Hypocrisy consists in a false pretension to virtue. It is employed as a means of drawing selfish advantages from an undeserved character for goodness. It involves the criminality of fraud. It tends to raise a suspicion even against virtue itself; and it includes a false assumption of superiority to which men do not patiently submit.

Most systems of mystical morality inculcate a perpetual struggle against human nature; a struggle in in which the most enthusiastic must constantly fail. Mysticism, moreover, has a necessary tendency to defeat itself. Wonder is the foundation of it; and novelty, or uncommonness, is essential to wonder. Let any thing become for a long time the sole or principal matter of contemplation, it grows familiar and common-place; and the sentiment of wonder is no longer excited by it. Thus, the more thoroughly a man becomes a mystic, the more certain he is to cease presently to be one; or if he continues to be a mystic in theory, he ceases to be so in practice. Mysticism as a motive of action, loses its influence over him. But mysticism is, and long and most extensively has been, a great source of consideration, influence, character, wealth, and power. Of course, Hypocrisy steps in to supply the place of enthusiasm. What was once sincere and hearty, now becomes merely formal. There is a vast deal of profession and pretension, with very little of reality; and as mysticism assumes the character of a mere dead letter, a creed full of absurdities, and a set of childish and tedious forms repeated by rote, but without intelligence or feeling, the doubt creeps on, whether morality

itself, morality being supposed wholly dependent upon mystic considerations, be any thing more than a fable or a dream.

12. It seems to be this disagreeable feeling of doubt and uncertainty, this general perception of the insufficiency of the mystic hypothesis, and the want of some more solid basis upon which to rest the theory of morals, which, under the name of want of Faith, has been pointed out by Mr. Carlyle, and some other late writers, as the great need, the prevailing pain and misery of the age.*

* Mr. Carlyle is a rhetorician. He vamps up and passes off old and common thoughts under the disguise of new phrases, and under a similar disguise, he vends some new thoughts too, which would hardly pass current, at least in England, if plainly spoken out. The phrase, want of faith, like many other of his phrases, has a very happy ambiguity. He has not thought it judicious to come to an open quarrel with the mystics, who still exercise a despotic and intolerant power over public opinion, and who in Great Britain control the courts of criminal law, and exercise a strict censorship over the press. Faith is a very convenient term. The mystics may, and will, understand it as meaning mystic faith, which is, indeed, in a rapid, though at the present moment, a silent progress of decay; and which not all the united efforts of bigotry and fanaticism will be able to revive. It is evident, however, that Mr. Carlyle regards this mystic faith as being, in his own phraseology, a sham, a humbug, a lie. This possible interpretation, however, serves as a honeyed cate for stopping the more than triple mouth of that watchful, but not very sagacious Cerberus, called, in England, the religious public. The want of faith to which Mr. Carlyle actually refers is a want of faith in the reality of duty and of virtue, a sort of eddy or counter current created by mystical faith in the modern European mind, which, in these times, has become more powerful than the main stream.

CHAPTER X.

MORALS A PROGRESSIVE SCIENCE.

1. IN estimating the moral character of actions there are three different sets of consequences to be taken into consideration; sets of consequences which are often in opposition to each other.

Those which may be called Consequences of the first order, are palpable consequences which result at once to certain particular assignable individuals.

Those which may be called Consequences of the second order, are remoter consequences liable to result at some future time to individuals assignable or not.

Those which may be called Consequences of the third order, are consequences not limited to particular individuals, but which spread and affect a whole community, or perhaps, the whole human race.*

2. In proportion as knowledge increases, and the rational faculties are more called into exercise, consequences of the second and third orders come to be more and more attended to, and exercise a constantly greater influence over moral judgments. It thus appears that the science of morals, like all other sciences, is progressive in its nature, advancing continually as experience extends. As a community grows more and more intelligent, the science of morals

* Bentham was the first to point out these useful and important distinctions. See Theory of Legislation, Vol. I. Principles of Legislation, ch. 10.

makes a constant progress, and diverges more and more from the rude and narrow maxims and notions of early times. This change relates primarily to theoretical morals. We shall presently proceed to inquire, upon what advancement in the practice of morality depends.

3. The moral opinions in which all men are and always have been agreed, relate to acts of which the immediate consequences in pleasure or pain to others, are very obvious; and as to the remote consequences of which, no question has yet been raised.

It is only necessary, however, to raise such a question, and to advance some probable reasons for supposing that the consequences of the second and third orders which result from any action, are contrary to those of the first order, to throw doubt upon the best settled moral precepts. For example, alms-giving, down to a very recent period, had been long and very extensively regarded as a meritorious act, however indiscriminately and thoughtlessly those alms might be bestowed. Of late, however, forceable reasons have been adduced to prove that indiscriminate alms-giving is attended by great evils of the second and third orders; whence has resulted a decided change of opinion, as to the moral character of indiscriminate charity.*

* An American Professor of Moral Philosophy - President Wayland - recently published a Treatise, upon the "Limitations of Moral Responsibility," the real object of which is, to show, that men are not under any moral obligation to regard consequences of the second and third order. The argument proceeds wholly upon mystical grounds; and affords a curious illustration of the sort of aid afforded by mysticism to morality.

CHAPTER X.

MORALS A PROGRESSIVE SCIENCE.

1. In estimating the moral character of actions. there are three different sets of consequences to be taken into consideration; sets of consequences which are often in opposition to each other.

Those which may be called Consequences of the first order, are palpable consequences which result at once to certain particular assignable individuals.

Those which may be called Consequences of the second order, are remoter consequences liable to result at some future time to individuals assignable or not.

Those which may be called Consequences of the third order, are consequences not limited to particular individuals, but which spread and affect a whole community, or perhaps, the whole human race.*

2. In proportion as knowledge increases, and the rational faculties are more called into exercise, consequences of the second and third orders come to be more and more attended to, and exercise a constantly greater influence over moral judgments. It thus appears that the science of morals, like all other sciences, is progressive in its nature, advancing continually as experience extends. As a community grows more and more intelligent, the science of morals

*Bentham was the first to point out these useful and important distinctions. See Theory of Legislation, Vol. I. Principles of Legislation, ch. 10.