pended; a few obscure and alarming hints excepted, of his having landed in the neighbourhood of Quebec, where he was in danger of being crushed by the whole force of Canada, under the marquis de Montcalm. Happily he was not so ignorant of the fate of the expedition against Niagara. Having received an account of its progress before he left Ticonderago, he had detached brigadier Gage to assume the command of the troops in the room of Prideaux, who was unfortunately killed by the bursting of a cohorn, while directing the operations against the fort, to which he had been suffered to advance without the least molestation.

Meanwhile the command of that expedition devolved upon sir William Johnson, who prosecuted with equal judgment and vigour the plan of his predecessor. He pushed the attack of Niagara with such intrepidity, that the besiegers soon brought their approaches within a hundred yards of the covered way. Alarmed at the danger of losing this interior key of their empire in America, the French collected a body of regular troops (from the garrisons of Detroit, Venango, and Presque Isle), and a party of savages, with a resolution of attempting the relief of the place. Apprised of their intention, general Johnson ordered his light infantry, supported by some grenadiers and regular foot, to take post between the cataract of Niagara and the fortress. He posted the auxiliary Indians on his flanks; and while he thus prepared himself for an engagement, he took effectual measures for securing his lines and bridling the garrison.

The enemy appeared about nine o'clock in the morning, and the battle was begun with a horrid scream from the July 24. hostile Indians, according to their barbarous custom. It was this scream, called the War-whoop, the most frightful sound which imagination can conceive, that struck a panic into the army under Braddock, and had on other occasions carried terror to the hearts of European soldiers. But having now lost its effect upon the British troops, it was heard with a contemptuous indifference. And the French regulars were so warmly received by the English grenadiers and light infantry, while their savages were encountered by other barbarians, that they were totally routed in less than an hour, and the place surrendered on the same day'.

The taking of Niagara effectually cut off the communication between Canada and Louisiana, and consequently was a great step toward the conquest of both. But the reduction of Quebec

1 London Gazette, September 18, 1759.-Knox, ubi sup.

was a still more important object; and if general Amherst had been able to form a junction with Wolfe, it would have been attended with equal certainty, as a proportional force would have been employed to accomplish it.

The issue of this grand enterprise seemed, at first, very doubtful. The land forces did not exceed seven thousand men. They were, however, in good health and spirits. Having been embarked at Louisbourg, under convoy of admiral Saunders, they were safely landed, toward the end of June, on the isle of Orléans, formed by two branches of the St. Lawrence, a few leagues below Quebec. There the soldiers and sailors found every refreshment: and there general Wolfe, who was accompanied by the brigadiers Monckton, Townshend, and Murray, published a spirited but somewhat romantic manifesto, vindicating the conduct of the king his master in making this hostile invasion, and offering protection to the inhabitants of Canada, with the entire possession of their property and the free exercise of their religion, provided they should take no part in the dispute for dominion between the crowns of France and England. He represented to them the folly of resistance, as all hopes of relief were cut off, while the British fleet not only commanded the navigation of the St. Lawrence, but enjoyed the empire of the sea; and he reminded them, that the cruelties exercised by the French against the English subjects in America, would excuse the most severe retaliation. But Englishmen, he said, were too magnanimous to follow the barbarous example; and he concluded with extolling the generosity of Great Britain, in thus stretching out to them the hand of humanity, when it was in her power to enforce their obedience'.

As this manifesto produced no immediate effect, Wolfe was under the necessity of considering the Canadians as enemies, and saw himself exposed to the difficulties of a general commanding an army in a country where every thing is hostile to him. These difficulties, on examination, appeared so great, that although he was naturally of a sanguine temper and an adventurous spirit, he began to despair of success before the commencement of operations. "I could not flatter myself," says he, in his celebrated letter to Mr. Pitt," that I should be able to reduce the place." Nor is this to be wondered at. Besides the natural and artificial strength of the city of Quebec, which is chiefly built upon a steep

rock on the northern bank of the St. Lawrence, and farther defended by the river St. Charles, which places it in a kind of peninsula, Montcalm, the French general, was advantageously posted in the neighbourhood, with a force superior to the English army. To undertake the siege of the town, in such circumstances, seemed contrary to all the established maxims of war.

Resolving, however, to make every possible exertion before he should abandon the enterprise committed to him by his sovereign, and the event of which was already determined in the fond imagination of his admiring countrymen, Wolfe took possession of Point Levi, on the southern bank of the St. Lawrence, and there erected batteries against the town. But these batteries, by reason of their distance, made small impression upon the works, though they destroyed many houses, and greatly incommoded the inhabitants. The fleet could be of little use, as the elevation of the principal fortifications placed them beyond its reach, and even gave them a degree of command over it. The English general, therefore, became sensible of the impossibility of reducing the place, unless he could erect batteries on the northern side of the river. That shore, however, for a considerable way above Quebec, was so bold and rocky, as to render it impracticable to land in the face of the enemy. Below the town the French army was strongly encamped, between the Montmorency and St. Charles. If the former of these rivers should be passed, and the French driven from their entrenchments, the second, beyond which they would then take refuge, would present a new and almost insuperable barrier against the victors. With all these obstacles Wolfe was well acquainted; but he also knew, to use his own heroic language, "That a victorious army finds no difficulties!" He therefore resolved to pass the Montmorency, and bring Montcalm to an engagement.

A part of the British army had landed at the mouth of that river, and the main body had been ordered to ford it higher up, when some unpropitious circumstances made it necessary to withdraw the troops, and relinquish the design. Wolfe's original plan was, to attack a detached redoubt close to the water, and apparently situated beyond reach of the fire from the enemy's entrenchments. Should they attempt to support that fortification, he doubted not of being able to bring on a general action; and if they should remain tame spectators of its fall, he could afterward coolly examine their situation, and regulate accordingly his future operations. But observing the enemy in some

confusion, he rashly changed his purpose; and listening only to the ardour of his courage, determined immediately to attack the French camp.

With that view, orders were sent to Townshend and Murray, to keep their divisions in readiness for fording the river. In the mean time, thirteen companies of English grenadiers, and July 31. part of the second battalion of Royal Americans, who, having first disembarked, had been directed to form upon the beach, until they could be properly sustained, rushed impetuously toward the enemy's entrenchments, as if, in their ungovernable fury, they could have borne down every thing before them. But they were met by so strong and steady a fire of musketry, that they were quickly thrown into disorder, and obliged to seek shelter in or behind the detached redoubt, which the enemy had abandoned on their approach'. There they continued for some time, before they could repass the river, exposed to a dreadful thunder-storm, and a more terrible storm of bullets, which proved fatal to many gallant officers, who fearlessly exposed their persons, in attempting to form the troops. And instead of lamenting this early failure, though occasioned by inexcusable precipitancy, and attended with the loss of near five hundred brave men, we ought rather to consider it as a fortunate event; for, if the whole British army had been led on to the attack, there is reason to believe, from the strength of the French entrenchments, that the consequences would have been much more destructive'.

When this mortifying check, and the information connected with it, had convinced Wolfe of the impracticability of approaching Quebec, on the side of Montmorency, while the marquis de Montcalm chose to maintain his station, he detached brigadier Murray, with twelve hundred men in transports, to co-operate with rear-admiral Holmes above the town, in endeavouring to destroy the French shipping, and otherwise to distress and distract the enemy, by descents upon the banks of the river. In pursuance of these instructions, Murray made two vigorous attempts to land on the northern shore, but without success: in the third he was more fortunate. By a sudden descent at Chambaud, he burned a valuable magazine, filled with clothing, arms, ammunition, and provisions. This was a service of some importance, though inadequate to his wishes. The French ships were secured in such a manner as not to be

1 Letter from general Wolfe to Mr. Pitt, in the London Gazette, Oct. 6, 1759. 2 This is, in soine measure, admitted by Wolfe himself.

approached either by the fleet or army. He therefore returned to the camp at the request of the commander-in-chief, in some measure disappointed, but with the consolatory intelligence (received from his prisoners)," that Niagara was taken; that Ticonderago and Crown Point were abandoned; and that general Amherst was employed in making preparations for attacking the enemy at Isle-aux-Noix."

This intelligence, however, though agreeable in itself, afforded no prospect of immediate assistance. The season wasted apace; and the fervid spirit of general Wolfe, which could not brook the most distant prospect of censure or disgrace, began to prey upon his delicate constitution. Conscious that the conduct of no leader can ever be honoured with true applause, unless gilded with success, he dreaded alike to become the object of the pity or scorn of his capricious countrymen. His high notions of military glory, the public hope, the good fortune of other commanders, all turned inward upon him, and converted disappointment, and the fear of miscarriage, into a disease that threatened the dissolution of his tender frame. Though determined, as he declared in his disquiet, never to return to England without accomplishing his enterprise, he sent to the ministry a Sept. 2. pathetic, and even desponding, account of his situation, in order seemingly to prepare the minds of the people for the

worst1.

Having thus unburthened his mind, and perhaps found considerable relief, he called a council of his principal officers, in which it was resolved, that the future operations should be above the town, with a view of drawing the French general from his impregnable position, and bringing on an engagement. The camp at Montmorency was accordingly abandoned; and the troops reembarking, some landed at Point Levi, and the rest were carried higher up the river. The good effects of this new scheme were soon visible.

The marquis de Montcalm, apprehensive that the invaders might make a distant descent, and come on the back of the town, detached M. de Bougainville, with fifteen hundred men, to watch their motions, and thus weakened his own army. Meanwhile a daring plan was formed by the three English brigadiers, and presented to the commander-in-chief; namely, a proposal for landing the troops in the night, under the heights of Abraham,

1 "The affairs of Great Britain, I know," says he, "require the most vigorous measures; but then the courage of a handful of brave men should be exerted only where there is some probability of success!" Letter to Mr. Pitt, ubi sup.