titution to which he might choose to destine them, he found them to his cost an adversary too proud to be commanded, and it is sincerely to be wished, too formidable to be subdued. He aimed at the Castilian honour a blow, which was returned with spirit. But these conclusions were too sanguine and ill drawn to be all true. Bonaparte, to be beaten from his purpose, will take a great many hard blows; and it remains to be seen, whether the Castilian spirit will evaporate, or continue with unabated strength.

The means required to resist the appalling power of the French nation at this time must be formidable indeed. It demands a kind of revolutionary energy to attain the object. Talents, and those of the very highest order, which the occasion must naturally call forth to view, should be sought with avidity, and the command of the armies be confided to men of real ability, and not to any of the impotent adherents of the corruption of the old court This revolutionary spirit promed well in the first instance: the addresses of the juntas breathed nothing but this energy. They called on the people to restore to the nation its ancient freedom and original constitution, they impressed upon their minds the futility of depending upon hasty levies of troops. 'Think you,' said these statesmen, 'that a tumultuous levy of brave inhabitants, without military skill, without chiefs, without money, without magazines, will be able to withstand experienced armies and soldiers grown old in the habits of victory? They then recommended the true policy of avoiding all general engagements,' of making a partizan war upon the French, embarrassing and wasting their armies by cutting off their supplies of provisions, destroying bridges, &c. which kind of hostility the natural situation of Spain, rendered highly probable would be prosecuted with the greatest success. They particularly said, "it is indispensable that each province should have its general of known talents, as much experience as our situation permits.' The affairs of the patriots, from the energy, and at the same time the circumspection with which they were governed, under all the aspects in which they were viewed, afforded prospects of a successful termination. Still however, no action of equal numbers had absolutely occurred; but the French were driven from the country in all directions, by multitudes of armed peasantry. Yet from the difficulties which the patriots experienced in subduing such detachments of the French armies as were spread about the country, it was reasoned that when Bonaparte, at the head of his forces should arrive in Spain, that success which over the small bodies of troops had been oftentimes retarded, would be no longer attainable. It was always hoped that the patriotism of the times would not be disheartened by any temporary successes of the enemy, (for the appearance of new and inexperienced levies before veterans almost always terminates in defeat) but that the disasters of the Spanish would afford them lessons of wisdom and teach them to profit by their first errours, so that at last they might be able to make an efficient stand. Experience

had convinced most thinking men, that the popular indignation would soon subside, unless it were constantly excited. The height of rage was therefore the proper time to secure a permanent force, by proper enlistments, and the introduction of a system of discipline which might be permanently useful. The American revolution had afforded abundant proofs of the want of efficacy in a militia inlisted for only a year, when they were allowed to return home; it was therefore hoped that the Spaniards would contrive to raise a large army which should be durable, and be placed under the direction of such faithful officers as might hereafter insure success, even against such troops as Napoleon could bring into the field. The regulations of the Supreme Juntas were in some respects well calculated to effect so desirable an end; they required the services of all citizens without regard to rank; but there may exist some doubt of the excellence of the system on which they were enlisted. The services of all the male inhabitants from the age of sixteen to forty-five, were put in requisition for the army. They were divided into three classes: the first class were all volunteers who chose to enlist, and they held themselves ready to march at a moment's call: the second class consisted of unmarried persons and married men and widowers without children; these were to be called upon when their services should be required: the third class, composed of married men and widowers with children, were only to be required to attend the army in the last resort, when it should become necessary to sacrifice their lives to save their country. Of these three classes, the first was called into immediate service; they were volunteers, stimulated by their patriotism, ambition and courage, and probably the flower of the Spanish people. As they were not selected from any particular rank in life, it is somewhat an interesting subject of enquiry to ascertain their comparative excellence to French veterans, when brought into competition.

The great perfection of a military system consists in the prompt and complete submission to superiour orders; not merely review submission, but an obedience which shall induce the soldier to lay down his life at the command of his officer, to encounter every peril and disaster without impatience and without repining. The ardour and enthusiasm of the new levies would undoubtedly carry them a great way in this mode of obedience; but the pride of the Castilian could ill brook the intolerant rigour of a petty disciplinarian, probably placed over him on account of his greater capacity, but inferiour to him in rank. The heart-burnings and jealousies which are the natural effects of the new system, would more than any thing tend to subvert that quietness and strictness of subordination, which is absolutely necessary to complete the soldier for service. We are fearful that the powers of the Supreme Junta may not be sufficient to curb the licentiousness to which this spirit will naturally incline; their proclamations often seem to be in the style of invitation rather than of irresistible authority.

Our belief therefore, was that the Spaniards would not only be beat. en at first, but they would be obliged to fight hard afterwards to extinguish the fire of insubordination that is always generated in new levies, unless they are rigorously watched. If a few defeats do not damp their ardour in the cause, though the immediate effects may seem disas trous, the permanent effect will be favourable. It will teach the superiour officers where to look for the best soldiers, and who it is most advisable to promote; it will serve to 'vent the musty superfluity,' of the times; and bring the precious gems to the light, which had been surrounded and hidden by mean and earthly incrustations.

On the other hand, the cause in which they are engaged, presents a permanent motive for unremitted exertions; and it will probably keep up a constant stimulus to their bravery, If it does, though Napoleon should march to Madrid and crown his brother Joseph there, still hope would not languish; the Spanish nation would rise behind them after they had passed, and recover their original strength, as a plant which has been trodden down is restored to its former elevation, by means of its natural elasticity. The first battles which have occurred since the entrance of Napoleon into Spain, are by no means so disheartening as might have reasonably been supposed; he has proceeded towards Madrid, and what else could be expected? The policy which the Supreme Junta very wisely prescribe to their generals is by all means to avoid a general engagement. A partizan warfare will impede but cannot stop the progress of the enemy. Let Joseph be crowned at Madrid. What then? Are the Spaniards of necessity conquered? By no means. All the losses they at present have sustained, are very inconsiderable; and they have met with some success. It does not appear that the second class of the Spanish people are yet called out. Let us consider for a moment the extent of the French successes.

The advantages they have gained are evidently exaggerated. The left wing of the Spanish army under General Blake, which has generally been considered completely destroyed, to judge even from the French accounts is by no means in so desperate a condition. It appears the French having received great reinforcements under Marshal Le Febre, the Duke of Dantzick, he joined the division of General Merlin, and attacked Blake on the 31st of October, who was posted at Sonorsa, near Bilboa. The Spanish army, the French accounts assert, amounted to 30,000, the truth is probably less; but at all events, the French were much superiour in point of numbers. After fighting the whole day, the Spaniards abandoned their positions, for fear of being cut off : they displayed great bravery during the action, and they retreated in such order, that General Blake formed a junction of all the corps which had been engaged, and marched them to the heights of Bilboa, stopping on the road to rest for the space of two hours. All the Spanish troops were not engaged in this affair; and Blake, leaving Bilboa un

der the command of D. Nicholas Mahy, marechel de camp, took a new position at Valmaseda. The numbers of the French became so great that Blake saw the necessity of re-concentrating' his forces, and gave orders to unite the different divisions; they all effected a junction, excepting the second division of the army of Galicia, which had not been previously engaged. In the mean time he had ordered Bilboa to be evacuated, and the Duke of Dantzick, entered it in the evening of the 1st of November. The loss which either the Spaniards or French suse tained in the affair of the 31st was very inconsiderable, and the French bulletin admits they took very few prisoners.'

The second division of the army of Galicia, (which could not form a junction with the main army stationed at Guenes,) under the command of Don Vincent Acevedo, was attacked on the 3d of November, and repulsed the enemy. The defeat was not decisive; for the French still maintained a position between Acevedo's corps and the main army; which circumstance induced Blake to make a decisive movement against them. He accordingly divided his army into four divisions; the third commanded by Brigadier D. Francisco Riguelme, was destined to attack the intercepting corps of the French; the fourth marched to Valmaseda, for the purpose of attacking whatever troops they might meet; the first and reserve under the immediate command of Blake, were to proceed to Gordejuela, to cut off the communications between the different French divisions; and the corps of the north remained, as a general reserve. But the French drew off their forces, suffered Acevedo to take an advantageous position, and retreated precipitately. The fourth division of Blake's army, encountered a body of 7,000 of the enemy, at Valmaseda, under the command of the French General Vallet, drove them out of the town and pursued them upwards of a league, took some prisoners and much booty. On the 7th of November, Blake met with a body of French, amounting to 8,000 men, a firing commenced which lasted through the day, when the French fel! back; but no material advantage was gained on either side. Blake made a movement from right to left with an intention of attacking them in a new direction; but the inclemency of the night, and the fatigue of the troops induced him to retire to his head quarters at Valmaseda, before day break. The French accounts are completely enveloped in mystery respecting these affairs; all they say is, that had they occurred on the plains instead of on the heights, not a Spaniard would have escaped; they mention no losses sustained on their part, but they think the Spaniards must have experienced a loss of from 3800 to 4,000

men.

After these events, Blake posted himself, November 10, at Espinosa, acccording to the French statement, in a very formidable position. The resistance which the Spaniards had made in the affair of Guenes, had called the reinforcements of Marshals Belluno, and Dalmatia from

;

Orduna and Burgos to the assistance of the Duke of Dantzick. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon Blake's army was attacked by Belluno, and Romano was dislodged from a post which he had taken. Both armies fought until night; and both maintained their positions. At break of day the attack re-commenced, the right of the French was commanded by Le Febre, the left by Victor and the centre by General Maison while Soult marched towards Reynosa in order to intercept the retreat of the Spaniards. Blake, who had for twelve days been contesting with a superiour force, was now obliged to retreat precipitately. The French say, he abandoned his arms, colours and artillery. But they do not pretend to enumerate the loss which the Spaniards sustained in this action separately considered; they mingle it with the affair which the centre of the Spanish army had had at Palencia, near Burgos, in which the patriots made no stand; in both actions it is stated by the French, that the Spanish loss was 60 pieces of cannon, and 20,000 men killed, wounded and taken prisoners; but as they resort to the artifice of combining the two actions, in order to swell the patriot loss, particularly as the action at Palencia had been detailed in a previous Bulletin, we may reasonably conclude, that the French statement, but more especially our fear, has greatly exaggerated the disasters which General Blake has experienced.

These conclusions will be rendered more probable when we consider the little progress which the French have made beyond Espinosa, after the pretended overthrow of Blake. Soult, the Duke of Dalmatia, who had marched in the certainty of intercepting Blake's retreat, so far from accomplishing his object, was at St. Andero the next day after the engagement, which is on this side of the scene of action; and the greatest progress, which any of their corps had made in pursuit of the Spaniards, is just within the borders of the province of Asturias; and we have since understood that Blake had taken post at Villa Vioca, not very far distant from this spot. The Madrid Gazette, as late as the 29th November, does not mention the defeat of Blake, though the retreat of Frias, after the battle of Burgos and Palentia, is expressly noticed. The Spaniards at that time were in excellent spirits; they seemed to have expected some reverses; they bore up stoutly against them, and it now remains to be seen, whether after the palpable errours which Castanos and Palafox committed at Tudella, they are still resolute in their hopes, and sanguine of the ultimate success of the struggle. As to Blake our hopes must not wholly sink in despondency; he has proved himself an excellent General, the dispositions of his army the French themselves acknowledge to have been masterly, and from the uncommon caution with which the bulletins are worded, in relation to the operations against him, it is evident they yet consider him a formidable opponent, although they pretend to have caused him to seek his personal safety by flight, and to have completely destroyed his