LETTER, &c.

REVEREND SIR,

WHEN your Letter to me was announced in

the public papers, I expected only a pasquinade under a fictitious name, in which I was again to be represented as an advocate for the Church of Rome, because I had promoted the Liturgy of the Church of England. Such representations are perfectly congenial with the spirit of the ancient Puritans, who regarded the Churches of England and of Rome as twin-sisters, who viewed the Prayer-book and the Mass-book in the same light, and always inveighed against the Church of Rome, when they meditated a blow against the Church of England. But I never heard before, that the members of your Church admitted the similarity which was urged by the Puritans; and therefore, as your name was previously unknown to me, I supposed it was nothing more than a mask, to conceal an attack from some other quarter. I have been lately however informed, that you have a real existence; and that, so far from writing in

the way of ridicule or banter, you are serious in supposing me a defender of the Church of Rome. I do not, indeed, perceive that you consider me as altogether a convert to your religion; but you claim the honor (if an honor it is) of having, in the Margaret Professor of the University of Cambridge, an advocate of those very principles, which the writers of your Church have urged against the Reformation.

every

You suppose, that I have abandoned "the vital principle of Protestantism;" that I have conceded to the Church of Rome the post, in which she strived to entrench herself against the early Reformers; and you admire the manliness and candor, with which the concession has been made by a Protestant Professor. The notion, once entertained by Protestant, that the Bible only is the fountain of religious truth, is now abandoned, as you imagine, by a Divine even of the Established Church. I am supposed to admit, that something more than the Bible is wanted, to maintain the truth of the doctrines, as well of our Church, as of your own. I am consequently represented, as defending the Church of England against Protestant Dissenters, on the same ground, as the Church of Rome was defended against the tenets of Luther. I should hardly have supposed that my real meaning could have been so strangely misunderstood, if similar representations had not been already made by some of my Protestant opponents. I ascribed them, however, entirely to the heat of contro versy; I thought them unworthy of notice, and supposed, that, with every rational being, they would involve their own confutation. My opponents have full liberty to apply to me whatever names they choose, whether it be Papist, or Socinian, whether it be Jew or Mahometan. From such titles of intended reproach, no man can stand in need of vindication, whose religious opinions have been so fully

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and decidedly recorded. I do not indeed believe, that any thing opprobrious was intended on your part; on the contrary, you must, consistently, believe, that you confer an honor on every man, whom you consider as approaching to the Church of Rome. But since, with real earnestness, though with great simplicity, you have adopted the notion, that I have really conceded an important position to the Church of Rome, and this notion, if not confuted, might at the present moment be of serious injury to the Established Church, I no longer consider it as a matter of indifference, whether the confutation be withholden, or not. I will prove, therefore, that I have not made the concession imputed to me; that I have not required more than the Bible to maintain the truth of our doctrines; that I have not defended the Church of England against Protestant Dissenters on the same ground, that the Church of Rome was defended against the early Reformers. When the Church of England is assailed on all sides, it is more than ever necessary, that the foundation, on which it stands, should be neither weakened, nor misunderstood.

The chief cause of misapprehension on this subject must be sought in the common error of confounding two things, which, though united in our Church, are in themselves distinct; namely, "true religion," and "established religion." Men have argued, as if those terms were synonymous; and hence conclusions, which may be fairly deduced from the one, have been falsely deduced from the other. If the terms were synonymous, Truth would be often at variance with itself; it would apply, or not apply, to the very same thing, according to mere accident. And as a religion does not become true, because it is established, so, on the other hand, a religion is not necessarily the established religion, because it is the true one. For whether (for the sake of argument we suppose the Church of England, or

the Church of Rome, or the Church of Geneva, or any other Church, to be the true and genuine form of Christianity, such form would then of necessity be every-where adopted. In fact, the establishment of a religion in any country (as both Bishop Warburton and Dr. Paley have clearly shown) is not founded on the consideration of its truth. The establishment of a religion is an act of the legislature but no legislative enactment can decide the question whether a religion be true or false. This question lies without the province of the legislature; it is a question of theology, and not of civil government. When a religion is established by law, the honors and emoluments, set apart for the ministers of religion, are exclusively appropriated to one religious party. But the legislature, in the selection of this party, and in preferring it to all the rest, is guided solely by the consideration of its superior utility to the state. And, as that religion, which is professed by the most numerous and most powerful party, is likely to be most useful to the state, it is this party, with which the state allies itself, and to which it affords an establishment. The persons, who profess the religion so established, both may be, and ought to be, directed in their choice, by a belief that the object of their choice is a true religion and so far the truth of a religion may operate, remotely or indirectly, on the decision of the legislature. But the immediate and direct motive, which operates in the establishment of a religion, is its utility to the state and that utility (namely, to the state) will be greater or less in proportion to the number and influence of the party which professes it. Thus, before the Reformation, the Church of Rome was the established Church in this country: but when the great body of the people agreed to profess Christianity under a different form, this form became the established religion: and it would cease to be the established religion, if at any time the great body of

the people should determine to profess Christianity under another form.

From these premises it necessarily follows, that whenever a religion is to be defended, very different arguments are requisite for its defence, according as we have to defend, either the truth of that religion, or the establishment of that religion. If, for instance, the truth of those doctrines, which constitute the religion now established in this country, required further illustration than has been already afforded them by our eminent Divines, a Churchman, in common with every other Protestant, would appeal to the authority of the Bible, and of the Bible alone. And he would confine himself to this appeal, whether he defended the truth of those doctrines against the objections of a Romanist, or against the objections of any other Christian. He would not appeal to the Liturgy, or the Articles, or the Homilies; for his opponents might reply, We do not recognize such authority.' Indeed it is obvious that, in every controversy, the sole authority, which can be consistently quoted, is such as is mutually admitted by the contending parties. For this reason it is useless, when a Romanist argues with a Protestant, to appeal to Tradition: for his opponent would silence him by the simple reply, that the Bible only is the religion of the Protestant.

But a very different mode of proceeding is necessary, when we undertake to defend a religion in reference to its establishment; or in other words, when we undertake to support an established religion against the dangers, which menace the destruction of that establishment. We are then concerned, not merely with an abstract theological inquiry: We are concerned also with a question of ecclesiastical, and even of civil polity. Every establishment presupposes a test: there never was, and there never can be, a religion established by law, without some formulary, to