We may learn from experience, that whatever opening there may be left for human freedom, (and enough is there left, both for merit and demerit,) it is not so uncontrolled as in the least to affect the universe. It is not in our power to interrupt the course of nature; nor can we, like the giants of old, heap mountain upon mountain. There is an irreversible order of things, to which we necessarily submit; an indissoluble concatenation of successive causes with their effects, by which both the being and the well-being of this whole are maintained. This divine order or concatenation has different denominations: referred to the Supreme Being as to its author, we call it fate; referred to his foresight for the good of all, we call it providence.* It is this which mingles itself with all our actions and designs; which cooperates with the pilot, the husbandman, and the merchant; nor with these alone, but with all of every degree, from the meanest peasant, up to the mightiest monarch. If it cooperate favourably, they succeed; if otherwise, they fail. And hence the supposed efficacy of time and place, so often of such importance in this cooperation. It is hence, “the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong," &c. A pilot sails, with intention to reach a certain port. All that the skill of a good navigator can suggest, is done; yet he sails at a time when hurricanes arise, and, instead of gaining the destined port, is dashed upon the rocks. A farmer with proper industry manures and sows his fields; yet the seasons destroy his harvest, and (according to his own phrase) "the times fight against him." A merchant travels, for the sake of gain, to a distant country, and there contracts a pestilential disease, which carries him off. These incidents, thus connected with time and place, are referred in common language to chance, as to their cause; and so indeed they may, as far as chance implies a cause, which human reasoning was not able either to foresee or obviate. But if we go further, and suppose it a cause, where there is, in fact, no reason at all; in such case we do nothing less than deify chance, committing the affairs of the world to the blindest of guides, instead of that One, All-good, All-powerful, Divine Intelligence, which, in the same undivided instant, both sees and hears all things." And so much for the two genera or arrangements of when and where. * Three terms are here employed, chance, fate, and providence; the two first of which have been often improperly asserted, the last has been often hardily denied, and all this to favour the Atheistic system. servient to the cause of Providence, and by making them wholly dependent on the supreme intelligent principle, to make them weaken the system of Atheism, rather than contribute to its support. y See Epicharmus, quoted in note a, p. The author of these notes has endeavoured to give such meanings to the terms 282. chance and fate, as may render them sub CHAPTER XIII. CONCERNING POSITION OR SITUATION. WHAT IT IS, AND HOW DEDUCED HOW IT EXISTS IN BEINGS INANIMATE-IN VEGETABLES—— IN MAN-ANIMAL PROGRESSION. WORKS OF ART. ATTITUDESILLUSTRATIONS OF ATTITUDE-FROM POETS-FROM ACTORS FROM ORATORS. ITS EFFICACY, WHENCE, POSITION, AMONG THE ELEMENTS OF DEMOCRITUS-ITS INFLUENCE AND IMPORTANCE IN THE NATURAL WORLD-IN THE INTELLECTUAL. THE arrangement or predicament of position or situation has a near affinity with that of place. They are both of the relative order, and are both conversant, when taken strictly, about corporeal substances only. They differ, however, inasmuch as the simple possession of space constitutes place; the manner of posIsessing it, position, or situation." Now the manner, in which a body possesses space, has respect to certain relations, which exist, some within, and some without it; relations, which arise from its parts, its whole, its immediate place, and the place surrounding it. We shall explain what we assert, (which perhaps may appear obscure,) by beginning from bodies the most simple, and passing from these to others, more complex and diversified. The simplest and most perfectly similar of all bodies is the sphere. If, therefore, we take a sphere, and place it upon the ground, the part furthest from the earth's centre we call its top; that the nearest, its bottom; and all lying between we call its 2 Differt situs ab ubi in hoc, quod ubi est locatio totius, situs est ordinatio partium in loco. Ubi est simpliciter esse in loco; situs secundum partium ordinationem. Fell, p. 104. Ad situm omnem requiritur triplex habitudo, quæ conjuncta constituit situm; habitudo partium alicujus totius inter se; partium alicujus totius ad ipsum totum ; partium et totius ad locum. Sanderson, p. 49. l. i. c. 14. Prædicamentum situs (ketola) respicit positionem rei, tum respectu partium suarum inter se, tum respectu loci, aliarumque rerum. Wallis, 1. i. c. 13. Οὔτε οὖν τὸ κείμενον σῶμα, οὔτε τὸν τόπον, ἐν ᾧ κεῖται, τῇ διανοίᾳ περιλαμβάνοντα, δεῖ νοεῖν τὸ κεῖσθαι, μόνην δὲ τὴν ἔχουσαν πως θέσιν ἐν τῷ γένει τοῦ κεῖσθαι λογιζόμενον κατὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα, ὅσα πέφυκεν ἕτερα ὑφ ̓ ἑτέρων ἀνέχεσθαι, ή ἐνιδρύεσθαι τὰ ἕτερα ἐν τοῖς ἑτέροις· ἡ γὰρ τοιάδε συμπλοκὴ τῶν ἐνιδρυμένων καὶ τῶν τὴν ἕδραν παρεχόντων κυριωτάτη καὶ πρωτίστη ἐστὶ τοῦ κεῖσθαι ὑπογραφή : "We are not to understand the genus of lying, or position, by taking into our discussion either the body lying, or the place in which it lies, but singly and solely by taking into our account the peculiar mode of site in the genus of lying, as it runs through all those ranks of beings, which are formed by nature to be supported some of them by others, or to be seated some of them upon others; for it is this connection between things that are seated, and things that afford the seat, which makes the primary and the strictest description of lying, or position." Simpl. in Præd. p. 85. edit. Basil. 1551. a The sphere, and other solid figures, soon after mentioned in this chapter, are, for the greatest part, well known. He, however, who wishes for ocular inspection, may find them all (the sphere alone excepted) among the diagrams of the eleventh and twelfth books of Euclid, to which books we refer him, as they are easy to be had, under various editions. middle. These distinctions in the sphere regard external objects only, because the sphere, being everywhere similar, contributes nothing to them itself. If we roll it, therefore, along, the distinctions are not lost; only, while the motion continues, they perpetually vary, and that merely with reference to local distinctions, existing without. And hence it follows, that the sphere, though it have place, yet according to these reasonings has in strictness no position, because it has no peculiar parts deducible from its own figure, which parts can be called top or bottom, as contradistinguished one to another. What is true of the sphere, may be asserted almost as truly of the five Platonic bodies, the equilateral pyramid, the cube, the octoedron, &c., and that, because they are not only regular, but because their several faces are every way similar. What is true of these bodies, is true also of their opposites, the bodies I mean, which are not only dissimilar, but universally irregular. Fragments of rock, and hillocks of sand, have neither top nor bottom, but what is merely casual; and therefore, though of necessity they exist in place by being bodies, yet, as they have no internal local distinctions under the meaning here adopted, it of course follows they cannot properly have position. But if we pass to those bodies which are neither irregular, like the broken rock, because they have order and proportion; nor yet every way similar, like the sphere, because they have extensions that are unequal, (such, for example, as the cylinder, or the parallelipopedon;) here we shall find the very bodies, from their own attributes, to concur with the world around, both in acquiring to themselves position, as well as in diversifying it. The cylinder, for example, extends further one way than another, and therefore possesses within itself three such parts, as two extremes, and one mean. If we so place it, therefore, that one of these extremes (no matter which) shall be most remote from the earth's centre, and the other most near; in such case, by this manner of blending external and internal relations, the cylinder is said to stand. If we remove in part the higher extreme from its perpendicular, and thus differently blend relations, the cylinder is said to incline. And if we pursue this inclination, till the two extremes of top and bottom become horizontal, then it is said to lie. The motion which leads from standing to lying, we call falling; that from lying to standing, we call rising. Every one of these affections may well happen to the cylinder, because its peculiar figure, taken with its peculiar place, cooperates to the production of the positions here described. It is not so with those bodies already mentioned, where these internal characters are not distinguished. The sphere and the cube neither fall nor rise, because they neither stand nor lie more at one time than another. But suppose we go further: suppose to one extreme of this cylinder we add a new part, that is a capital; to the other extreme another part, that is a base: the two extremes of the cylinder would no longer in such case remain indiscriminate, but the characters of top and bottom would become distinguished and ascertained, even in the figure itself, without looking to things external. The consequences of these new characters are new modes of position. A pillar (for such we must now suppose it) is not only capable, like the simple cylinder, of standing and of lying, but inasmuch as two of its parts, that is to say, its extremes, are essentially distinguished, if it rest on its base, it stands upright; if on its capital, it stands inverted. Let us carry our suppositions further, and by a metamorphosis, like one of Ovid's, transform this pillar into a tree. Let the capital sprout into branches, the shaft become a trunk, and the base strike into roots. Here then in a vegetable subject we behold the same distinctions; a top, a bottom, and a middle of its own, leading as before to the same diversities of position. If we still pursue the metamorphosis, and transform the tree into a man, making its branches into a head, its trunk into a body, and its roots into feet, we shall discover also in an animal subject the same distinctions as before; and the subject will in consequence be capable of lying, as well as of standing; of standing upright, as well as inverted. But this is not all. Man is not only an extended substance, like the column, or the tree, but over and above, as an animal, he is by nature locomotive. Now the part of him in progression, which leads the way, we denominate his fore part, or front; the opposite, his hinder part, or rear; and the two parts upon each side, his right and his left. And thus has man, in consequence of his animal frame, over and above the former distinctions of top and bottom, (both of them common to the other subjects already described,) four additional distinctions peculiar to him as an animal, the distinctions of front and rear, of right and left, which four are wholly unknown both to the column and to the tree. While he is under the position of standing, these four distinctions have little force, but when he happens to lie, then is their efficacy seen, and each of them leads to a new and different position. If his front, while he is lying, be nearest to the earth, then is he said to lie prone; if his hinder part, or rear, then to lie supine; if neither of these, then it is either on his right, or on his left; which positions are unknown either to the pillar or the tree. Thus, besides the standing positions of upright and inverted, has man, in consequence of his frame, four other positions, which appertain to him, as he lies; so that his frame taken together, as one perfect whole, is susceptible of six different and specific positions, which have referenee to the six different and specific extensions of his body.b Fables tell us, that the triangular island Sicily was thrown upon the Giant Typhoeus. Under one promontory lay his right arm; under another, his left; under a third, his legs; under Mount Etna, his head; under the whole island his body, having his breast upwards, his back downwards. These positions refer to the several extensions above described. Vasta giganteis ingesta est insula membris Ovid. Metam. v. 346. But not to anticipate with regard to poets, of whom we shall say more hereafter. In a cube there are six faces, capable of denoting as many positions; and yet there is this important difference between the cube and the man: the faces of the cube being all of them similar, its positions, being only nominal, can only refer to things without, and every face can alike concur to the forming of the same position. But the parts analogous to these in man being all of them dissimilar, his positions, being real, are by no means thus commutable; but if the head be uppermost, then, and then only, is he, by position, upright; if his back be uppermost, then, and then only, is he, by position, prone; nor can he possibly be called either prone or upright, were any other part to exist in the same place, excepting the two here mentioned. From what has been alleged, we see the true origin of position or situation. "It arises from the relation which the distinctions of parts within bear to the distinctions of place without; and it varies, of course, as this relation is found to vary." The fewer of these internal distinctions any being possesses, the less always the number of its possible positions. As it possesses more, its positions increase with them. As to the progression of animals, peculiar to them as animals, that progression (I mean) by which they move, not as mere bodies, but as bodies possessed of instinct and sensation; it is to be observed, that this progression is formed by the help of joints and muscles; and that these, during their operation, form within b See these different extensions, which Aristotle calls “ distances,” διαστάσεις, fully discussed in his treatise De Animalium ingressu, p. 129. edit. Sylb. In his History of Animals, we read, exei d' d avoρwπos kal τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω, καὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν καὶ τὰ ὀπίσθια, καὶ δεξιὰ καὶ ἀριστερά. Hist. Animal. p. 17. edit. Sylb. |