motives of benevolence, and by the mere force of self-interest alone.

65. Many men, themselves of the greatest benevolence, and the most ardent friends of virtue and of human happiness, observing what little effect is produced upon the conduct of men in general, by disquisitions about the abstract beauty and intrinsic excellence of virtue; disgusted with those ascetic systems, the object of which seemed to be to banish enjoyment from the earth, and to reduce all to one. common level of misery; perceiving how mystical systems of morals, instead of contributing to human happiness, were turned into engines of a universal despotism, and gave rise, under the two forms of bigotry and fanaticism, to the most frightful evils; perceiving to what abuses the theory of self-sacrifice was liable, especially when conjoined with mystical notions; perceiving also how powerful an influence self-interest exerts over human conduct; many benevolent men, and warm friends of human happiness, perceiving these practical defects in existing theories and systems, eagerly caught at the idea of pressing self-interest into the service of benevolence, of reconciling expediency and right, and of producing actions beneficial to mankind at large, by the mere force of selfish motives.

66. Undoubtedly these men have rendered a good service to morality, by showing that moral pleasures and selfish pleasures are not so often in opposition to each other as had been imagined; and that selfish good and moral good are, in a great number of cases, nearly or quite coincident. This method is of great

use towards promoting the increase of ordinary virtues. In cases, however, in which extraordinary virtue is required it fails entirely; indeed it stands in the way.

67. It is curious to observe, on the other hand, among those who have carried on the most desperate war against Hobbism, Utility, and Interest well understood, many who have contended for disinterestedness in human conduct, under influences almost purely self-interested; or at least excessively narrow. The systems of Hobbes, of Hume, of Helvetius, and of Bentham, taught that men might, and ought, in what they did, to have a chief reference to their own temporal wellbeing. The mystical systems of morals which, before the time of these philosophers, had been universally prevalent in the schools, declared it to be the moral duty of men to disregard their own temporal interest altogether. This doctrine, though, as usually taught, a system of pure selfishness, was nevertheless recommended by a specious appearance of disinterestedness. It had early been pressed into the service of despotism; and men had long been taught by priestly moralists, that it was their duty to submit to all sorts of oppressions and miseries; to surrender up to a select few all the good things of this life; and to labor day and night for the sole benefit of those few; because such is the will and pleasure of God; and it is man's duty to promote God's pleasure by obeying his will. Hence the doctrine of the divine right of popes, bishops, priests, and kings, and the other doctrine, less celebrated, but equally noxious, of the divine appointment of ranks

and orders, in other words, of the divine right of aristocracies.

All the defenders of the existing unequal distribution of the good things of this world, at once took up arms against the doctrine of self-interest, whether in the shape of Hobbism, of Interest well understood, or of Utilitarianism; because they readily perceived that neither of these theories would allow morality to be any longer made use of, as the tool of a self-interested despotism. Thus we may explain the curious enigma, presented during the last century, of the most benevolent, humane, and liberalminded philosophers contending for the sovereignty of self-interest, and that, too, from the most benevolent motives; while all the bigots, and all those most violently opposed to sacrificing any existing social arrangements to the demands of humanity, however loud, were most selfishly clamorous in their defence of the disinterestedness of virtue !

68. The fact, that moral distinctions originate in the sentiment of Benevolence, and that benevolent actions and virtuous actions are often but different descriptions of the same thing, in fact, that all virtuous actions must have some tinge of benevolence about them, is far too obvious not to have been noticed by many who have turned their attention to the subject of morals. It has accordingly been held by several forensic schools of moral theorists, and this idea has been adopted by some of the mystics, that virtue consists in pure Benevolence; and to actions springing from that motive alone do they give the title of Disinterested Actions. This false limitation

of Disinterestedness to pure Benevolence, this theory which has made virtue synonymous with a total abandonment of self, which makes the least regard to self inconsistent with virtue, has led its partisans, when they have attempted to apply their notions to practical morals, into endless paradoxes. It has brought the Disinterested theory into great contempt with all men of the world; that is to say, with the men who have had the greatest experience of human nature, and who ought to understand it best; and has given to the partisans of the Selfish theory a great advantage in the argument.

69. In fact these ultra advocates of disinterestedness, these partisans of the doctrine of self-sacrifice, have wholly overlooked or confounded the distinction universally made in all moral judgments between actions which are right but indifferent; those which are not only right, but duties; and those which are right in the highest degree, but at the same time not duties; and which a man may omit to perform, and yet be entitled to the reputation of ordinary virtue. The partisans of self-sacrifice, with as much contempt for the common sense and common feelings of mankind, as was ever exhibited by Stoics or Epicureans, have held and taught that all beneficial actions within our power to perform are duties, and that every selfish act is a crime. It is a man's duty, they tell us, to devote himself entirely to doing good; that is, to devote all his time and thoughts to the welfare of others, without any regard whatsoever for himself; or at least only so much. regard for himself as is essential to preserve his

existence, and so to enable him to go on doing good to others. It is a man's duty, they say, to make a perpetual sacrifice of his own wellbeing for the benefit of his neighbours. Every action, in any degree injurious to others, is wrong; and nothing can possibly make such an action right, or even permissible.

The partisans of these self-sacrificing doctrines have naturally enough been led to hold, that morals are only to be carried to perfection by exterminating or subduing all the other sentiments, or capacities of pleasure or pain which belong to human nature, and so giving the sentiment of benevolence an absolute preponderancy. Inasmuch as these other sentiments lead perpetually to selfish actions, they are looked upon as participating in the criminality which is ascribed to selfish actions.

Still

It is not considered, that, supposing this object to be accomplished with the whole human race, the sentiment of benevolence would no longer have any matter upon which to exercise itself; since it is chiefly through the medium of the selfish sentiments, that men can confer benefits upon each other. less is it considered, that supposing this object to be accomplished in any one individual, he must be reduced to a state of almost absolute inaction; since there exist a vast number of most important cases, in which it is quite impossible to confer pleasures, without at the same time inflicting pains. This is the case in particular with respect to a great number of those acts, the performance of which is universally considered to require the highest pitch of virtue.