour to remember these remarks myself; and though I must of necessity proceed in this discussion primarily on the ground of my own experience and consciousness, I will readily admit, even at the age of threescore years, that my experience and consciousness may, in some things, be defective. The voluntary power belonging to me may not have been so perfectly developed, as in some others; or if it has been, I may have failed to notice its developments so carefully, or to recollect them so exactly, as others. And it may, perhaps, be suitable for every man to admit also, that the faculty of will, as found in him, may have less original power, and less acquired expertness, than in others, so that no one may be able to come to a right conclusion on every part of mental science, without availing himself of the experience and consciousness of his fellow-men. This is the case, we well know, in all parts of physical science. How long and attentively soever, any man may have observed the course of events in the natural world; he will find himself, in many cases, totally unable to judge from his own personal knowledge, what the laws of nature are, and so will be obliged to supply the defects of his own experience by the experience of others. In the study of natural science, men do this constantly and freely, and why is it

not the dictate of modesty, and of wisdom too, that something like this should be done in relation to our present subject? If the facts which have occurred in our experience, are not sufficient to teach us the whole extent of power belonging to the will, why should we not gladly avail ourselves of any well attested facts, which have occurred in the experience of others? If by diligent, persevering exertion, any of our fellow-men have obtained a more perfect control over their thoughts, feelings, and actions, than we have, would it not be manifestly unjust for us to deny, that the will may attain to a higher degree of power than it has attained to in us? Why might we not as well say, that the understanding is not capable of being enlarged beyond the narrow limits to which ours has attained?

It will be kept in mind, that I use the words will and volition in the restricted and exact sense in which they are used by Locke, Reid, Abercrombie and others. Volition, according to Locke, "is an act of the mind exerting that dominion which it takes itself to have over any part of the man, by employing it in, or withholding it from any particular action." Or more briefly, according to Reid, "it is the determination of the mind to do, or not do, something which we conceive to be in our power." This determination relates to a variety of mental, as well as bodily action.

I shall now pursue the inquiry, what power belongs to the will? I begin by saying negatively, the will has no power to alter the laws of nature, either in the material or spiritual world. For example, gravitation is an established law of all material bodies, and we have no power by our volitions to set aside or modify this law, or to direct or vary any events which stand related to it, except by availing ourselves of its influence. What man in his senses ever attempts to do this? Again, it is a law of nature that vegetables spring up and grow from seeds, under the influence of heat and moisture, and that animal life is sustained by food, and destroyed by continued abstinence, or by poison; and who has power, by an act of the will, to make it otherwise? I give these as examples. The same is true as to the laws of the spiritual world. It is a law of the mind, that the ideas of sensible objects are first excited by having those objects presented to the senses; that knowledge, in the higher sense, is acquired by study; that the regular action of mind requires a sound state of the brain, &c. Now we have no

power, by an act of the will, to alter these laws of the mind, or to produce any mental action, except in conformity with them. Again, it is found to be a law of the mind, that the affections are excited in view of suitable objects, and that the influence of external objects is according to the character and state of the mind. And who has power to make it otherwise? What man of sense will ever attempt to interfere with those settled laws? If through ignorance we should think we could move our hearts to love or hate by the mere force of volition, without having a suitable object before us, or if we should think that, with an object in view, we could, by a volition, excite any affections in ourselves, except in accordance with the character and state of our minds, we should soon be convinced of our mistake.

These remarks are made merely to illustrate the position, that we have no power, by a volition, to contravene the laws of nature, whether as to matter or mind, and no power to accomplish any thing, except in accordance with those laws. The whole range of our voluntary agency is confined within these limits.

This brings me to the business of showing, positively, what is the power or influence which belongs to the will; or more properly what power we ourselves have by the acts of our will. This may be briefly described thus. By availing ourselves of the laws of nature, we can voluntarily produce an endless variety of effects. For example, we have power in this way to secure a harvest, to promote bodily health, to cure diseases, to improve our intellectual and moral faculties, and obtain the advantages and comforts of life. Our voluntary power extends to these bounds, and no farther.

It evidently follows, that the greatest extent of voluntary power requires a complete knowledge of the laws of nature. "Knowledge is power" only as it enables us to avail ourselves of these laws. If we are ignorant of them, how can we, by a volition, turn them to any useful purpose? Without a knowledge of the laws which regulate events in the physical and moral world, we are utterly unqualified to act our part as intelligent, accountable beings; unqualified in every respect for the proper exercise of our faculties. Without a good degree of this knowledge, all our efforts would be made at random, and the result would be altogether uncertain, and so the motives to exertion would be inefficacious.

Our voluntary power, considered in this light, manifestly admits of an almost unlimited increase. Take the power we have, by an act of the will, to direct our attention to one thing or another, and to fix and detain our thoughts on any particular subject. We are conscious of possessing this power now in a certain degree. But we may not be aware to what a vastly higher degree it is capable of being increased by suitable exertion. The power possessed by such men as Newton, Locke, and Edwards, to confine their attention steadily, and for a long time, to a particular subject, and to exclude all thoughts pertaining to other subjects, was acquired by diligent and continued efforts. Other men may acquire the same. And if a man had his mind raised to the highest improvement of which it is susceptible, he would possess this power in such perfection, that he could, without difficulty, fix his thoughts on any subject he might choose, with the utmost intenseness, uninterruptedly, and for such length of time as the case should require. The voluntary control which we commonly possess over our thoughts— what is it, compared with that to which we might attain? No man, however conscious of present inability thus to command his thoughts, has any right to conclude that his inability cannot be effectually removed by the diligent, persevering discipline of his own mind. It is the same here, as in regard to the voluntary control which a man, by long use, acquires over his bodily motions. In infancy, near the beginning of life, a power to move some of the members of the body by an act of the will is developed. But this power admits of an indefinite increase. No one, however great the activity and adroitness which he has acquired, can say, that he has raised his voluntary power to its highest possible limits.

And yet it is a law of our nature, and doubtless a wise and benevolent one, that this voluntary power should be extended over a part only, and that a small part, of our bodily organs. Our sensations are, in themselves, all involuntary. When the proper objects are presented, the sensations follow without any act of the will. Indeed the will has no power to prevent them. The action of the heart, of the blood, and of the digestive organ is also involuntary. The continued life and growth and health of the body, instead of being under the control of volition, result from their appropriate