it was found impossible to send away suitors satisfied, by having their causes tried, when, from the multiplicity of actions on the docket at a circuit court once a year, but a few could be tried; and the people not discerning always what prevented it, laid the blame upon the judges. It would re- quire twelve judges, one of these holding a circuit or nisi prius court, every three months, to keep down, or discharge the business without delay through the state. The system is much preferable, of district judges, with writs of error to a court of the last resort. Presidents alternating with each other in adjoining districts, under some regulation, might be an improvement. But in that case it would be unreasonable not to allow journey expences according to the extra riding. Something of this nature has been done in a particular case, but provision ought to be made by a general law, to a certain extent, in all cases. But, a

5th, And leading cause of that obloquy under which all courts of justice, and the supreme court especially, laboured from 1800 down, was to be found in the temper of the times.

The pressure of the preceding causes, had been felt by the people, joined to others more latent, and of a personal nature, so far as respected manners; and there was an uneasiness, and struggle to throw off the whole judiciary. With a certain description there was a struggle to throw off the law altogether. This was the case pretty generally with those editors of journals, who had been in the habit of arraigning characters at their bar, and did not much relish there being an appeal to the courts of law, in cases of libel. The common law itself, therefore, became a subject of defamation; and batteries were erected in every county; and gazettes playing upon it in every direction. What was common law, seemed to be uncertain, and could not be understood. No one likes the restraint of law. The idea is always popular and pleasing, to be able to do without it. The language of John Cade, in Shakespeare, is much the same with the popular and prevailing sentiments, at a certain period in Pennsylvania.

Even learning itself began to be considered as a disqualification for office; at least for the legislature.

So far as respected law it seemed to be pretty generally

the opinion that it could be dispensed with in the decisions of questions of property; indeed, in every matter of demand, or even trespass, unless with some reservation of appeal in certain cases, the idea was, that good sense, without a knowledge of legal rules, might suffice. Hence the increase of the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace; and the system of arbitrations.

The then governor, who had been chief justice of the state, undertook to stem these innovations as unconstitutional. This naturally led to the meditating a change of the constitution itself. It requires great judgment and knowledge of the popular current in favour of what is called reform, to know how far to stem it, or how far to fall with it, until its force is spent. Where a reform is really judicious to a certain extent; if it is resisted, short of that extent, it swells to a torrent, and goes to a greater excess than it would otherwise have done. The people would have the jurisdiction of the justices encreased; and arbitrations introduced, that they might make the experiment. I was for having it done; and was sorry that any impediment or obstruction was thrown in the way. I well knew that the rage would satiate itself, and on experiment what was found salutary, would be retained; and what was otherwise would be amended or abrogated. I could pretty well see where it would ultimately rest; and that would not be far from where it began, as to arbitrations. The single amendment that I saw necessary in the law as to arbitration, was this, that at the instance of the defendant on the return of the writ into court, a reference might be ordered by the court to be conducted under their direction. And, at the discretion of the court themselves, in any case, where a cause appeared proper for a reference, it should be ordered. This would take place chiefly in matters of account; or in controversies of lesser moment.

I am favourable to the increase of the jurisdiction of the justices; and perhaps from the depreciation of the circulating medium, it might be still farther augmented. Be that as it may, I consider it much more favourably than I do an indefinite reference to arbitration.

A discontent with the judiciary branch, would seem, in

some measure, to have subsided. The chief justice, at least, is above all exception. The delay in the admini stration of justice, which as we have pointed out, was a great cause of it, has been in part removed. By an act of 24th February, 1806, it was provided that "no circuit court of the supreme court, shall be held otherwise than by a single judge. By this act also, the high court of errors and appeals, which was also a cause of delay, was suspended, so as to sustain no new cause; but, with a power to hold two terms at which all the causes then before them should be determined and whereupon the said court should be abolished."

By an act of the 11th March, 1811, circuit courts were abolished, which had been a distressing grievance to the judges of the supreme court, and a great ground of delay of trials, and consequent dissatisfaction of the country. By this act it was provided that, no issues in fact should be tried in bank; a thing which the judges of the supreme court themselves, as I have already pointed out, ought long before, to have corrected, and which they had the power to do.

By the act of 24th February, 1806, the state had been divided into two districts of the supreme court, called the Eastern and Western: And by act 10th April, 1807, a middle district was established. And now by the act of 11th March, 1811, two new district terms were added; so that so far as respected the hearing causes in Bank, justice, if not brought home to every man's door, must be said, at least, to be brought nearer to it. All these were great improvements; for writs of error, to a court in Bank at Philadelphia, were to a great part of the state, but a mere illusion, and a name. And yet before these terms were established, writs of error could ly only to that in Philadelphia, for it was the term for the whole state. For this reason, a case at nisi prius, in the remote counties especially, not appealed from, founds but little presumption of an acquiescence in the law decided. And hence nisi prius decisions in Pennsylvania are of the less weight. The great bulk of these referred to in Smith's edition of the laws, ought to pass for nothing, except so far as to give information as to a knowledge of the history of the law, and the way of thinking of individual judges.

By an act of the 30th March, 1811, "the district court for the city and county of Philadelphia," was established; to take jurisdiction, "where the sum in controversy shall exceed one hundred dollars," and to which court, "all suits, and causes depending in the court of common pleas of the city and county of Philadelphia, where the sum in controversy exceeds one hundred dollars shall be transfered, and the original jurisdiction of the said court of common pleas of the city and county of Philadelphia where the sum in controversy exceeds one hundred dollars, shall thenceforth cease and determine." This gave great relief to the court of common pleas, and, by such tail race, so to speak, the wheel of this court continued no longer to wade, as the phrase of the millers is. It is farther provided by this act," that no suit shall be removed from the district court by certiorari, or habeas corpus; but, that in all cases, the final judgment of the said district court may be examined and affirmed, or reversed on a writ of error from the supreme court." By this provision, a great relief is given to the supreme court, lessening the number of trials at nisi prius, so as to present a prospect of the wheel of that court, no longer continuing to wade also. For though there is a sufficiency of business for the nisi prius of the supreme court, even sitting 33 weeks in the year which is prescribed by law, yet it is in the power of the court by this means to keep the business pretty well done, and we hear now of little or no complaint of the delay, which has been justly termed a denial of justice; for it is a denial to a certain extent. All things considered, the system of the judiciary establishment in Pennsylvania, is the best in the union, but is even yet susceptible of some amendments. As I have already hinted, one of these is, the reducing the number of counties in some of the presidential districts to the constitutional limit of three. It is preposterous that there be four, five or six counties in a mountainous district; and not more than three, in some cases, in the level country, and where the seats of justice are more adjoining. It is an unequal distribution for the same salary. The earliest attention of the legislature, ought to be drawn to this; more especially

as in the mountainous country of the western districts, a greater croud of business, from ejectments depending, has been thrown upon the dockets, from the abolition of the circuit courts. It is what reflects much credit upon the late and present administration of the state government, that the attention of the legislature has been so much drawn to amendments, both of the judicial codes, and judiciary system; and though sometimes touched unskiifully, in the opinion of scientific men; yet, no question can be raised, but that a disposition has been shewn to do what was for the best.

On the Naturalization Laws of Congress, and the principle involved in the right of expatriation.

CAN the subject of a foreign power, be detained contrary to his subjection? It would be immoral to detain a bale of cloth; and why the property of a man? But is he detained by our naturalization laws? It might not be immoral were we only to refuse the aid of our municipal law, for the apprehending and delivering him to his sovereign. But do not our naturalization laws oblige us to go farther; and to protect him against the claim of his sovereign demanding him? That cannot but be implied; for allegiance and protection are reciprocal.

But it cannot be construed, it will be said, as going further than to protect while under our municipal law. But the going that length must imply that he is his own property, and may be protected, at least, to that extent, against the claim of his sovereign. As to the protecting him while in our service, and out of the municipal jurisdiction, can involve a question of power only, not of right. If we have a right to protect him while under our municipal law, we have a right to protect him while out of it, and on the high seas if we can do it. The allegation therefore is idle, that there is a distinction in the case, between the right to protect within our municipal jurisdiction, and out of it.