in which he advanced many things contrary to the received doctrine of geometricians, and brought upon himself (whether justly or not it is not our business to inquire) a severe censure, for attempting to correct what he did not himself sufficiently understand. To complete his body of philosophy, he published, in 1658, "A Dissertation on Man,” in which he advanced many singular opinions concerning the intellectual and moral powers of human nature.

23

After the Restoration, Hobbes came to London, and was graciously received by the king, who admitted him to a private audience, and gave him a pension of one hundred pounds per annum. Through the vigilance of the clergy, he was, however, prevented from executing his favourite design of collecting and republishing his works in English, and was obliged to send them over to Amsterdam, where an entire edition in Latin was published. Whilst the writings of Hobbes were reprobated by the general body of the clergy, and occasioned many learned and able replies, they were not without their admirers both at home and abroad. Foreigners of the first distinction visited him, among whom was Cosmo de Medicis, then prince of Tuscany. Even in the public schools his doctrines had professed advocates; and Daniel Scargil, a Cambridge scholar, maintained some of his fundamental tenets in a public disputation; on which account he was expelled from the University. This circumstance brought so much odium upon Hobbes, that Bishop Fell, in his Latin edition of Wood's Athena Oxoniensis, thought it necessary to leave out the eulogium which the author had passed upon the philosopher of Malmsbury, and insert in its stead a severe censure. Wood, offended at this freedom, acquainted Hobbes, who wrote a letter in justification of himself to the author of the Athenæ Oxoniensis, which was published at Oxford. This produced from Fell a bitter invective, to which Hobbes, who was now far advanced in years, made no reply. In his last days he retired into the country, and employed himself in translating Homer, and writing the history of the civil war.

This latter work Hobbes could not obtain the royal per mission to publish; but it was sent into the world by a

friend, without his knowledge. He died in the year 1679, having lived to the great age of ninety-one... 10 sur tach

Hobbes was certainly possessed of vigorous faculties, and had he been sufficiently careful to form and improve his judgment, and to preserve his mind free from the bias of prejudice and passion, would undoubtedly have deserv ed a place in the first class of philosophers. The mathematical method of reasoning which he adopted, greatly assisted him in his researches; but he was often led into error, by assuming false or uncertain principles or axioms. The vehemence with which he engaged in political contests biassed his judgment on questions of policy, and led him to frame such maxims and rules of government, as would be destructive of the peace and happiness of mankind. An arrogant contempt of the opinions of others, an impatience of contradiction, and a restless ambition to be distinguished as an innovator in philosophy, were qualities which appear to have contributed in no small degree to the perversion of his judgment. To enumerate all the particu lars in which Hobbes departs from the beaten track of opinions, would carry us beyond our limits. The follow ing positions, chiefly selected from his Leviathan, may serve as a specimen of his philosophy.

All knowledge originates in sensation, and is produced by the pressure, either immediate or mediate, of external objects upon the senses. Sensible qualities are, in their objects, nothing more than the motion of matter operating variously upon the organs of sensation. Imagination and memory are the permanent effects of former impressions upon the senses. Thinking is the succession of one imagination after another, which may be either irregular or regulated with a view to some end. Every conception, being derived from the senses, is finite; we have, therefore, no idea of infinity, and God is an object, not of apprehension, but of reverence. No one can conceive of any thing but as existing in some place, of some finite magnitude, and divisible into parts; nor can any thing be wholly in one place and wholly in another at the same time, or two or more things be at the same time in the same place. Truth and falsehood are attributes, not of things, but of language. The intellect peculiar to man is a faculty

arising from speech; and the use of reason is the deduction of remote consequences from the definitions of terms. Science is the knowledge of these consequences. There are in animals two kinds of motion-one, vital and involuntary; the other, animal and voluntary. The latter, if it tends towards an object, is appetite; if it recedes from it, aversion; and the object in the former case is said to be good, in the latter, evil. Appetite is attended with pleasure, aversion with pain. In deliberation, the last impulse of the appetite is will; success in obtaining its object, enjoyment. Moral qualities are those by which the peace and security of the state are preserved. Felicity consists not in tranquillity, but in a perpetual progress from one desire to another. The diversity of human characters arises from the different ways in which men pursue happiness.

The desire of investigating causes leads to the knowledge and belief of a first cause, the one eternal Deity, although the Divine Nature is incomprehensible. From men's ignorance of true causes arises anxiety, fear, superstition.

Nature has formed all men equal; whence arises the universal hope of acquiring by violence whatever we de sire, and the universal apprehension of suffering violence from others. The necessary consequence is, that a state of nature is a state of perpetual hostility, in which no individual has any other means of safety than his own strength or ingenuity, and in which there is no room for industry, because no secure enjoyment of its fruits. In this state, every one has a right to use his own faculties at pleasure for his preservation, and of doing whatever he judges to be conducive to this end; and since there is no property, there can be no injustice.

For the sake of peace and security, it is necessary that each individual recede from a part of his natural right, and be contented with such a share of liberty, or freedom from restraint, as he is willing to allow to others. This resignation of natural rights may either be a simple renunciation or a transfer of them, as an individual or body, by mutual consent, for the common good. The multitude, thus brought out of a state of nature, becomes one person,

which is called the Republic or State, in which the common power and will are exercised for the common defence. The ruling power cannot be taken from those to whom it has been committed, nor can they be punished for maladministration. If the supreme magistrate inflicts any penalty upon the innocent, he sins against God, but does not act unjustly. The interpretation of the laws is to be sought, not from preceptors nor philosophers, but from the authority of the state; for it is not truth, but authority that makes law; nevertheless, the king ought to interpret the law according to his own natural reason and conscience. Punishment is an evil inflicted upon the transgressor of the law, to this end, that the apprehension of it may bend the will of the citizens to submission. The public law is to be instead of conscience to every individual; it is therefore false, that every violation of conscience in a citizen is a sin. The offices of the supreme governors are to be regulated by those ends, which comprehend the security of the people.

Although Hobbes often admits false principles, and advances pernicious tenets, many just and profound observations are to be met with in his writings, which have probably led the way to the improvement of moral and political science.

It is much to be regretted that Hobbes, though he had the precept and example of Lord Bacon to guide him, neglected the new and fertile path of experimental philosophy. So little was he aware of the value of this kind of knowledge, that he censured the Royal Society of London, at its first institution, for attending more to minute experiment than general principles, and said, that if the name of a philosopher was to be obtained by relating a multifarious farrago of experiments, we might expect to see apothecaries, gardeners, and perfumers, rank among philosophers."

24 Vidend. Burnet's Hist. of his Own Time, v. i. p. 36. 92, 150. 211. Gundling. Obs. Select. t. i. Obs. 2. Gundlingiana, p. xiv, Huberus Orat, de Pædantisino, p. 66. Rapin. Reflex. sur la Phil. p. 55. Cumber land on the Law of Nature, Lond. 1672. Puffendorf. Erid. Scand. p. 206. Andree Discuss, fundam. Hobbesii. 1672.

In modern times, few philosophers have a higher claim to distinction, both on account of the variety and originality of his speculations, and the celebrity which he obtained in the philosophical world, than Des Cartes, who, though the father of a sect, himself pursued his researches with such a free and independent spirit, as justly entitles him to a place among the Eclectics.

Renes Des Cartes,25 a native of France, was born in 1596, at La Haye in Tourain. Whilst he was a child, he discovered an eager curiosity to inquire into the nature and causes of things, which procured him the appellation of the Young Philosopher. At eight years of age, he was committed to the care of Dinet, a learned Jesuit, under whom he made uncommon proficiency in learning. But a habit of close and deep reflection soon enabled him to discover defects in the books which he read, and in the instructions which he received, which led him to form the ambitious hope that he should, in some future time, carry science to a point of perfection which it had never hitherto reached. After spending five years in the diligent study of languages, and in reading the ancient poets, orators, and historians, he passed on to severer studies, and made himself well acquainted with the elements of mathematics, logic, and morals, as they had been hitherto taught. His earnest desire of attaining an accurate knowledge of every thing which became a subject of contemplation to his inquisitive mind, did not, however, in any of these branches of science meet with full satisfaction. Concerning Logic, particularly, he complained, that after the most diligent examination he found the syllogistic forms, and almost every other precept of the art, more useful in enabling a man to communicate to others truths already known, or rather, like the Lullian art, in qualifying him to discourse copiously upon subjects which he does not understand, than

* Baillet. Vit. Cartes, Par. 1691. Epit. 1693. Borelli et Tesselii Vit. Cart. Witte Mem. Phil. dec. iv. p. 580. Niceron. t. 31. p. 274. Sturm. Diss. de Cart. Bayle.