are visible; the beauties which they relish are of the coarsest kind; and of these they have only a weak and confused impression; while in others, taste rises to an acute discernment, and a lively enjoyment of the most refined beauties. This inequality of taste among men is to be ascribed undoubtedly in part, to the different frame of their natures; to nicer organs, and more delicate internal powers, with which some are endued beyond others; yet it is owing still more to culture and education. Taste is certainly one of the most improvable faculties of our nature. We may easily be convinced of the truth of this assertion, by only reflecting on that immense superiority which education and improvement give to civilized, above barbarous nations, in refinement of taste; and on the advantage, which they give in the same nation to those who have studied the liberal arts, above the rude and illiterate vulgar. Reason and good sense have so extensive an influence on all the operations and decisions of taste, that a completely good taste may well be considered, as a power compounded of natural sensibility to beauty, and of improved understanding. To be satisfied of this, we may observe, that the greater part of the productions of genius are no other than imitations of nature; representations of the characters, actions, or manners of men. Now the pleasure we experience from such imitations or representations, is founded on mere taste; but to judge whether they be properly executed belongs to the understanding, which compares the copy with the original. In reading, for instance, the neid of Virgil, a great part of our pleasure arises from the proper conduct of the plan, or story; from all the parts being joined together with probability and due connexion; from the adoption of the characters from nature, the correspondence of the sentiments to the characters, and of the style to the sentiments. The pleasure which is derived from a poem so conducted, is felt or enjoyed by taste, as an internal sense; but the discovery of this conduct in the poem is owing to rea-son; and the more reason enables us to discover such propriety in the conduct, the greater will be our plea sure. The constituents of taste, when brought to its most perfect state, are two, delicacy and correctness. Delicacy of taste refers principally to the perfection of that natural sensibility, on which taste is founded. It implies those finer organs or powers, which enable us to discover beauties that are concealed from a vulgar eye. It is judged of by the same marks, that we employ in judging of the delicacy of an external sense. As the goodness of the palate is not tried by strong flavours, but by a mixture of ingredients, where, notwithstanding the confusion, we remain sensible of each; so delicacy of internal taste appears, by a quick and lively sensibility to its finest, most compounded, or most latent objects. Correctness of taste respects the improvement this faculty receives through its connexion with the understanding. A man of correct taste is one, who is never imposed on by counterfeit beauties; who carries always in his own mind, that standard of good sense, which he employs in judging of every thing. He estimates, with propriety, the relative merit of the several beauties, which he meets in any work of genius; refers them to their proper classes; assigns the principles, as far as they can be traced, whence their power of pleasing is derived; and is pleased himself precisely in that degree, in which he ought, and no more. Taste is certainly not an arbitrary principle, which is subject to the fancy of every individual, and which admits no criterion for determining, whether it be true or false. Its foundation is the same in every human mind. It is built upon sentiments and perceptions, which are inseparable from our nature; and which generally operate with the same uniformity as our other intellectual principles. When these sentiments are perverted by ignorance or prejudice, they may be rectified by reason. Their sound and natural state is finally determined by comparing them with the general taste of mankind. Let men declaim as much as they please, concerning the caprice and uncertainty of taste; it is found by experience, that there are beauties, which, if displayed in a proper light, have power to command lasting and universal admiration. In every composition, what interests the imagination, and touches the heart, gives pleasure to all ages and nations. There is a certain string, which being properly struck, the human heart is so made as to accord to it. Hence the universal testimony, which the most improved nations of the earth, through a long series of ages, have concurred to bestow on some few works of genius; such as the Iliad of Homer, and the Æneid of Virgil. Hence the authority which such works have obtained, as standards of poetical composition; since by them we are enabled to collect what the sense of mankind is, with respect to those beauties, which give them the highest pleasure, and which, therefore, poetry ought to exhibit. Authority or prejudice may in one age or country, give a short-lived reputation to an indifferent poet, or a bad artist; but when foreigners, or posterity examine his works, his faults are discovered, and the genuine taste of human nature is seen. Time overthrows the illusions of opinion, but establishes the decisions of nature. What is TASTE? Is it a faculty common to all? How do the rudiments of taste appear in childrer.? How in savages? What is inferred from this? How does taste appear in different individuals? What is the cause of this inequality? Is taste an improvable faculty? How may we be convinced of this? Of what is a completely good taste compounded? How may we be satisfied of this? How is this illustrated in reading the Eneid of Virgil? What are the constituents of taste? What is said of delicacy of taste? Upon what is it built? What has been found by experience with respect to taste? Are the Iliad and Æneid standards of poetical composition? CRITICISM.-GENIUS.-PLEASURES OF TASTE. SUBLIMITY IN OBJECTS. TRUE criticism is the application of taste and of good sense, to the several fine arts. Its design is to distinguish what is beautiful, and what is faulty, in every performance. From particular instances, it ascends to general principles; and gradually forms rules or conclusions concerning the several kinds of beauty in works of genius. Criticism is an art, founded entirely on experience; on the observation of such beauties as have been found to please mankind most generally. For example, Aristotle's rules concerning the unity of action in dramatic and epic composition, were not first discovered by logical reasoning, and then applied to poetry; but they were reduced from the practice of Homer and Sophocles. They were founded upon observing the superior pleasure which we derive from the relation of an action, which is one and entire, beyond what we receive from the relation of scattered and unconnected facts. A superior genius, indeed, will of himself, uninstructed, compose in such manner, as is agreeable to the most important rules of criticism; for as these rules are founded in nature, nature will frequently suggest them in practice. Homer was acquainted with no system of the art of poetry. Guided by genius alone, he composed in verse a regular story, which all succeeding ages have admired. This, however, is no argument against the usefulness of criticism. For since no human genius is perfect, there is no writer who may not receive assistance from critical observations upon the beauties and faults of those who have gone before him. No rules indeed can supply the defects of genius, or inspire it, where it is wanting; but they may often guide it into its proper channel; they may correct its extravagances, and teach it the most just and proper imitation of nature. Critical rules are intended chiefly to point out the faults which ought to be avoided. We must be indebted to nature for the production of eminent beauties. GENIUS is a word which in common acceptation extends much further than to objects of taste It sig nifies that talent or aptitude which we receive from nature, in order to excel in any one thing whatever. A man is said to have a genius for mathematics as well as a genius for poetry; a genius for war, for politics, or for any mechanical employment. Genius may be greatly improved by art and study; but by them alone it cannot be acquired. As it is a higher faculty than taste, it is ever, according to the common frugality of nature, more limited in the sphere of its operations. There are persons, not unfrequently to be met, who have an excellent taste in several of the polite arts; such as music, poetry, painting, and eloquence; but an excellent performer in all these arts is very seldom found; or rather is not to be looked for. A universal genius, or one who is equally and indifferently inclined toward several different professions and arts, is not likely to excel in any. Although there may be some few exceptions, yet in general it is true, that when the mind is wholly directed toward some one object exclusively of others, there is the fairest prospect of eminence in that, whatever it may be. Extreme heat can be produced, only when the rays converge to a single point. Young persons are highly interested in this remark; since it may teach them to examine with care, and to pursue with ardour, that path, which nature has marked out for their peculiar exertions. The nature of taste, the nature and importance of criticism, and the distinction between taste and genius, being thus explained; the sources of the pleasures of taste shall next be considered. Here a very extensive field is opened; no less, than all the pleasures of the imagination, as they are generally called, whether afforded us by natural objects, or by imitations and descriptions of them. It is not, however, necessary to the purpose of the present work, that all these be examined fully; the pleasure, which we receive from discourse or writing, being the principal object of them. Our design is to give some opening into the pleasures of taste in general, and to insist more particularly upon sublimity and beauty. We are far from having yet attained any system concerning this subject. A regular inquiry into it was first attempted by Mr. Addison, in his essay on the |