when every man is liable to be called upon at any moment to risk his body and his life in the common defence, has, for very obvious reasons, been raised to the highest rank of virtues. Courage among the Romans was virtue par excellence; and the same estimate of it has been transmitted, from barbarous and warlike ancestors, to the nations of Modern Europe.

What is called moral courage and moral fortitude, consists in enduring, through the force of the moral sentiment, those numerous pains which spring from the malevolence of others to whom our conduct gives offence; particularly those pains to which we are subject through the sentiment of self-comparison, pains of obloquy, mortification, and disgrace.

7. The sentiment of self-comparison often combines with the sentiment of benevolence to produce physical courage and physical fortitude. Whereas, in cases requiring moral courage and moral fortitude, it often happens that the whole force, or almost the whole force, of that powerful sentiment, then called false shame, impels the other way. As moral courage and moral fortitude indicate, in general, a stronger force of moral obligation than physical courage and physical fortitude, they are, on that account, objects of a higher moral approbation; and as they are more rare, they are on, that account, objects also of greater admiration.

8. There is another quality called CONSTANCY, FIRMNESS, STEADINESS, PERSEVERANCE, closely related to Fortitude, and, indeed, only a modification of it, which is absolutely necessary towards the accom

plishment of any thing that requires continuous exertions. This quality results from the continuous predominancy of certain pains and desires, and an ability to bear certain pains without yielding to them. It depends partly on temperament or constitution, including the state of health, and partly on position. Temper or Self-control falls under this head. What is called Patience, is sometimes this. quality, and is sometimes fortitude, properly so called, or a mixture of both. Faithfulness or Fidelity is one particular modification of constancy.

9. But all these means for the production of virtuous actions must fail to be effectual, unless there be added to them a certain HOPEFULNESS, otherwise called CONFIDENCE, and, by some recent writers, FAITH; that is to say, a certain persuasion that we shall be able to accomplish the beneficial objects at which we aim. To point out the origin, nature, and modifications of this Hopefulness, or Faith, would lead us into some curious and important inquiries, which, however, would be foreign to the immediate objects of this Treatise. This Hopefulness or Faith, being essential to actions beneficial to others, is esteemed a virtue, and the want of it is stigmatized as a vice, under the names of Doubtfulness, Despondency, Skepticism. Doubt is painful in itself; it produces a pain of inferiority, and is shunned on that account. Confidence, or Faith, is in itself a pleasurable feeling, a pleasure of certainty, a pleasure of superiority, and on that account is sought and desired. Hopefulness is often carried to a degree which leads to absurd and impracticable enterprises, and makes.

us exhaust our energies to no purpose.

It is then no longer a virtue, but a vice, and is stigmatized as blind, irrational Folly and Credulity. A rational confidence is commonly implied in the use of the word, Wisdom.

10. But Benevolence, though seconded by all the qualities heretofore enumerated, must still fail to be productive in virtuous acts, unless there be added to it a certain degree of ACTIVITY, or inclination to act. Activity is of two sorts, muscular and mental, each head embracing many varieties. It depends upon the relative force of the pleasures of activity, through which men find a certain enjoyment in action independent of any of its other consequences either to themselves or others, and of the pains of activity, those pains which flow from every kind of action, when continued beyond a period greater or less. All this depends very much upon the state of the body as regards sickness or health; and to a certain degree, also, on original temperament; but much more upon habit. That degree of exertion which gives pleasure to a man in health accustomed to it, is absolutely intolerable to a sick man, or to one unaccustomed to it.

It

The influence of bodily health upon moral character is a most important matter, which of late years is beginning to attract the attention it deserves. affects, to a greater or less degree, all our capacities of pain and pleasure; and so influences our whole course of conduct.

Activity is so essential to virtuous actions, that the want of it, under the names of Sloth, Indolence,

Idleness, has been stigmatized as a vice, the parent of all the other vices; while activity, under the name of Industry, has been commended as the nurse of all the virtues.

11. But Benevolence, Wisdom, Courage, Fortitude, Constancy, Hopefulness, and disposition to act, all combined, are yet of no avail to produce actions beneficial to others, without Strength, Capacity, or Ability to act. Mental ability Mental ability is indeed included and implied in Wisdom. But even bodily strength was reckoned a virtue by the ancients; and all codes of morals enjoin the duty of preserving one's health; a duty which owes its origin in part to the fact, that a certain degree of health is essential to ability bodily or mental, and that a certain degree of bodily and mental ability is essential to action of any kind, and of course to virtuous action. The duty of preserving one's health depends also in part upon the fact, that ill health, by exposing us to the constant influence of certain bodily pains, tends thereby to diminish the force of the sentiment of benevolence.

12. But let it always be borne in mind, that all the preceding qualities, Wisdom, Courage, Fortitude, Constancy, Hopefulness, Activity, and Ability, only attain the character of virtues, by reason of a certain degree of benevolence, which is supposed to be joined with them. When any of these qualities exist, unattended by the ordinary force of the sentiment of Benevolence, they are no longer virtues, but vices. They are then called Craft,* Audacity, In

* Wisdom and Craft were originally used indifferently, to indicate a superior degree of knowledge and sagacity. Wisdom is now re

sensibility, Obstinacy, Credulity, Restlessness, Brute force. These qualities, therefore, in point of fact, are, in their own nature, morally indifferent; and they only come to be considered as morally good or morally bad, that is, to assume the character of Virtues, or Vices, accordingly as, being conjoined with, or dissevered from, the sentiment of benevolence, they operate towards the production of beneficial or injurious actions.

CHAPTER IV.

DEFINITIONS OF VIRTUE.

1. We may now be able to understand why all attempts hitherto made to give a definition of Virtue have failed. Those attempts have proceeded upon the supposition, that what is meant by the word Virtue is a simple, identical thing. Whereas, under that term, in its more general sense, is included all that part of human nature which coöperates in impelling and enabling men to perform actions beneficial to others; first, the pains and pleasures of benevolence; secondly, certain impulses of the pains and pleasures of self-comparison; thirdly, those pains and pleasures of anticipation included under the heads of the fear of punishment and the hope of

stricted to signify knowledge and sagacity employed for good ends, while Craft is employed to designate knowledge and capacity employed for bad ends.