amiable qualities; that is to say, qualities that give pleasure, and which tend to excite a feeling of benevolence towards those who exhibit them.

25. Good manners, which have been very properly called the "lesser morals," consist, in a great measure, in paying deference and respect to others, -thus gratifying in them the sentiment of selfcomparison, and so affording them pleasure. This may be done either from benevolent or selfish motives. In the former case, it is called gentleness, Politeness, good breeding; in the latter case it is called Flattery; or when it is excessive, and plainly intended to secure some benefit to ourselves, through the agency of the person flattered, and in consequence of his benevolence towards us excited by means of it, it is stigmatized as Sycophancy. The proverbial power of flattery indicates the great and general force of that sentiment to which it is addressed.

Those persons who are most universally popular, that is, who are regarded with the most general favor, and who have the fewest enemies, are those over whom the sentiment of benevolence, either from their original constitution, their education, or their position, exercises influence enough to make them uniformly polite and obliging in little matters; who enjoy a good flow of spirits, that is to say, a succession of pleasurable ideas, which they have the power of communicating to others; whose talents are but ordinary, though their accomplishments are considerable; and over whom the love of superiority exercises but a moderate degree of force. These are what are

commonly called good, amiable, agreeable, pleasant persons. They are general favorites; but they never become objects of that enthusiastic love of which admiration is an essential ingredient; nor do they often perform distinguished acts of virtue.

26. The love of superiority seeks and finds its gratification in a vast variety of ways. It is this sentiment combined with certain pleasures of activity, that gives a zest to hunting, fishing, war, and all the numerous games, whether of skill or chance, in which men so generally delight, and the object in all which is, to conquer, subdue, or excel.

It is this sentiment upon which depends the distribution of men into ranks and orders; and hence it is that the most trifling circumstance, a title, a place, a wreath of leaves, a ribbon, a spangle, may come to be regarded as a matter of the utmost importance, if it only be converted into a mark of superiority. It is this sentiment, also, which makes fame, applause, glory, reputation, such objects of pursuit.

27. But this sentiment finds, perhaps, its fullest and most complete gratification in the power of commanding and controlling the actions of others. It is to the love of superiority that government owes its origin; for though it be true that government is of such obvious utility, and even necessity, that both the benevolent and the selfish motives unite to induce men to submit to it; yet government existed before its utility was ever thought of; and its utility only became known in consequence of its prior establishment. That desire of authority, distinction, and respect, which is displayed by the head of every

family, - at least by every good head of a family, - for mere tenderness and affection uniformly degenerate into the most fatal indulgence, leads to the extension of that authority over neighbouring families, over tribes, over nations. All government is originally monarchic in its character. Projects for the distribution and the division of power, aristocratic and democratic forms of government, are the contrivances of later times; originating, however, in that same sentiment, which gives rise to the original monarchy; that sentiment, namely, which makes inferiority painful, and superiority pleasurable.*

28. There is, however, a sort of power, much more attainable by men in general, than political power, to wit, the power which the possession of wealth bestows; and this power, accordingly, is a much more universal object of pursuit.

Wealth is the possession of the means of enjoying many pleasures, and of escaping many pains; and money, which is the representative of wealth, is, therefore, sought from a great variety of motives, that is to say, through the impulse of a great variety of pains and desires. But after all, it is the desire of superiority which is the great and permanent motive for the accumulation of money; a motive which continues to operate after all others have lost their force; and which grows stronger by indulgence, till the last moment of life. Hence it happens that in communities in which the desire of superiority is most fully brought into play, countries, for in

* This idea will be pursued and developed in the Theory of Politics.

is

stance, such as England or America, — money much more keenly, and much more generally pursued, than in societies in which this sentiment is comparatively quiescent.

29. Political power can seldom be attained, except by a great disregard of the pleasures and pains of others; and one of the most common ways of attaining wealth, is, to attain it at the expense of others, by taking from them, by force or fraud, what they have; or by frightening or cheating them into labor for our benefit.

The manifold evils which the desire of political power and the pursuit of wealth lead men to inflict upon their fellow-men, and the entire triumph which these desires obtain so often over the sentiment of benevolence, may well account for all the declamations of moralists against Ambition and Covetousness; and may enable us to understand why some of them have denounced the love of power, and the love of money, as the roots of all evil.

30. The desire of superiority, however, that sentiment which is, at times, the most dangerous opponent of the sentiment of benevolence, is, at other times, its best and firmest ally; to such an extent, that the Stoics built their system of morals almost wholly upon it.

31. According to the Stoics, the pleasure of superiority is far superior to all other pleasures; the pain of inferiority far greater than all other pains. In fact, these are the only pleasures and pains that deserve to be called such; and no man can be a Stoic whose constitution is not conformable to this idea.

But as virtue is universally esteemed the highest attribute of human nature, the highest degree of superiority can only be obtained by the highest superiority in virtue. Therefore, the greatest pleasure and the greatest virtue must be coincident.

Such was the reasoning of the Stoics; and although their theory fails entirely to explain the origin and nature of moral distinctions; though it neither assists us to ascertain what actions are virtuous, nor points out the reason why virtue is esteemed the highest of human attributes, yet it evinces a certain insight into the motives of human conduct, and into the origin of that pleasure with which the performance of virtuous actions is attended.

32. We have already pointed out how it happens that virtue is that quality which enjoys the highest esteem among men. To be inferior in that quality inflicts a pain; to be superior in it affords a pleasure; which pain and which pleasure are keen in proportion as the power of moral perception is acute, and the desire of superiority strong. The desire of superiority, however, as to most matters, is satisfied, provided we can attain the level of equality with those about us. Except as to some few things, or some single thing, in which we may esteem ourselves able to excel, it is the pain of inferiority rather than the desire of superiority, that impels us; and it is this same pain of inferiority which is a perpetual and most efficacious spur to the performance of those actions which are esteemed duties. What are called duties the performance of which indicates only an