such liability would import, that he was in a measure dependent for his enjoyment on the unmanageable caprices of his own creatures; in other words, that the omnipotent.God was lying, in some sense, at the mercy of worms of the dust. He whose resources are infinite, made beings, in full foresight of the fact, that they would harrass and disquiet him! This hypothesis exhibits him tossed hither and thither, by conflicting feelings and purposes, like a benevolent earthly monarch, who, grieved by the rebellion of his subjects, exerts himself to the utmost and in vain, to reduce them to submission. Is such, then, the wretched condition of that great Being, concerning whom the Scriptures and enlightened reason concur in affirming, that He doeth his pleasure in the armies of Heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth? Immutability is a peculiar and incommunicable attribute of God. "The Father of lights, with whom is no variableness (rapaλayn, change, mutation), neither shadow (arooxiaopa, the smallest trace) of turning." God is sometimes said to repent, to represent the change in his treatment of creatures, according to the change of conduct in them. The expression imports, that he does not do in these instances, what, from his words or conduct, had seemed to us to be his purpose. In this sense, he repented that he had made man, and that he had threatened evil against the Ninevites. Is it to be supposed then, that he violated his word? He did nothing, save what was implied, on condition of the occurrence of the given circumstances, in the original language of his commands, prohibitions or threatenings. Did he alter, in any respect, the plan which had before existed in his mind? His change of conduct, instead of being the result of fickleness, or of new perceptions, sprang necessarily from the unchangeableness of his nature, and of the principles of government, which he established from the beginning. When reference is had to his natural attributes, or the character of his moral feelings, or his purposes, it is constantly declared in the Scriptures, that he is without repentance, and without change. "God is not a man, that he should lie; neither the son of man, that he should repent: hath he said, and shall he not do it? or hath he spoken, and shall he not make it good?" Passion, in the * James 1: 17. + Numb. 23: 19. Also 1 Sam. 15: 29. Ps. 102: 27. Isa. 46: 9, 10. Mal. 3: 6. Rom. 11: 29. 2 Tim. 2: 13. common acceptation of the term, implies a change of mind. To attribute it to God, therefore, is to deny to him that immutability, which he claims as his peculiar glory. On this hypothesis, instead of saying, He is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever, it would be more agreeable to truth to affirm, that he is subject to variations every day, hour, and moment, according to the contingencies which occur in his moral kingdom. And when will he find repose? Peradventure,-never. From the notions, which the Bible and sound philosophy teach us to entertain concerning the simplicity and incorruptibility of God's essence, I might show the improbability, that he should be liable to such passions as belong to beings of a day, arrayed in material and corruptible bodies. I merely add, that the doctrine I am opposing is no less contrary to the infinite moral perfection of the Most High, than to his natural attributes. Sinless creatures, though free from sorrow, may be subject to diversified and changing emotions; but it is because their capacity, and consequently their holiness, is limited. Holiness absolutely infinite, must continue unaltered and unalterable, (however it may regulate its particular acts by the fitness of circumstances, and the changes of character among intelligent beings,) in all its views, essential feelings, and specific designs. God may approve of creatures to-day, whom he disapproved yesterday. But the change is in them, and not in God. To suppose it otherwise, would be to suppose some variation in his judgement or knowledge; or some increase, or diminution of his moral excellency. II. The absence of passion in God, in the sense in which passion is generally understood, is conclusively inferred from the universality and immutability of his purposes. The reality of these purposes is proved from his attributes. By his infinite benevolence, he is disposed to pursue the highest good; by his infinite knowledge, he is qualified to choose that system, which will effectually secure this object; and by his infinite power, he is able to carry into effect all the desires of his heart. The deductions of reason on this subject, are fully confirmed by the Scriptures. There we are told, that "known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world;"* that he "worketh all things after the counsel of his own will;"t that "he hath Acts 15: 18. + Eph. 1: 11. done whatsoever he hath pleased;"* that "there are many devices in a man's heart; nevertheless, the counsel of the Lord, that shall stand ;" that "the king's heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water: he turneth it whithersoever he will;" and that "his counsel shall stand, and he will do all his pleasure." His purposes are declared to extend to all the volitions and acts of moral agents. If the brethren of Joseph wickedly sold him into Egypt, God meant it unto good; Sennacherib was his rod and his staff, for the punishment of Israel;¶ haughty Babylon was employed as his battle-axe and weapon of war;** he purposed the treachery of Judas,tt and the crucifixion of Christ by the wicked hands of his blood-thirsty foes. While God's decree leaves sinners entirely free and without excuse, it at the same time so restrains and controuls them, that they will never overleap the bounds which it throws around them. It is expressly affirmed, that the wrath of man shall be made to praise God, and that the remainder of wrath he will restrain. It cannot be reasonably doubted therefore, that, on the whole, the issue of all things will be perfectly agreeable to the divine will. In this sense, the Lord will rejoice in his works. Though many events are in themselves very undesirable, and contrary to the wishes of infinite benevolence; yet, viewed in their connexions, they accord entirely with that plan, which the eternal mind has chosen, and which is most worthy of its choice. The least variation from the actual result of the great system, as it will appear at the con * Ps. 115: 3. + Prov. 19: 21. Isai. 10:5-15. ** Jer. 51: 20. 4:27, 28. §§ Ps. 76: 10. + Prov. 21: 1. § Isai. 46: 10. Gen. 50: 20. tt Luke 22: 22. #Acts 2: 23. 3: 18. HI"There is no inconsistency in supposing, that God may hate a thing as it is in itself, and considered simply as evil, and yet that it may be his will it should come to pass, considering all consequences. I believe there is no person of good understanding, who will venture to say, he is certain that it is impossible it should be best, taking in the whole compass and extent of existence, and all consequences in the endless series of events, that there should be such a thing as moral evil in the world. And if so, it will certainly follow, that an infinitely wise being, who always chooses what is best, must choose that there should be such a thing. And if so, then such a choice is not an evil, but a wise and holy choice." "The Arminians themselves must be obliged, whether they will or no, to allow a distinction of God's will, amounting to just the same thing that Calvinists intend by their distinction of a secret and revealed will. They must allow a distinction of those things which God thinks best should be, considering all circumstances and consequences, and so are agreeable to his disposing will, and those things which he loves and are agreeable to his nature, in themselves considered."-Edward's Works, Worcester Edition. Vol. v. pp. 298, 299, 300. summation of all things, would so far mar its beauty, and detract from the rich display of divine perfections made in it. This view of the divine purposes directly contradicts the notion, that God is on the whole disappointed, or grieved, by any event; or that he is subject to any such emotions as unexpected contingencies produce in creatures. It is not possible that he should be, unless it is supposed that he purposed the existence of certain events, with the design of making himself unhappy, (and what reasonable being would act from such a motive?) or that the creation has, to a certain extent, broke loose from his controul, and that the disorders thus occasioned, occur, in every sense, in opposition to his choice. On this supposition, the mighty One of Israel, but for whose fiat there had been no creation to rebel against him and to suffer, sits, in impotent distress, contemplating the swelling tide of evil, which he cannot arrest, without sacrificing the moral agency either of individual sinners, or of the entire moral universe. What an idea of Him who is from everlasting to everlasting, who dwells in inaccessible light, and who reigns over all worlds! III. The supposition that God is subject to passions, according to the received meaning of that word, is inconsistent with his perfect and unchangeable happiness. That his happiness is of this character, is a first principle, which it is difficult to see how any believer in revelation can think of calling in question. He is expressly called the blessed (happy, paxapís) God; and the blessed, and only potentate (paxápios dvráσrns);† as if a felicity, pure, perfect and immutable, were essential to the nature and attributes of the supreme Ruler. The opposite of this doctrine has rarely, if ever, been defended, except in connexion with the worst forms of heresy or paganism. His perfect happiness supposes that He is infinitely above liability to pain, grief, or suffering of any kind. But provided that the passages, which represent his benevolence or fixed hatred of sim in the language of human passions, are to be understood as teaching the manner, as well as the fact, of the moral actings of his mind; then clearly, he is so far from being perfectly happy, that he is the greatest sufferer in the universe. Let it be supposed, that he is literally grieved, vered by every instance of sin; then surely it must be admitted, that ere this he must be broken-hearted, and in view of the innumerable sins of this world and of hell, his misery must be infinite. An entire race, in conjunction with devils, gone over to the ranks of rebellion, and persisting for thousands of years, in their resistance of his will! Let it be supposed that his heart is literally grieved by the pain of his creatures, and will it not follow, that his bosom must be convulsed and bleed with infinite anguish, as he witnesses the insupportable and endless torments of all the damned? It has been said, that the universe is not as happy as it would be, did creatures do their duty; that God longs, all things considered, to have them do better than they do; that his feelings are wounded by their disobedience;-and of course it follows, that He is not as happy, as they could make him. And is not this comparative negation of good, positive suffering? It depends then on creatures, ungrateful ones too, who hate their Maker, how much God shall suffer. To suppose God to be susceptible of suffering in any degree, is to suppose him susceptible of suffering in an infinite degree. If he may feel any pain, that pain may be greater than is, or can be felt by all creatures. If he may suffer more than the whole creation now; he may suffer more than the whole creation, to all eternity. Where, then, can happiness be found? It is not in God. As for wicked. beings, the very nature of their moral affections ensures their misery. And those who love God, cannot surely have uninterrupted enjoyment, while they behold their greatest and best friend, continually mourning over the failure of his most cherished hopes. Heaven, then, instead of being a place where all tears are wiped away, must be full of weeping, a dreary Bochim-forever and ever. Should it be objected to this reasoning, that God has so many sources of enjoyment independent of the occasions of suffering, that he is, on the whole, notwithstanding the pain he feels, infinitely happy; I would say in reply, that this is either a virtual denial of the very principle which it professes to maintain, or it is a mere evasion. What is intended by sources of enjoyment to God, independent of the occasions of suffering? Is it that he can gratify all his wishes? If so, then he is possessed of that unchangeable felicity, which is opposite to all those disturbed and successive emotions, which spring from uncontrollable inferiour agencies, thwarting his designs. In other words, however strong his moral principles may be, he can have no pas |