fortitude, and repel with courage, all the efforts of Napoleon to subjugate them. Have the democrats extolled republican France? Have they used all their endeavours to extend their principles by the formation of jacobinical societies, have they extinguished their former old fashioned prejudices in order to p 'pu rify themselves for worship in the temple of republican liberty?" And yet do they now make the theme of their most extravagant panegyrick, the man who has overturned that temple, who has not left one stone resting upon another in the fabrick; the tyrant who has extinguished every right but that of power, and violated every tender feeling for the gratification of his malignant passions, who in one word has made France a military despotism? The deceptions of French republicanism no longer de lude; we have long ago found out the corruption that lurked within, though the sepulchre was attractive without. But Frenchi despotism is more manifestly dangerous to us, than even the an archy of the revolution. The ancient countries are chained and fastened by the mighty grasp of the gigantick despot; we no longer apprehend what may be done to subvert the liberties of existing governments; we have witnessed what has been done in utterly destroying that liberty. We want no Edmund Burke to raise the spirits of sedition, malignity, turbulence, and oppres sion, and then to dispel them by the day light of his understanding. Our dangers, horrid and portentous, are thickening every moment in the political horizon, and every moment approach us; the comet shakes from his horrid hair, dismay and death; yet the democrats hail the day with rapture, when pestilence and war' may be realized from the dreadful luminary, and denounce the federalists that they contemplate the prospect of such scenes with any other sensations than those of rapturous exultation.

GOVERNOUR LINCOLN AGAIN.

The commander in chief felicitates himself that from these instructions there will be seen as well the indications of a friendly adjustment with France as with Great-Britain, and that should such be the happy fruits of the pacifick and wise policy pursued by the late administration, it cannot fail of forcing in return, grateful acknowledgments from the candour and patriotism American. He congratulates his fellow citizens on every the superiour resources their country possesses for preserving peace, and her rights in a disciplined militia and commercial regulations; these are fully evinced by actual experience...? and reflection on the nature and tendency of past measures.” CATE bytu General Orders of May 13, 1809, av

of

The reasoning of his Honour the Lieutenant Governour of this commonwealth upon the subject of a friendly adjustment of our differences with foreign nations, not being in itself sufficiently erroneous, he undertakes to use it at an improper time, and in a place where we should least have expected it, a military order. It seems the President of the United States has instructed his Honour, that the detachment of the 11,000 militia formed in this state last November, is no longer required to be held in readiness for actual service; hence his Honour comes to the decided conclusion which is drawn in the quotation we have just made. The venomous malignity and spite which Mr. Lincoln feels would probably never have been spurted forth in an official shape, unless he had seized as a last resort, this most improper vehicle of conveyance: but we presume his Honour may have determined to continue consistent until the final termination of his political career. A death-bed repentance can have no attractions for a man without a sense of shame, without any established principles of faith. Let us examine for a moment the points which he has suggested in one short paragraph, that are not founded in reason or on fact.

1st. That indications of a settlement with France as well as Great-Britain, may be discovered in the directions to disband the militia.

2d. That these adjustments will have been the fruits of the pacifick and wise policy pursued by the late administration."

In the first place these instructions can afford no indications of an adjustment with Great-Britain; the best indications upon that subject, were the letters of Mr. Erskine and Mr. Smith; and the instructions were the result of that friendly adjustment.With regard to France it must be well known to his Honour, that not a single fact has transpired which can warrant the conclusion that she is even favourably disposed towards this country. On the contrary, it would not be in the least degree surprizing if Napoleon should prefer a series of complaints against us, in consequence of our accommodation with Great-Britain, and probably declare, though he could not be able to conduct, a war against the United States. That the British ministry imagine this will be the course of his conduct, it is not unreasonable to preHow otherwise can it be accounted for, that in this settlement with us, they have offered terms much within the line of

sume.

limitation upon which the non-intercourse law was established ? Mr. Pinckney was authorized to settle our differences, or at least to restore commercial intercourse upon terms infinitely less favourable to us than those which we have now been spontaneously offered by Great-Britain. This is a kind of game which we should naturally expect from the subtlety of Mr. Canning's diplomacy; but we have no reason to believe that he would, without some really powerful, indeed without some almost irresistible motive, consent to a settlement of the dispute between the two countries upon the liberal conditions on which the controversy is now based, when he had it completely in his power almost to have dictated a renewal of commercial intercourse to the American gov There is something in this policy more than natural, if philosophy could find it out.'

ernment.

It is ridiculously futile then, to suppose in opposition to probability, as well as in direct repugnance to fact, that any indications are to be seen in the instructions of the President relative to the detachment of the militia, that France as well as Great-Britain, has come to a friendly adjustment. France began the aggression upon us by unjust edicts against neutral commerce and we do not believe she will see any reason to change her plan of hostility, especially when she will percieve very clearly, that she will not be able to derive any benefit from her colonies. They will certainly be blockaded by Great-Britain, in order to secure the advantages of her own West-Indian monopoly. The late Dutch decree too is another consideration, directly in the teeth of the supposition, that any accommodation with France is to occur.— A decree more hostile in its effects, more unprincipled in its doctrine, and more inhuman in its nature, than all the impressment system which is practised by Great-Britain. But if France must be coupled with England, by his Honour, in this accommodation, why is not the correspondence in which it has been concluded upon made publick? His Honour's order erroneously places both nations upon the same level of accommodation.

In respect to the second point on which he congratulates his fellow citizens, on the importance of the militia and commercial regulations, in restraining the temerity of foreign nations, we cannot but view such an hypothesis with alternate pity and contempt. That a man who even pretends to assume the name, much less aim at the character of a statesman, should expect the

terrours of our militia men of buckram, and our parchment hostility, should frighten Great-Britain into compliance with our system of policy, and make Napoleon tremble for the loss of the property of his subjects, who utterly disregards how many of their lives he sacrifices to consummate his ambition, would be as utterly incredible as it is preposterous, did not the opinions of his Honour Levi Lincoln give currency to the absurdity.→ Yes, these adjustments of our differences have been the fruits of the pacifick and wise policy pursued by the late administration.' We presume the raising 100,000 militia is pacifick poli cy; at any rate it is just about as coercive as our non-intercourse and embargo systems. The truth is, we must resort to other causes than those inefficient ones, to discover the reasons which have produced the late happy termination of our national differ

ences.

It is fortunate for his Honour, that he is about to retire, just at the present moment; since his daring conduct respecting the militia last winter has not yet been forgotten. The attempt to enforce without authority the last embargo law, which stamped such indelible infamy upon the administration which enacted it ; the peculiar circumstances of cunning, turpitude and hypocrisy which accompanied the transaction, and the secrecy which betrayed his Honour's conviction of his crime, have marked this feature in his conduct with a character so indelibly infamous, that the most superficial novice in physiognomy, on the first exhibition of the picture, would shrink with horror at the contemplation of his visage. It is fortunate therefore that his Honour is about to quit the scene of business, though not the scene of disgrace; he may now escape impeachment; but had he remained, it is probable the justice of his country would have condemned him to an exemplary fate, commensurate with the blackness of his designs.

POPULAR ERROURS

Respecting the number of the French armies, refuted.

THE expectation of hostilities between France and Austria renders all military discussions of peculiar interest at the present moment.The following intelligent remarks upon the state of the French armies are taken from the London National Register.

'Let us now examine if the etats of the French army are not false and exaggerated. But we must make a material discrimination. The exaggerations of the French are not an effect of vanity and folly, but a characteristick feature in Bonaparte's system. By this pompous display of his military resources, he expected to strike a terṛour into all the states of Europe, and to convince them how useless resistance would be to such an army. Let us now see how far the armies he employed against Austria and Russia in the year 1805, will agree with the etat he published in the beginning of the same year.

Bonaparte long foresaw the coalition forming against him by this country, the emperours Alexander and Francis. In order to convince the French however, that this event was unexpected, he gave orders that the army collected at Boulogne, Brest, and Holland, should embark, in order to make the vaunted invasion of England. He had two objects in view when he made this gasconade. He wanted to convince the French that this project was capable of execution, and thus save his own reputation; whilst he hoped to prevent our government from sending immediate assistance to the allies. His second object was to make his soldiers, whom he knew to feel the greatest repugnance and apprehension to a meeting with our seamen, enter with greater alacrity on a continental war. The wary usurper was not mistaken in his expectations. He kept the soldiers confined for about five or six days on board the vessels destined for this grand expedition; and when they were informed that the perfidy of the Austrian government obliged them to defer their vengeance against the tyrants of the ocean, they gave unequivocal proof of their joy at being employed on any other service, than that of attempting a descent on our shores. They therefore proceeded with greater alacrity to attack the Austrians' and Russians on the banks of the Danube. The terrour they felt at the possibility of a rencontre with our mariners outweighed every consideration, and though they by no means forgot their former ill-success against Suwarrow, this circumstance was trifling in their opinion compared to the danger of being exposed to the thunder of our navy. As we had an opportunity of procuring at that time an exact amount of three corps of that army, we hope to be able to form a satisfactory conclusion as to the amount of the whole.

'This army, with which Bonaparte intended to oppose Mack and the Russians, consisted at first of eight corps, to which a ninth was afterwards added. When Marmont's corps passed through Cologne, the writer happened to be in that city, and as he was intimately acquainted with the mayor and one of his adjuncts, he had an opportunity of knowing precisely its amount. It consisted of 18,000 French, and 6000 Dutch, the latter commanded by Dumonceau. The whole corps, cavalry, infantry, artillery, and baggage, passed in the course of three days. No mistake could occur as to their number, because or Vol. I.

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