40. Generally speaking, the love of knowledge leads to the performance of beneficial actions, since all have an interest in the advancement of knowledge. Hence it has ordinarily been reckoned by moralists a good motive of action. When it takes an injurious turn, or one thought to be so, it is stigmatized as Inquisitiveness, Impertinent Curiosity, or, to use a modern term, Want of Reverence.

41. We have thus pointed out the operation of the sentiment of Self-comparison, when acting in opposition to, and conjointly with, the sentiment of Benevolence. But sometimes it acts in conjunction with the sentiment of Malevolence. A superiority over me, against which I struggle in vain, and which seems likely to be permanent until I become accustomed to it, and lose all hope, and with hope all desire to shake it off-inflicts upon me a pain, which makes me hate him who is the cause of it. The hatred arising from this particular cause is called Envy. The feeling with which we regard those who seem likely to obtain a superiority over us, but who have not yet fully succeeded in doing so, is called Jealousy. As envy and jealousy often lead us to depreciate, or to injure, those who are particular objects, to the rest of the world, of admiration and love, by reason of some good quality in which they excel; hence these feelings are regarded, in a moral point of view, as among the worst motives of action. All codes of morals, however, make a certain allowance for the force of these feelings; and they justify, in the conduct of rivals towards each other, or pass by, with a slight reproach, many injurious actions,

which between other parties would be held inexcusable; while many beneficial acts done towards a rival attain a character of extraordinary virtue, called Magnanimity, which, but for the circumstance of rivalry, would not have been so regarded.*

CHAPTER III.

OF CERTAIN QUALITIES OR TEMPERAMENTS CALLED VIRTUES BECAUSE THEY ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE PERFORMANCE OF BENEFICIAL ACTIONS.

1. HAVING thus enumerated and separately examined the sentiments, that is to say, the sensibilities to pleasures and pains, which operate to modify the influence of the sentiment of benevolence over human judgment and conduct, we now proceed to enumerate and define certain qualities, which are called virtues, because without them, the highest degree of benevolence will be unproductive in actions beneficial to others. These qualities are included under the head of virtue, because that term is employed to describe the entire impulse, whatever it may be, or however compounded, upon which the performance of beneficial actions depends; and as, without them, beneficial actions cannot be performed, they are naturally included under the term virtue.

* Milton's Satan

as Dryden observes, the true hero of Paradise Lost is a most splendid personification of the sentiment of Selfcomparison in all its manifold operations.

2. First among these qualities may be mentioned WISDOM, otherwise called PRUdence, though this latter term is generally employed in a much more restricted sense. By wisdom is signified a superior knowledge of relations in general. When employed in reference to morals, it signifies a superior knowledge of the relations between actions and human happiness; or, more generally, a superior knowledge of those relations upon which human happiness depends; without which knowledge it is perfectly evident that the most unlimited benevolence may be productive only of evil. Wisdom depends upon unusual strength of the rational faculty, conjoined with extensive experience. Wisdom, virtue, and understanding have sometimes been confounded together, as though they were one and the same thing; and both that theory of morals which makes virtue to consist in conformity to absolute relations, or the Platonic Theory, and that theory which makes it consist in the pursuit of our own highest happiness, or the Theory of Self-interest well understood, have tended to countenance this confusion.

Let it be observed, however, that on moral questions, questions whether such and such actions will tend to promote the happiness of others, a strong degree of the sentiment of benevolence is absolutely essential to a right judgment; and that all the perspicacity, in the world, if the light of love be wanting, will not prevent us from falling into the most ridiculous errors, errors which a child may de

tect.

3. But it is not enough that we desire the good of

see.

others, and perceive the true means of accomplishing that good. In order to act conformably to that desire and those perceptions, we must have the cOURAGE to encounter the pains, which, it is possible or probable our action may bring upon us, and which, the wiser we are, we shall be the more likely to foreIt often happens that the delights of virtue are only to be won by first encountering a host of pains. The apprehension of future pains, of whatever kind, is a present pain called Fear: and a pain which has a vast influence over human conduct. Moral fear, that is to say, the fear of moral pain, as it is a great preventive to actions injurious to others, and as it necessarily implies a certain degree of force in the sentiment of benevolence, is esteemed a good quality, a virtue; and so is the fear of shame, or that dread of the pain of inferiority, which, as we have just now seen, is essential even to ordinary virtue.* But fear, in general, that is to say, the dread of encountering pain in general, inasmuch as it is almost universally an obstacle in the way of beneficial action, is esteemed a bad quality, a vice. Courage is that constitution of mind which leads men, in pursuit of a pleasure, whether a moral pleasure or any other, to encounter pains; it is that state of mind in which pains of desire triumph over pains of anticipation; and as it is absolutely essential to the performance of many actions beneficial to others, it thence has acquired the character of a virtue.

"I dare do all that may become a man,

Who dares do more, is none."

Macbeth, Act I. Sc. 7.

4. It is necessary; however, carefully to distinguish between the moral approbation which we bestow upon courage, and which never is bestowed except when that quality is contemplated as an aid towards actions beneficial to others; and the admiration with which extraordinary courage is regarded, a sentiment founded entirely on the fact, that it is extraordinary. The sentiment of admiration may, and often does, operate to modify our moral judgments, of which some extraordinary instances will presently be pointed out; but admiration and moral approbation, though often confounded together, are, in their nature and origin, totally distinct.

5. But though courage may suffice to induce us to commence a virtuous action, or course of action, in spite of the pains with which that action threatens us, we need FORTITUDE to induce us to persevere, after those pains of apprehension begin to be realized. Courage may owe its origin to ignorance, to thoughtlessness, to folly; and it may fail at the very moment when it most is needed. Fortitude, which consists in persevering endurance, is the only security we can have for the fulfilment of a virtuous intent; and it has accordingly, in a moral point of view, been always ranked as superior to courage.

6. Both Courage and Fortitude may be considered under the twofold aspect of physical courage and physical fortitude, moral courage and moral fortitude. Physical courage and physical fortitude consist in the encounter of such pains as hunger, wounds, and bodily torments ending in death. This quality, among communities constantly engaged in war, and