a suffete, the prince of Carthage; Cornelius Nepos nated him pretor; and Gellius styled him dictator. is has also observed, that the sufes, or according to its haginian pronunciation, sufet, was the supreme magisof Carthage.

f the mode of electing the suffetes, we are ignorant, but it ld appear that their power was only annual, and that r authority answered to that of the consuls at Rome. y were empowered to assemble the senate, in which they ided, proposed subjects for deliberation, and collected the S. They likewise presided in all debates on matters of ortance. Their authority was not confined to the city; netimes they had the command of the armies. When ir employment as sufletes expired they were made pretors, ich was a considerable office, as will be seen in the course the narrative, under the section relating to Hannibal. The senate appears to have been a numerous body, com sed of the principal citizens, venerable on account of their re, and exalted by their birth, their riches, and, above all, eir merit. The chief authority was vested in this body, d they were the soul of the public deliberations. Their umber is not exactly known, but it must have been consierable, since the tribunal of the Hundred, which the Greek riters call Gerusia, were selected from their body, to form a parate assembly. In the senate, all affairs of consequence were debated, the letters from generals read, the complaints f provinces heard, ambassadors admitted to audience, and peace or war determined, as the reader will perceive in the ensuing narrative.

Aristotle says, when the sentiments and votes were unaninous, the senate decided supremely, and no appeal could be nade; but when there was a division, and the senate could not be brought to an agreement, the affair was then laid before the people, on whom the decision thereby devolved. This regulation was happily adapted to crush factions, produce harmony, and enforce and confirm good counsels; such an assembly being extremely jealous of its authority, and not easily prevailed upon to let it pass into other hands. Polybius adduces a memorable instance of this. When, after the loss of the battle fought in Africa, at the close of the second Punic war, the conditions of peace offered by the victor were read in the senate, one of the senators opposed them with great warmth; but Hannibal, representing that, as the safety of the republic lay at stake, it was of the utmost importance

for the senators to be unanimous in their resolutions, to prevent such a debate from coming before the public, the opposing senator yielded, and Hannibal carried his point. This, doubtless, laid the foundation of the power of the senate, and exalted its authority. Polybius observes, in another place, that whilst the senate had the administration of affairs, the state was governed with great wisdom, and was successful in its varied enterprises.

As late as the time of Aristotle, (from 384 to 322 B. c.) the government of Carthage was carried on solely by the senate. But the aspect of affairs changed afterwards. The people, having become insolent by their wealth and conquests, and forgetting that these blessings were the fruits of the prudent conduct of the senate, were desirous of sharing in the government, and they arrogated to themselves almost the whole power. From that period, cabal and faction ruled the state; to which cause, Polybius chiefly ascribes the ruin of Carthage.

Concerning the tribunal of the Hundred, Aristotle says: The Carthaginians had a body of 104 magistrates, similar to the Ephori of Sparta, but selected with greater discernment from among the most worthy; and that the kings and the Gerusia of Carthage resembled the kings and the Gerusia of Sparta in their respective offices. But there was this difference between the Ephori and the Gerusia, or the tribunal of the Hundred, namely, that the former consisted of five members only, who continued in office but a year, while the latter consisted of one hundred members, and upwards, and their office was perpetual. According to Justin, the Gerusia was a select body chosen from among the senators, to watch over and investigate the conduct of the magistrates, and especially of the generals returning home from foreign command, and it was first established at the time when the house of Mago, by its vast influence and popularity, excited fears of some ambitious designs, about 400 B. c. Its chief design was to act as a curb to the authority of the generals, which, whilst their armies were in the field, was almost boundless, by obliging them to give an account of their actions before these judges on their return from the campaign. From the tribunal of the Hundred, five were selected, who possessed a jurisdiction superior to that of the rest; but it is not known how long their authority lasted. This council of Five resembled the council of Ten at Venice. When there was a vacancy in their number, it could be filled up by none but themselves, and

they also had the sole power of choosing those who composed the council of the Hundred. Their authority was very great, and for that reason none were elected into this office but persons endowed with rare merit. Neither salary nor reward was annexed to the office, the public welfare being considered sufficient to engage honest men to a conscientious and faith ful discharge of their duty.

In his account of the taking of New Carthage by Scipio, Polybius distinguishes two orders of magistrates established in Old Carthage; for he says that among the prisoners taken at New Carthage were two magistrates belonging to the body or assembly of old men, that is, the council of the Hundred, and fifteen of the senate. Livy mentions only the fifteen senators, but in another place he mentions the old men; and he tells us also that they formed the most venerable council of the_government, and had great authority in the senate.

Establishments, though constituted with the greatest wisdom, and the most just harmony of parts, have frequently degenerated into disorder and licentiousness. Thus it was with the tribunal of the Hundred. These judges, who, by the lawful execution of their power, were a terror to transgressors, abusing their authority, became, in the lapse of time, so many petty tyrants. This is verified in the history of Hannibal, who, during his pretorship, after his return to Africa, employed all his influence to remove this abuse, and made the authority of these judges only annual, about two hundred years from the first founding of the tribunal.

The magistrates of Carthage were either elected by the people, or proposed by the senate and approved by the people; and Aristotle observes that bribery was resorted to, and that offices were bought and sold. Aristotle speaks of dinners given by various societies, probably like our clubs, in which political questions were discussed. Livy also speaks of their political circuli, clubs, or cercles, as they are now called in the French language. Concerning the choice of magistrates, Aristotle observes, that the qualities required were their wealth, personal character, merits, and popularity; which shows that the people had a real power in the elections.

This is all that is known concerning the constitution of the government of Carthage, no Carthaginian author having reached us. Had Aristotle's work on Constitutions not been lost, we should probably have had a much fuller account of the Carthaginian government and social state: we meet with observations in that author's writings, however, concerning

two defects in the government, and we have some information concerning the policy of the government, which may throw some additional light on the subject.

The first of these defects was, the investing the same person with different employment. This was considered at Carthage as a proof of uncommon merit; but Aristotle speaks of it as highly prejudicial to the public welfare. His argument runs thus: he says, A man possessed but of one employment is much more capable of acquitting himself well in the execution of it; because affairs are then examined with greater care, and sooner despatched. Thus, he observes, we never see, either by sea or land, the same officer commanding two different bodies, or the same pilot steering two ships. Besides, the welfare of the state requires that places and preferments should be divided, in order to excite emulation and reward merit; whereas the bestowing them on one man too often dazzles him by so distinguishing a preference, and always fills others with jealousy and discontent.

The second fault noticed by this author, in the government of Carthage, was, that in order for a man to attain the first posts, a certain income was required, besides merit and noble birth; by which means, poverty might exclude persons of the most exalted merit. Then, says he, as virtue is wholly disregarded, and money all-powerful, the admiration and desire of bribes seize and corrupt the whole community; and when magistrates and judges are obliged to pay large sums for their employment, they conclude they have a right to reimburse themselves. This latter charge must be understood of the presents that were given in order to procure the votes of the electors; a practice, as Polybius observes, very common at Carthage, where no kind of gain was deemed a disgrace.

Although the Carthaginians were a people essentially commercial, they were very attentive to agriculture. The country in the neighbourhood of Carthage, and indeed all that tract of land which formed its real territory, which is described in the ensuing narrative, was beautifully cultivated and extremely fertile. When Agathocles landed in Africa, and when Regulus, half a century later, and Scipio Africanus, and Scipio Emilianus at a still later period, invaded the Carthaginian territory, their march lay through rich fields covered with herds of cattle, and irrigated by numerous streams. Vineyards and olive grounds, also, appeared on every side, and villages and towns were spread over the face of the country; and as they drew near to the "Great Car

," the neighbourhood was thickly studded with the ry seats of the wealthy citizens.

oncerning the foreign policy of the Carthaginians, it has observed, that it was "grasping, jealous, and often inan." This policy must, however, be dated from the pewhen Carthage became a conquering nation, which, as hall see, was in the fourth century of its existence. Be

that time, like their Phenician progenitors, they contented aselves with trading both inland and by sea, and establishfactories on the western coasts of the Mediterranean for ying on a trade of exchange with the natives. At a very y date, they took possession of the smaller islands, near ir own coasts, such as Melita or Malta, Gozo, Lampedosa, I afterwards of the Balearic and the Lipari islands.

Their policy, and their old enmity towards the Greeks, ich originated in commercial rivalry, led them to enter o correspondence with the kings of Persia, especially at time when Darius and Xerxes invaded Greece. They ewise joined the Etruscans at an early period against the oceans, who had settled in Corsica; and afterwards the igurians against the colony of Massilia, or Marseilles. In concluding this chapter, we would only observe, that me people have drawn a parallel between Carthage and ngland. But this is mere fancy, and is, moreover, a very perficial view of both states. Carthage never had a comact territory, with an homogeneous population, like Great Britain. Its armies were, indeed, almost entirely composed f mercenaries; and there are, also, numerous other discrepncies between the policy and the respective institutions of he two countries, which the attentive reader of the succeedng pages cannot fail to notice. The Christian reader, more especially, will observe, that he is reading of a nation whose institutions were founded on pagan principles, while in his, own country they are professedly established on the foundation of Christianity; and while he observes this, he will bless the Giver of all good for his superior advantages, and exclaim with the psalmist, "The lines are fallen unto me in pleasant places; yea, I have a goodly heritage!" Psa. xvi. 6.

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