therefore, that our administration could never calculate upon further concessions in our favour, than the former British ministry had granted; and that the favourite principle of Mr. Madison, which is the complete protection of every person sailing under the American flag in merchant vessels, could never be acceded to by the new administration.

Our claims in respect to the prosecution of commerce, were equally repugnant to the present ministry. The idea of its granting the principle either of "free ships, free goods," or a further relaxation of the rule of war of 1756, must have been imaginary and delusive to all but very theoretic and speculative men. And though the West-India merchants and planters made the concessions granted to us in the rejected treaty, the occasion of great clamour against Mr. Fox and his friends, and indeed preferred them as charges for the removal of that ministry from power; yet Mr. Madison now contends for them, with as much confidence and pertinacity, as if the views of the United States alone, were to be consulted, and as if the English nation had no other right or interest, but to clear away the obstacles which intercept them. The opposition made to our commercial claims, was sufficiently notorious in England and in this country, insomuch that the English merchants concerned in West-Indian affairs, had become formidable enough to render the ministry exceeding jealous of all plans proposed by our minister at the Court of St. James, which could be viewed in any light repugnant to the feelings of so powerful a party.

Under such a state of publick sentiment in Great-Britain, the kind of probability existing, that the Embargo could produce a concession of the principles which it was its apparent intention to inforce, could be found only in such brains as those of Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison. For under any emergence, this sentiment would still continue in its fullest force; and the calculation was, that the distresses which we vainly flattered ourselves would be produced, were not likely to arrive.

Though the West-Indian colonies would probably be driven to a great strait, by a scarcity of flour and provisions; yet the idea of starving them, was always considered futile and ridiculous. Every principle of commerce was in direct repugnance to the notion; not only because the colonists would probably turn their attention to the culture of grain, and additional quantities of yams, and other vegetables; but because it was foreseen that there would be frequent evasions of the Embargo laws in this country. That the prices of every description of provisions, with which we were in the habit of supplying the West-Indies, would be greatly enhanced, was certainly evident; but at the same time it was equally apparent, that the English colonists could well afford to pay much more than usual for such supplies, because the evident effect of the measure in Europe, was to increase very considerably the demand for their own West-India productions. This will be rendered apparent, if the state of the colonies be considered at

the period when the Embargo was established; in which we shall discover the causes of the opposition to American commerce, just now referred to, as presenting formidable obstacles to the settlement of any definitive principles, on which our colonial trade might be prosecuted.

From a variety of causes, in the front of which, the interfering commerce of this country was arrayed as the principal, the British WestIndian concerns, were, in the years 1806 and 1807, involved in extraordinary calamity. The excessive cultivation of sugar all over the islands, produced a glut in the great market of the world; and the Americans supplied nearly the whole of continental Europe, with that article. The English on the other hand, were obliged to confine themselves to their home markets. It was apparent that we should supply the continental market with no more sugar than we could realize a profit upon, which of consequence threw back the whole surplus sugar of the world, upon the English merchants and planters. The re. sult of all this was, that there arose a gradual accumulation of upwards of 100,000 hogsheads of sugar, which lay as a drug in the English market; being so much over and above the actual demand. This surplusage had reduced the average price of sugar from 65/4 per cwt. which was the estimate in the year 1800, to 33/6 per cwt. which was the mean price, for the first six months of 1807.* It seems also, that the actual cost of cultivation in the West-Indies, together with freight and insurance, amounted to 36/10 the same year; hence it follows that an absolute loss accrued to the planter, from the cultivation of his estate. All this difficulty was charged to the effects of American commerce, and of course the whole West-Indian interest was decidedly opposed to our government. The policy which they urged on Great Britain to adopt with respect to us, was to enforce the rule of war of 1756; and our Embargo has seconded their views more effectually than any other conceivable measure of their own ministry could possibly have done. By depriving the continent of the advantages of our supply of sugar (we confine ourselves to this single article for the sake of perspicuity) the Embargo created such a demand for the article, that the English found a vent for a great part of their surplusage; and of course it has considerably raised the price in Great Britain.

I

The quantity of sugar exported to the mother country, by all the English colonies, amounted to 2,810,915 cwt. in 1805, and in 1806 to 280,000 hogsheads, of 13 cwt. each, making a total of 3,640,000 cwt, An enhancement of 1 dollar per cwt. on this quantity, would produce 3,640,000 dollars. The quantity of flour exported to the English West-Indies from the United States, amounts, on an average, annually, to 431,504 barrels. During the Embargo they can receive no other

Edinburgh Review, No. 21, p. 153.

supplies from us, than they obtain in a clandestine manner; therefore they must depend upon England and other countries for their immediate supply. The presumption is, however, from the high price which the article now bears, and from the attention of many of the colonies to the raising of food within themselves, that the West-Indies do now receive from abroad but little more than one third of their usual supply. That portion of this third, which is not obtained from England, cannot reasonably be supposed to amount to more than 71,917 barrels. Now. it is manifest that the colonists could afford to pay 50 dollars 60 cents per barrel for this article, provided their sugar, in Europe, was enhanced in price only 1 dollar per cwt.! We will here subjoin a calculation founded upon facts, by which it will appear evident that the price of sugar has obtained an infinitely greater increase than we have just suggested; and it is also evident that flour has by no means risen to the price abovementioned, in the West-Indies. The mean price of sugar in England, the first six months of 1807, was 36% per cwt. Soon after the Embargo went into operation, it began to rise; in June, 1897, it was 40/8, and in September from 50 to 51/per cwt. Let us take the middle price for an estimate, and we discover a rise of 16/6 per cwt. on the article which makes a difference between the two prices, on the whole amount of sugar imported into Great Britain of nearly 11,110,810 dollars. The article of Rum has also received an uncommon augmentation of value, from the operation of the Embargo: the spirit of ship building has revived in England, most astonishingly within the last year; and indeed the whole foreign trade of that country has greatly increased. These wonderful advantages, when combined with the effects of the measure, in restoring a large body of deserted seamen to the English navy, may fairly be placed as more than a counter balance to the evils of a scanty supply of staves in the West-Indies, and the losses the manufacturers in Great-Britain are obliged to sustain. These evils, on the other hand, we will venture to assert have been very much exaggerated by Mr. Giles; but even though they were as dreadful as the warmest advocate of the President could require, we think they present no motive to a concession of the most trifling doctrine of the British maritime laws. When we consider, that for the manufactures which we do now receive from England, we are obliged to pay most enormous prices; that the profits, on the raw materials which compose them, are mostly derived by the English colonists; whilst those on the manufactured articles are paid by us, and that the cotton, which we formerly supplied, is now rotting in our store houses: it is clear that the evils resulting to Great Britain, through the medium of her manufacturers, is overrated. The operation of the measure, relative to them, is in a double aspect unfavourable to us, and in only one view, inimical to that nation! The force of Mr. Giles's argument about the duties of 4 per cent. on the manufactures which we receive, is greatly

weakened from such considerations, since it takes for granted, that all her exports to this country, are necessarily at an end. It is vain to say, we will exclude the admission of English manufactures into our country; the impossibility which the Emperor Napoleon, with all his power, has experienced in a similar attempt in his dominions, speaks a lesson to us more forcible than the most powerful language, on the impracticability of such a policy. But we ask pardon; the hint of the impracticability of a measure is an argument with our government in favour of its adoption.

It is only by estimates calculated from the interests of the whole nation, that we can draw a conclusion as to the course which Great-Britain will pursue, or that any just determination can be discovered. The Embargo, therefore, is favourable to that nation in another view; it facilitates her blockade of the French colonies; and affords her a better opportunity of assailing them, than at that happy period, when our ships with various supplies, whitened every sea. The English colonies of Upper and Lower Canada, are notoriously benefitted by the continuance of this measure; and as to the supply of the West-India islands with staves and lumber, which Mr. Giles relies upon as impossible from any other country than the United States, we would only refer him to the shipments already made from Quebeck.

We consider the reasons we have produced, as quite apparent and conclusive; and as affording a sufficient solution of the refusal of GreatBritain to alter her Orders in Council, in our favour: but whether the Embargo had been effectual or not, we think it manifest that the British ministry would not be disposed to rescind those orders in any extremity, considering the hostile temper in which the Embargo originated, and the commercial pretensions which our government most pertinaciously maintained. It is, however, probable, from Mr. Canning's observations on the measure, that he was rather pleased with its effects, than irritated at its adoption. We are contented to draw this inference, from a part of his opinion, cited by Mr. Giles. "If," says this minister," the Embargo be a municipal regulation, which effects none but the United States themselves, and with which no foreign nation has any concern; viewed in this light, his majesty does not conceive that he has any right or pretension to make any complaint, and he has made none!" It is clear from this expression, that the English government care nothing about the Embargo; or, if they do, are pleased with its operation; and that as they hitherto have not, so neither will they ever perceive a pretension to complain of it.

Admitting however, for a moment, that its coercion abroad is intole rable; admitting the West-India islands to be greatly distressed, without deriving any counter-balancing advantages, and that the American supplies are almost indispensible to the European nations, yet we will venture to maintain that Great-Britain could not rescind her Orders in

consequence of that distress, without relinquishing her national dignity and honour in the first instance, and her dearest national interests in the second.

Her avowed intention, (we will not maintain that it was real,) but her avowed intention was to retaliate on France, for her Berlin decree of November 21, by her Orders in Council; and her Proclamation in relation to her seamen, of October 16, 1807, promulgated the principle, that she would seize her deserters in whatever merchant vessel she should find them. If therefore, her Orders in Council were taken off to-morrow, it would be a virtual admission before the world, that she could not maintain that measure against France. But the repeal of her Orders would not be sufficient for Mr. Madison, without a concession of that part of the Proclamation respecting English deserters in American merchant ships; because he has more than once required our ministers in London, to break off all negotiations with Great Britain, unless our claims in respect to seamen under such circumstances were acceded to. This point must also be yielded, or our government can have no commerce with England; and if yielded, Great-Britain disavows a principle on which her very existence as a nation most clearly and indisputably depend.

Thus it is unquestionable that Great-Britain could not rescind her Orders or Proclamation, without sacrificing the principles which she is pledged before the world to maintain, and without relinquishing to us, her enemy, her most evident and important interests.

On the whole then, we conceive it to be apparent, that the effects of the Embargo are unimportant as respects Great-Britain; or if otherwise, the balance of interest is rather in her favour, especially if our own distress be taken into account; it is clear that she never has, and we think, never will complain of it; and besides, if it were ever so distressing in its operations on that nation, she never could, for many reasons, grant a concession to America.

(To be continued.)

TEMPER OF THE TIMES.

To

THE many peculiarities of errour and turpitude by which the present administration of government, has been most shamefully disgraced, have stamped your character with such distinguishing marks of depravity, that to the future historian, it will only be necessary to mention a measure to be Jeffersonian, and the world will be ready to believe it inexpedient, unconstitutional, and corrupt. They will easily confess, that the man who would betray a friend, would sacrifice his country;