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choice,' and rally by frowning into silence all disorganizing movements.' The last metaphor of 'frowning a movement into silence' was reserved for the ever illuminated mind of Mr. Jefferson. ARBUTH.

* The threatening of the storm comes to nothing at last; because the President dismisses it where he found it. M. SCRIBLERUS.

WHIG AND TORY.

THE security of property is the great end of government. Surely then such measures as tend to render right and property precarious, tend to destroy both property and government. [Letter from the house of representatives of Massachusetts Bay, to the Right Honourable the Earl of SHELBURN, one of His Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, dated 16th of January, 1768.]

Your Lordship will allow us to say, that it is an essential right of a British subject, ingrafted into the constitution; or if your Lordship will admit the expression, a sacred and unalienable natural right, quietly to enjoy and have the disposal of his own property.' [Letter from the same to the Marquis of ROCKINGHAM, January 22, 1768.]

If the men who supported and maintain such doctrines, were whigs, were such persons as the democrats are willing to set up as the patterns to which we should conform; how can they, with any tolerable consistency, deny the propriety of opposing the embargo laws, which evidently infringe the principles above laid down. The epithet Tory, therefore should now be shifted from the Essex to the Middlesex Junto, with Samuel Dana and Levi Lincoln at the head of it, for they are the avowed supporters of tyranny, violence and oppression.

PARALLEL.

We will now offer an extract from the Instructions of the Town of Boston, in June 1768, to James Otis, Esqr. Mr. Samuel Adams, and John Hancock, Esq. members of the town in the General Court, which we think very strongly applies to the present state of affairs.

"In addition to all this, we are continually alarmed with rumours and reports of new acts to be passed, new importations of officers and pensioners, to suck the life blood of the body politick while it is streaming from their veins; fresh arrivals of ships of war to be a still severer restraint upon our trade, and the arrival of a military force to dragoon us into passive obedience."

How striking is this Parallel; the only difference is that our revolutionary forefathers felt themselves justified in condemning the evils before they happened, it was reserved for us not to make our remonstrances until the life bload' had been long flowing from our veins in copious streams.

MORE YET.

'These measures excite in our minds the strongest sense of PUBLICK DANGER. On the one hand we hear claims set up destructive to our rights, on the other, threatenings uttered if we offer to oppose those claims. But no ministerial rhetorick can persuade us that a denial of the authority of parliament in cases pernicious to liberty is to subvert the principles of the constitution,' or that to be deeply sensible of oppressions, humbly to complain of them and peaceably to seek redress of them is a factious and flagitious attempt to disturb the publick peace.' [Instructions to the Representatives of the city and county of Philadelphia. July 30, 1768.]

THE SPANISH CAUSE.

WE briefly noticed in our last number, some of the reasons drawn from the French bulletins, which induced us to conclude that General Blake had not been so completely overthrown as many people, who do not examine places and the movements of the armies, are ready to be lieve. The inferences to be drawn from such sources, however, always rest upon some peculiar construction of phrase in the bulletins, which are more remarkable for ambiguity of style and expression, for cautiously concealing every disaster, and magnifying every success, than perhaps can be found in the official statements of any other nation that ever existed. We do not therefore place a very strong reliance upon conclusions necessarily founded upon so unsure bases; but as the posts which the armies are said to occupy, are substantially correct in the French accounts, there are certain results which can always be drawn from an attentive perusal of the bulletins. It appears clearly that Bonaparte has proceeded with the utmost caution, in the present campaign, that his victories have cost him dearly, and that he has made no great progress after he had pretended to have obtained them. Thus from the 25th of October, at which time we may date the beginning of the operation of the armies, to the 1st of December, the progress of the French has been so uncommonly dilatory, or has been so greatly impeded, that they had advanced only 120 geographical miles; that is from Vittoria to Aranda de Duero, How different this, from

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the conquest of Prussia, after the battle of Jena, or indeed from any other campaign of Bonaparte. We cannot but think the peculiar warfare of the Spanish generals to have been the cause of all this delay. They kept their armies distinct from each other, so that the French were in a manner hemmed in a kind of triangle; on one angle, at the heights of Bilboa, Blake was posted, Castanos and Palafox were sta tioned at Viana and Tudella, whilst the army of Estramadura, under Frias, occupied Burgos and the neighbourhood. The head quarters of the French were at Vittoria, and from this place their movements were directed against the advanced guards of Castanos' army, who were driven from Lerin and Logrono, on the borders of Ebro, by Marshal Moncey. The next operations were against Blake, which we have already given in detail.

The army of Estramadura, consisting of nearly 20,000 men according to the French account, were at Burgos, and were attacked on the toth of November by the Duke of Dalmatia, and the Duke of Itria. The Spaniards made no stand. They dispersed almost at the first onset. The French say there were only 300 men killed, and 3000 made prisoners. They were new raised recruits, consisting of the students of the universities of Salamanca and Leon, and the other militia corps, and probably as far inferiour in point of numbers to the French army, as they certainly must have been in steadiness and discipline. The head quarters of the French, immediately after this battle were removed to Burgos. "We have not heard where the Spanish army have retreated, but suppose even if they have been dispersed they will rise again at the approach of the English, and make a more formidable re. sistance, as the discipline of real service increases.

No military operations of any importance after this took place until the 22d, when the French, directed their hostility against the army commanded by Generals Castanos and Palafox, stationed at Tudella and Calhorra. The French had waited quietly from the Toth to the 22d of November, until they could ascertain the retreat of Blake after the battle of Espinosa, that they might without much hazard require the services of the division of the Dukes of Belluno and Dantzick, who had been employed against him. The inactivity of the Spaniards during this time can only be accounted for, on the idea of their acting entirely on the defensive, until they should become convinced of the firmness and conduct of their forces in time of action; else it might fairly be presumed that an attack made upon the French whilst so large a proportion of the army were engaged in the mountains of Valmaseda, would have been eminently successful. In the battle of Tudella, the French brought their ablest generals and most veteran troops. Lannes was commander in chief, under him were Victor, Moncey and Ney; but Ney did not come up to his expected position in time. The Spaniards formed an oblique line from Cascante to Tudella. The

right wing at Tudella was commanded by Palafox, and the left at Cascante, by Castanos, which extended a league and a half; this errour the French took immediate advantage of, and pierced through the centre without fear, and Le Febre with his division of cavalry, pressed into the opening, and by a quarter wheel to the left, cut off the whole of Palafox's right wing. Castanos could not relieve him, which, had his force been concentrated, he might have done. But he was at the same time attacked by General Legrange, at the village of Cascante, and he retreated almost without resistance, but in good order. Palafox on the other hand, was treated more roughly; but on the whole, the Spanish loss, when viewed through the magnifying medium of French accounts, does not appear very alarming. There were only 6000 men engaged, and the enemy claim a loss of 4000 Spaniards, killed, or

'driven into the Ebro. The real loss is probably much less; but even that is small compared with the magnitude of the Spanish army, and the pretended completeness of the victory. After these battles, the French armies occupied nearly a square of about 160 geographical miles, and the Spanish and English armies were posted in various positions and in sufficient force on three sides of it: and from the extreme caution of the French movements, and the litle extent of country they have conquered, we do not yet think it time to suffer our expectations to subside into despondency.

Roads of Spain.

The following itinerary of the principal great roads from Madrid to the chief towns of the provinces, will be found very convenient by all persons reading the newspapers of the day. Many of the distances are stated from actual admeasurement: others are taken from the computed leagues of the country as estimated for the march of soldiers or hire of travelling horses, some of which have been corrected from the observations of the late M. Mechain, in his trigonometrical survey of Spain, in which he was employed, as well as in measuring a degree of the meridian in that country sometime in 1805. But as the country is very mountainous, and consequently the roads very crooked, no geometrical survey of the distances between the chief towns, as reduced from maps, can deserve the least attention; on the contrary, there are many places where the linear distances and the actual length of the carriage roads differ one fourth. It is to be observed that the nominal or common league of Spain is not less than four English miles, and that frequently the distance between villages estimated at a league, varies from 34 to 4 English miles.

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able to any thing but asses, mules, sheep, or black cattle. the bridle roads, which are shorter, more mountainous, and generally impassN. B. The distances in this table are taken on the carriage roads, and not Port Folio.

or 452 English miles; and so with all the others. towns of the provinces, or, as they are usually called, kingdoms, and the metropolis or court of Spain, MADRID. If it is desired to know the 252 English miles: if from Badajos to Zaragoza, we find 113 leagues, distance between Badajos and Madrid, the angle of the column under the former, and immediately opposite the latter, gives 63 leagues, or This table represents the number of leagues between all the capital

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