certain actions which produce pain to others, are classed under the borrowed term of debts, dues, or Duties; and modern authors, who have reduced the moral code to writing, have distinguished these actions into three classes, namely, Duties to others, Duties to ourselves, and Duties to God. How certain acts, beneficial to others, have come to be distinguished, in particular, as Duties will be explained hereafter. Our present business is, to show, that all those acts which have, at any time, been classed as moral duties, are, in fact, acts productive of pleasure, or supposed to be productive of pleasure, to some sensitive being or beings other than the actor ; and that the supposed possession of this quality of producing some pleasure to some sensitive being or beings other than the actor is an essential characteristic of duty.

25. With respect to that class of actions included. under the head of Duties to others, and which are generally arranged under the two great divisions of Justice and Benevolence, it is obvious, at the first glance, that pleasure to others is of the very essence of all those actions.

Why will such an action be unjust? Because it will inflict pain upon some person other than the actor. It is impossible to imagine an act of injustice without some pain inflicted upon another, including under the word pain, the deprivation of pleasures. Indeed, injustice may be defined in general terms, as the securing of pleasure to ourselves at the expense of pain to others.

Why is such an act benevolent? Because it con

fers a pleasure upon somebody other than the actor. Every benevolent act implies a pleasure or benefit conferred. Justice requires us to abstain from inflicting pain, or, if we have inflicted it, to make up for it; benevolence requires us to confer gratuitous, positive pleasures.

26. We proceed next to consider that class of acts called Duties to ourselves. They are usually arranged under the three heads of Prudence, Temperance, and Economy. These duties, in most codes of morals, hold a very high rank; so much so, that in the English language, what is meant, in common parlance, by a moral man, is, a man observant of these duties. The duties of this class differ, in one obvious and striking particular, from those called Duties to others, namely, in not operating directly upon others, but only indirectly, by first operating upon ourselves. It is for this reason that they are arranged in a separate class. But the effect of these actions, upon the welfare of others, is not, on that account, any the less certain or important, or any less the reason why they are distinguished as duties.

27. Prudence, Temperance, and Economy are essential to place a man in such a position, as will enable him to confer pleasures upon others; while Imprudence, Intemperance, and want of Economy lead, of necessity, to the infliction of the severest injuries upon others. No man stands alone. Every man is surrounded, to a greater or less extent, by those whose welfare is more or less dependent upon him; and in this way it becomes a duty to others, to take care of ourselves; to keep ourselves in a posi

tion which will preserve us from inflicting pains, and will enable us to confer benefits.

28. What are called acts of imprudence, are, in general, acts which result in some loss or suffering to the actor; which loss and suffering the actor foresaw, or might have foreseen. But no such act is ever condemned as morally wrong, unless the loss or suffering of the actor overflows, and embitters the cup of some other person, or seems likely to do so. It is in this alone that the moral wrongfulness of imprudence consists; and, therefore, whether we shall condemn a man or not, as guilty of imprudence, depends entirely upon circumstances. Many acts are reckoned imprudent in a poor man, which would not be considered so in a rich man; in a weak man, which would not be so in a strong man ; in the father of a family dependent upon him for support, which would not be so in a person without incumbrances; and so in many other instances.

29. The three chief breaches of the virtue of temperance, are gluttony, intoxication, and excessive sexual indulgence. The moral wrongfulness of these acts does not consist, as the Epicureans allege, in the pains which they are likely to produce to the actor, but in the pains which they may probably cause him to inflict upon others. All these indulgences, when excessive, tend to destroy the muscular and mental faculties; and thus to deprive us of the power of conferring benefits upon others. They tend also to weaken or destroy the force of those motives by which we are restrained from inflicting pain, and are impelled to confer pleasure, and thus

to take from us not only the power, but also the disposition, to confer benefits upon others. It is for this reason that they have been denounced by the moralists of every age; though great differences of opinion have existed, and still exist, as to the particular acts which deserve to be stigmatized with the reproach of intemperance. Much depends, in this case, as in the case of imprudences, upon the particular position of the actor.

30. Thus it would be a gluttonous and immoral act, for a poor man, whose children depended upon his daily wages for bread, to indulge himself, though it were once a year, in viands of which a rich man may partake every day, without reproach; and the reason is, that the poor man is not able thus to indulge himself, except by depriving his children of their needed bread; while the indulgence of the rich man. inflicts no evil, at least no obvious ascertainable evil, upon anybody.

31. As regards intoxication, whether produced by alcohol, by opium, or in any other way, if the pleasures and the pains, to which that indulgence gives rise, terminated with the individual, there would be no more moral guilt in it, than there is in the indulgence of a taste for music or poetry. But, not only does intoxication, while it lasts, disorder the understanding, destroy the sense of right and wrong, and render man a wild and dangerous animal, incapable of self-control, and, therefore, liable to inflict indefinite injuries upon others; but, if it become habitual, it is liable to occasion a general incapacity, to make its victim a burden to his friends, and a scourge to

society. Even the habitual use of intoxicating drinks, as it tends directly to the formation of habits of drunkenness, has come, and not without reason, to be regarded by many as an immoral act.

32. As to excessive sexual indulgence, what is in general so considered can hardly take place without the direct infliction of positive injury upon others. This injury, it is true, is oftener mental than physical; an injury to the feelings oftener than an external, visible injury; but it is not on that account any the less real. He who violates the marriage bed,⚫ inflicts an injury upon the husband, which has been reckoned, in all times and countries, among the most unpardonable. He who seduces a girl, besides the injury that he does her by diminishing her chances of marriage, and, in many countries, ruining her character, and so at once destroying her self-respect, and depriving her, it may be, of all honest means of support, inflicts, at the same time, an injury upon her parents and friends, who share her disgrace and her sufferings; and upon whom, perhaps, he imposes the burden of supporting her illegitimate offspring.

The consent of the parties liable to suffer evidently does away with this wrong; and it has accordingly been held and is held, in many countries, that the consent of the husband or the father renders innocent the act of intercourse with the wife or daughter. Such was the opinion of the Romans, who were accustomed to lend their wives to their friends. Elsewhere this opinion has not prevailed; the chastity of woman having been judged of such serious importance to domestic happiness, that any infraction