It seems to me, however, that the opposition, on general principles, to all efforts to regulate and improve language is very much like fighting wind-mills. Reasonable reformers do not propose to do violence to the natural development of language any more than the reasonable horticulturist does violence to the natural development of a plant. If, for instance, it is apparent that in the struggle for existence form A deserves to carry the day over form B and in the natural course of things will do so, why should not Reform step in and shorten the struggle? The differences in German pronunciation to-day are trifling compared with what has already been accomplished in the matter of the unification of the language, and it does not seem as though the natural course of development could be greatly interfered with by a decision in favor of one or the other usage. Of course, much depends on the time and the circumstances, but it can, for instance, hardly be denied that the conscious efforts to regulate and improve the German language that were made in the 17th century by societies and individual grammarians and lexicographers have, in spite of many extravagancies and futile attempts, been on the whole beneficial. Of course, if our efforts to influence usage are not to interfere with natural development, but are merely, so to speak, to anticipate it, then our course must in each case depend on the question, What is the natural development? Here we come upon what seems to be the strongest reason for the reluctance of philologists to take part in systematic efforts to influence usage. There is some excuse for that kind of philological agnosticism which doubts whether in spite of what philology may teach us in regard to the past and the present, it can act as a prophet or a guide for the future. It may be argued that the phenomena into which the working of the human mind enters as a factor, are too complex to admit of complete analysis, and that we can never be sure that under apparently similar conditions similar results will follow. Thus it is now well recognized that the term law, as applied to linguistic processes, cannot be used in the same. sense as in speaking of purely physical phenomena. Every linguistic process is immensely more complicated than any purely physical one, or, to speak more accurately, in the latter we get down much sooner to certain universal truths, however inexplicable these may be in themselves. In the light of our present knowledge, the term law, in speaking, for instance, of phonetic change, can imply only that in a certain community, at a certain time, sufficiently similar phonetic conditions-for the conditions are never precisely identical-must have produced similar results, but it cannot imply, as in the case of physical phenomena, that under like conditions the same thing must always happen again. It must be admitted that the course of language is apparently very devious. We do not exaggerate in saying that there is no conceivable kind of violation of the laws of formal logic or of grammar that has not in one or the other language in the course of time been sanctioned by usage, and every language is full of such anomalies. The nominative is used for the accusative1 and the accusative for the nominative; the dative for the accusative and the accusative for the dative; a plural is treated as a singular and a singular as a plural; a masculine form is used for a feminine or neuter; a plural takes an additional plural ending and a 6 5 1 E. g., in the plural of the West Germanic a-declension: Goth. nom. pl. dagós, acc. dagans; OHG. nom. acc. pl. taga. 2 E. 9., in the singular of the OHG. 6-declension: Ags. nom. sing. giefu, acc. giefe; OHG. nom. acc. geba; so E. acc. pl. you used for the nom. ye. 3 E. g., E. dat. acc. him, her: Ags. dat. him, hire, acc. hine, hí, héo; NHG. refl. dat. acc. sich: MHG. dat. [im, ir], acc. sich. E. g., NHG. dat. acc. euch: MHG. dat. iu, acc. iuch. f.< Lat. gaudia n. pl. Similarly Fr. joie E. g., E. pea, pl. peas < ME. pese, pl. peses, pesen; similarly E. cherry, sherry, eaves, riches, etc. 1E. g., voller Freuden of a masc. or neut. subject, sing. or pl.; similarly halber, selber, etc. 8 E. g., E. children, brethren, kine. 5 6 9 7 2 8 comparative or superlative an additional sign of the comparative or superlative;1 an abstract or collective is used to denote a concrete individual; a perfect in the sense of a present3 and a present in that of a perfect; an infinitive for a past participle; the third person of the verb for the first and second persons; in the second person singular a subjunctive form is substituted for the indicative, while the other forms remain undisturbed; what is properly part of one word becomes part of another; what is properly positive is used in a negative sense; Latin, Greek, Romance and Germanic elements are combined promiscuously,10 and such modern formations as automobile and electrocution are only more novel but not more irregular than many similar hybrids and contractions in good repute. In view of such and countless similar anomalies who will venture to say what is the natural course of a language in any particular? English grammars may object to the expression he done it, but in saying he got instead of the older he gat, we have formed the preterit indicative on the model of the past participle, while if we say he has sat instead of the older he has sitten we have done precisely the opposite and analogy would call for he has did instead of he has done. How can we tell then whether or not he done it is likely to become the standard form? E. 2 E. E. lesser, worser; G. mehrere; E. foremost, hindmost. g Lat. agricola, E. youth, G. frauenzimmer. 3 E. g., Gr. olda and the Germanic pret.-presents; E. I have got: 1 E. g., E. "I forget who said so" for have forgotten. E. g., G. "ich hätte es thun müssen, dürfen," etc. © E. g., Ags. 1. 2. 3. pl. bindað < *bindand= Goth. 3. pl. bindand. = I have. 'OHG. námi, Ags. nóme=Goth. subj. nêmeis, for the indicative namt. 8 E. g., E. for the nonce < for then (Ags. Jam, dan) ones; E. a napron > an apron; OHG. lisis thu >lisistu > lisist thu ; NHG. währendes Krieges >während des Krieges. E. g., Fr. pas, point, jamais, G. kein, which are not in themselves negative. Of course the use of two negatives (which according to logic make a positive) does not belong in this same category, because everywhere in natural, untutored speech several negatives are felt to strengthen one another just like other combinations of synonyms. 10 E. g., E. atonement, righteous, starvation, druggist, biographer, witticism, etc. But not only have grammatical categories become mixed, particular terms confused and significations changed seemingly without rime or reason, but even the most general tendencies of linguistic change that have as yet been discovered appear occasionally to have given way to others. What may be called the counterpart, in linguistics, of the law of gravitation in physics, viz., the tendency according to which the larger bodies of forms attract the smaller ones and few forms can long maintain themselves in complete isolation, even this most general tendency has apparently not worked without exception. Throughout the history of the Germanic languages, for instance, the so-called weak verbs, being much more numerous than the strong, have attracted the latter, and many strong verbs have in the course of time passed over into the weak conjugation. As everybody knows, this tendency is still at work and the vulgar and dialectic forms knowed and growed for knew and grew are exactly in a line with the recognized sowed and glowed for the older sew and glew. In a few exceptional cases, however, weak verbs have gone over into the strong conjugation, e. g., the E. dig with its modern pret. dug for the older digged, and the G. preisen and weisen. With what degree of assurance can we then assert that in any particular instance one or the other tendency is the natural one? To such questions we may reply that in spite of all these anomalies most languages are in the main remarkably regular and the ruling tendencies in their development are unmistakable. The seeming irregularities are not due to the fact that any well recognized tendency has suddenly ceased to operate, but rather to the fact that there are always a number of conflicting tendencies, the relative strength of which it is not easy to determine. Very often our failure to recognize law and order has been caused by a desire to reduce all linguistic changes to very simple principles, forgetting how complicated the processes are and how many different factors have to be taken into account. It may be hoped that as our knowledge of facts increases and our conception of the nature of linguistic processes becomes clearer, the causes of many as yet unexplained exceptions will be revealed. Meanwhile there are in every language cases of variation in usage where the philologist can well determine which of the several forms of expression would be most in accord with the natural tendencies of the language. There can be no doubt that the most perfect language would exhibit the fewest idiosyncracies, that it would, as far as possible, express difference of meaning by difference of form, and likeness of meaning by likeness of form, and that it would do both by the simplest means that would be effective. Such regularity economizes force in the acquisition and the use of the language, and it enhances its beauty and usefulness. There can also be no reasonable doubt that in the same degree as a nation has guarded and advanced its other intellectual and moral interests, it has also striven, more or less consciously, to improve its language. What is then proposed, is, after all, only that the unsystematic and disorganized efforts of the millions should be directed by the systematic and organized efforts of the few that can bring the greatest intelligence to bear on the problem. It is, however, not only a question of making language simpler and more regular, but also of enriching it and adapting it to the needs of our ever changing life and thought. Simplicity and regularity depend chiefly on grammar, including pronunciation and orthography; the adaptation of language to the varying conditions of life and thought, however, is largely a matter of vocabulary. It is conceivable that in regard to its grammar a language may reach a comparatively stable condition, as, e. g., modern English has done, though even there changes in pronunciation are in progress and in other grammatical fields also the struggle between contesting forms is still going on. Change of vocabulary, however, is synonymous with general intellectual activity. Not only do philosophers, scientists, inventors |