time, as great a power of control at home as was consistent with the vast distance which divides the superintending from the executive administration. Thus, as a part of these opposite principles, Mr. Fox would have thrown all the patronage of India, not only that of appointment but also that of advancement, into the hands of his Parliamentary commissioners; while Mr. Pitt left the appointment to the Directors, and the advancement of those appointed, to the Indian Governments. This latter principle should be carefully preserved in any future modification of the present system, both because it will be useful in setting limits to ministerial influence and in adding strength to the local authorities. The distinction between the two sorts of patronage is of importance to this argument; and as we shall have little to do with the patronage of advancement, except as illustrating the value of appointments, a few words here on its general nature will be sufficient for our purpose.

In Lord Grenville's speech before referred to, we find the following passage strongly corroborative of much that has already been said, and containing a clear and succinct account of promotion to office in India:

It is well known how great the influence of the King's ministers already is in the appointment of those who are to exercise the supreme authorities in India whether civil or military. The reason of the case has here controlled the strict letter of the law. And it would, in my judgment, be far more constitutional that the responsibility of the nomination should openly attach on those who have, in almost every instance for thirty years, discharged the duty of selection. But with respect to the offices of inferior trust in India, including all below the Councils, the general course of promotion there, both in the civil and in the military line, has rested, as I apprehend, where unquestionably it ought to rest, with the Governments on the spot. They are best qualified to discriminate the characters of those who act under their inspection; they are most immediately concerned to reward the merit, to discountenance the misconduct of those who are to execute their orders. Such then, I trust and I believe, is now the established practice; and few who are conversant with the affairs of India will deny, that more inconvenience than advantage is likely to arise from an occasional interference with it. But undoubtedly this power, in itself so considerable, and administered at so great a distance, cannot be, nor is it, left without limitation. The law has done much to remove the opportunity, and with it the temptation, to abuse. By the Act of 1793, fixed classes and gradations of office have been established in India, of rank and value proportioned to the seniority of those who alone are qualified to hold them. Within these limits all exercise of patronage is restrained, and the effective operation of this principle has been considerably extended by a judicious, but perhaps, still imperfect separation of the lines of civil service. But by far the most important provision, without which no other could be effectual, is found in those clauses of the Act of 1784, which corrected the abuse of appointing to high stations in India persons new to that service. No office under the Government of our Indian Empire can now be conferred except upon its regular servants sent out in early youth, and trained to superior trust by the correct discharge of subordinate employments. When your Lordships consider, therefore, the jealousy with which the execution of these regulations is watched by a whole body of public servants, whose prospects depend on their observance; and when you further reflect that the persons among whom the selection must in every case be made, have originally been named in the outset of their life by various choice, urmixed with politics, and from different classes of society, it will no longer surprise us to be assured that the political divisions of the state have, under this system, found no admission into the exercise of Indian patronage.

But how can it possibly be shown that these wise provisions of the law, this salutary course and gradation of public service, depend upon the East India Company's authority? The King's civil service in India, should such be its future appellation, would equally subsist under the same regulations, secured in the same prospects, animated to the same exertions, protected by the same just inter position of the law against the noxious influence of political intrigue, and deriving only fresh distinction to themselves, and fresh respect among the powers of India, from the stamp and sanction of royal authority.

By thus lodging and restricting the patronage of advancement in India, no danger could arise from handing over the civil and military officers of the Company to the service of the Crown. Mr. Pitt recognized this principle, and considered that by leaving appointments in the gift of the local Government, and by preserving the gradation of seniority as the rule of succession, "he provided a sure means of preventing the exercise of undue influence, and of clipping the wings of patronage." Ministerial protection and countenance of per ons in India must of necessity, when ministers alone become responsible, be brought more immediately under the eye of Parliament. Nor will it have a wider field of action than now, for then as now it can only be exercised through the supreme civil and military authorities abroad, already in fact, although not in form, appointed by the Crown. The reason of the case has here controlled the strict letter of the law; for, as Mr. Fox forcibly observes,—

If there be a receipt, a nostrum, for making a weak Government, it is by giving the power of contriving measures to one, and the nomination of the persons who are to execute them to another. Theories that do not connect men with measures, are not theories for this world; they are chimeras with which a recluse may amuse his fancy, but not principles upon which a Statesman can found his system.

How much better would it be, were the appointments of Governor and Commander-in-Chief avowedly at the disposal of Ministers, instead of being vested in the Directors, subject to the King's approval. Suppose the Court in a contumacious temper of mind obstinately persevered in nominating persons unfit for those high stations, and whom therefore the Crown would not confirm; so long as nominations were put in, those offices might be kept vacant for any length of time, and their duties left to whatever abilities the Senior Member of Council or the officer next in command might chance to possess. Or, if the contumacy of the Directors were part of an agreed plan, those offices might be preserved vacant in consequence of a known disposition in the acting Governor or Commanderin-Chief to meet any favourite views of the Court. Such an absurdity can never be allowed to continue when the present charter expires; it can never lead to any practical good, but may produce much practical evil. That it has ever been suffered must be attributed to the peculiar situation of Mr. Pitt when he established a controlling power over the Court of Directors. Although the bold and violent change attempted by Mr. Fox had prepared the Company to consider the more confined and moderate proposal of his opponent as a boon conceded, rather than a restriction imposed, yet Mr. Pitt was, in some degree, shackled by his previous opposition to Mr. Fox's measure, and the jealousy which he had raised through the country, of Crown influence and attacks upon chartered rights. Had he not been embarrassed by the strength of public prejudices founded on ignorance and error, we may infer, from his language in debate, that Mr. Pitt would have further reduced the power of the Court of Directors; above all, that he would have held in the hands of Ministers an unqualified right of appointing to the supreme civil and military offices in India. A body worse constituted than the Court of Directors, for a just and discriminating exercise of patronage and political influence, can scarcely exist; and it would appear that the more Mr. Pitt reflected

2 If the Court of Directors neglect to fill up vacant offices within a certain period, the appointments lapse to the Crown.

upon this part of the subject the more he was convinced of their unfitness for such a duty, for his second bill enlarged the authority of the Board of Commissioners beyond the limits provided by the first bill, which was thrown out. It is clear, too, that he anticipated the growth of a necessity for enlarging still further their control over the Government of India. That necessity, perhaps, is now matured; by what means we shall shortly consider, as bearing directly on the question of patronage. Since the formation of the East India Company, the Crown has, from time to time, put in and maintained a claim to participate in the wealth and advantages enjoyed by those exclusive monopolists of East India trade. Sometimes money has been paid by the Company rather for the use of the Crown than the supply of the public treasury; but in some shape or other any extension of the Company's commerce or territory has always been followed by a certain consideration paid to the sovereign for the right, as it were, of enjoying the new benefit or acquisition." Although it thus seemed clearly intimated where the sovereignty of India lay, yet the charter of William the Third, which expressly reserved it to the Crown, perhaps created the doubt which it was intended to prevent. Mr. Fox, speaking in 1783, says

Many and grave persons are of opinion, that the territorial possessions in India belong to the Crown; and they argue, that it is absurd to suppose, that a body of merchants should be capable of managing and governing great territories, and of entering into all the mazes and refinements of modern politics. I am aware that very weighty persons have, on the other hand, maintained, that the territories belong of right to the Company.

In fact, till 1813, the sovereignty of the Crown over India had been kept as a reserved point, and so to the partial judgment of the Company seemed almost questionable; but the preamble of the act 53d Geo. 3. cap. 155, then set the matter at rest by the insertion of the words "without prejudice to the undoubted sovereignty of the Crown, &c. in and over the same, &c.' Thus, by precedent and law, the right of interference is now established, whenever any political or other change in the state of India should give cause, in the opinion of his advisers, for the King to modify or abolish, in the prescribed course, the Company's charter.

Yet, up to the present day, is not the Company talked of, and do not the Proprietors talk of themselves, as a Sovereign Company? Many of the facetious members of this imperial corporation will sometimes exclaim, "We are the King of India, but the Board of Commissioners is Viceroy over us."

If this feeling evaporated in a joke, however stale, the Proprietors and Directors might enjoy it among themselves; but, as the spirit of both appears by their debates to be impatient of control, and viciously opposed to every kind of check, we may be allowed to suspect that it must sometimes embarrass the most wholesome measures for the government of India. Such an opinion seems to have been long ago entertained by the legislature, for we find the following passage in the preamble of an Act of Parliament nearly sixty years old, for regulating the qualification of

3

Among other similar enactments we may quote, as an example, the 9th Geo. 3. cap. 24., by which 400,0007. was to be annually paid by the Company for a limited time, in consequence of certain territorial acquisitions and revenues.

members for voting in the respective general courts of public companies and corporations :

"Whereas of late years a most unfair practice has been introduced of splitting large quantities of stock, and making temporary and separate conveyances of parts thereof, for the purpose of multiplying occasional votes immediately before the time of declaring a dividend, choosing a director, or of deciding any other important question, and which practice," it is said, "would leave the permanent interest of such companies liable, at all times, to be sacrificed to the partial and interested views of a few, and those perhaps temporary proprietors....it is enacted" that stock as a qualification to vote, must have been possessed for six calendar months previously to the exercise of that right. This is again confirmed and made peculiar to East India proprietors by the 13th Geo. 3. cap. 43. sec. 3. which extends the period to twelve months, and raises the qualifying sum from five hundred to a thousand pounds.

What a scene of cabal and faction must have been displayed in a general court before the year 1784, when, as the late Lord (then Mr.) Erskine, expressed it, "so immensely important an empire was governed by a ballot of men and women, and foreigners." The Court of Proprietors is an exhibition, in a sort of minor theatre, of the vivacious but small orators of the day; yet have they still the power, as we have lately seen, of sitting in judgment on the Government of India. To those influenced by the hope of support from women, foreigners, and others, or already pledged to some of the predilections or prejudices of such persons, is the administration and patronage of our Indian empire rashly intrusted. To the General Court itself, constituted as it is, has every modification of system for educating the Company's servants been solemnly submitted. But why is the creditor of the Company to have a direct political influence in the state, while the public creditor of the nation, the holder of government stock, is wholly excluded from any share of it? Why is any person who holds India bonds to the amount of 1000l. to possess a privilege denied to the man who stands in the books of the Bank of England a creditor of the country to the amount of half a million? This is the harder, because the state, and therefore the nation, have become security for, and guarantee the Company's debt.

It must commonly happen that gentlemen come into the Direction with a list in their pocket of persons to be provided for, dependent on the most powerful of their constituents; a list quickly formed, but slowly disposed of. Who can resist the influence of the stars? Whatever his birth or station, whatever his abilities, John Nokes or Tom Styles is to have a writership. But then he must pass through the ordeal of Haileybury College; a terrible test, subject at any time to the regulation of those who are, or in future may be, the immediate superintendents of the College, and upon whom the institution itself is in fact dependent for its existence. As a consequence, influencial persons, related by blood, or connected by marriage, get out to India, who gradually grow up, and combine to promote and protect each other. Who can resist them abroad, who dare resist them at home? They come back with ample means to continue and increase the same interest which sent them to India. Which of them

4 The number of stars against a proprietor's name, denotes the number of votes which he commands for the election of Directors, and other jobs.

who chanced to be a delinquent could be pursued to justice or exposure? What object which they determined to carry could be defeated? Who would wonder if the most lucrative situations of India become almost hereditary? What better support of such a system could be invented than Hertford College? Preserve the nomination to appointments in the same hands, keep the nominees together in the same building, and leave the required test to become, as it must, a mere form, and we might venture to name those who would hold particular appointments, and some who would be in the Direction, a century hence, if India should then be in our possession, and the present system still in force. If the Directors had not been men of good intentions, however mistaken, and had they stood till this day uncontrolled, they must long since have done more mischief than any legislative enactment could remedy, or any regret on their part have atoned for. No man, or set of men, can withstand the irresistible effect of a bad system.

The Court of Proprietors elect from among themselves a Court of Directors. On their first entrance into office, the Directors are employed in superintending the Company's sales. They then rise by seniority to the duty of conducting the political administration of India. Thus, as young men are rarely, if ever, elected; individuals who have talents can seldom possess much influence over Indian affairs till they have gained the age of old men, and in most cases the character of old women. It was not, therefore, extraordinary, that the Court of Directors, before they were controlled by the King's Government, continued to blunder on in governing by theory, till one of their servants dared to disobey them, and save their possessions. At that time, we are told," that if a man wished to read the finest system of ethics, policy, and humanity, he would find it in the letters of the Court of Directors to the Company's servants abroad;" but unhappily, which few if any then knew, there was nothing practical in these beautiful essays. The Court's orders were abstractedly good, but in application impossible. Since the interference of Government, although theory, favoured by ignorance, held its ground for some years, information about India has been gradually diffused, and its administration better understood. There is but one mode of conquering, there are many modes of settling a country. Even now the laws affecting the tenure of land and the right of the soil, are a subject of difference among those best acquainted with India. Even now (how many will hear it for the first time!) all the laws are promulgated and administered in a language almost always equally foreign to judge, jury, prisoner, accuser, and witnesses. All are dependent on an interpreter ! Surely this is evidence enough of the wrong principle upon which our internal administration began, and of the prevalence of theoretical knowledge in England, and of ignorant precipitation in India. How little European theory can suit an Eastern country, we may be led to conjecture by the present land-tax of India. We calculate, in England, a third of the

• Debates on the India Bill, 1783.

• The judicial proceedings of India are conducted in Persian, a language vernacular only among the remnant of the Mohammedan conquerors of Hindoostan. When the Norman William introduced French into our Courts of Law, it had at least the advantage of being the native language of the judge, (see "The Friend of India,' a periodical work.) This subject will be shortly resumed in a future Number.