other; sometimes with equal reference to both. The epithets good and bad, and the corresponding substantives good and evil, when used alone, without the qualifying term, morally, have their signification greatly enlarged. The word good is employed to describe any thing that gives us pleasure; the words bad and evil, any thing that gives us pain, whether a moral pleasure or a moral pain, or a pain or pleasure of any other kind. As the qualifying epithet morally is frequently dropped, even when the signification of these words is restricted to moral good and moral evil, an ambiguity thence arises, which has led to infinite confusion and mistakes, an ambiguity which we must carefully avoid.

18. The word action, it must also be recollected, includes not only positive acts, that is, things actually done; but also negative acts, that is, things omitted to be done.

19. After these explanations, we may assert, that ALL POSITIVE ACTIONS CALLED WRONG, are actions that produce, or are supposed to produce, or to tend to produce, immediately or ultimately, some pain to some sensitive being other than the actor; and that ALL NEGATIVE ACTIONS CALLED WRONG, are actions that deprive, or tend to deprive, or are thought to do so, some sensitive being other than the actor, of some pleasure that he would otherwise have enjoyed; or which leave him exposed to some pain, from which, had the action been performed, he would have escaped.

20. Let it here be remarked, once for all, that the word pleasure, in its ordinary use, and for the

sake of brevity, we shall often employ it in the same extensive sense, includes not only pleasure properly so called, or positive pleasure, but also relief or freedom from pain, or negative pleasure; and that the word pain includes not only pain properly so called, or positive pain, but also deprivation or diminution of pleasure, or negative pain.

21. All actions that are not wrong, are RIGHT; but under the common head of right actions, two classes are embraced very distinct in kind. The first class includes those actions which are right, but at the same time, MORALLY INDIFFERENT; to which class belong all those actions, which, however pleasurable or painful to the actor himself, produce, or are supposed to produce, or to tend to produce neither pleasure nor pain to any sensitive being other than the actor. The performance or non-performance of these acts has no influence, any way, upon our estimate of moral character. On the other hand, those actions which produce, or are supposed to produce, or to tend to produce pleasure to sensitive beings other than the actor, are not only right, but also PRAISEWORTHY; and it is by the performanee of such actions that a character for virtue is acquired.

22. Thus it happens that the same external act will be classed, as morally Indifferent, as Praiseworthy, or as Wrong, according as it is productive, or thought likely to be productive, of different results. Whether I shall sit or stand, whether I shall pick up a stone or throw it down, these acts, so long as this is all that appears, are morally indifferent ; and whether I perform or omit them can have not

the slightest influence in determining my moral character. But suppose that my standing up be a signal which I have concerted with hired assassins, for the commission of a murder. Suppose that my sitting down be to interpose my body between some deadly weapon, and the life of my friend. Suppose

that my picking up a stone be with the intent to participate in the martyrdom of some innocent and worthy man; or that my throwing it down indicate my refusal to have any share in such a crime, even though that refusal expose ine to the indignation of an infuriated multitude. In these cases, the act, before so indifferent, assumes a decided moral character, and becomes highly wrong, or highly praiseworthy.

23. After these explanations, we again assert it as a general fact, that actions, externally considered, and without immediate reference to the motives of the actor, are everywhere among men distinguished into three great classes, PRAISEWORTHY ACTIONS, InDIFFERENT ACTIONS, and WRONG ACTIONS, the first two classes being ordinarily included together under the head of right actions;—and that actions are arranged in these three classes, according as they produce, or are supposed to produce, or to tend to produce, pleasure or pain, or neither, to sensitive. beings other than the actor. In other words, no action is ever prohibited as wrong, in any code of morals, except because it is thought to cause some pain to some sensitive being other than the actor; and no action is ever enjoined as a duty, except because it is thought to produce some pleasure to some

sensitive being other than the actor. And further, actions considered in themselves, and without immediate reference to the motives of the actor, are classed as more or less praiseworthy in proportion to the amount and extent of pleasure which they are supposed to confer, or to tend to confer, upon sensitive beings other than the actor; and they are pronounced more or less wrong, in proportion as the pain to sensitive beings other than the actor, which they inflict, or are supposed to inflict, or to tend to inflict, is greater or less in acuteness, permanence, and extent.

These allegations are of such great importance, and, if founded in fact, afford such a clue towards the discovery of the real nature and actual law of moral distinctions, that it is necessary to establish their truth somewhat in detail.

24. In all societies of men, the most rude and savage, as well as the most civilized, there exist sets of opinions on the subject of right and wrong actions,

that is, as to what actions ought to be performed, and what actions ought not to be performed, which sets of opinions, out of analogy to the codes of civil law, have been called the moral code, or the moral law. Indeed it is the moral code, which everywhere furnishes, to a greater or less extent, the foundations of the civil code.

These bodies of opinion, these moral codes, pass from generation to generation, sometimes by oral, and sometimes by written tradition; sometimes they are handed down for ages almost unchanged; sometimes they are gradually and imperceptibly modified; and sometimes they undergo very sudden and very violent alterations.

When we come to compare these moral codes with each other, we find, as in the various codes of civil laws, upon some points a perfect coincidence, and upon others a general similarity; while upon other points, and those often of the highest importance, we observe the most strange, and apparently unaccountable discrepancies; and sometimes the most positive contradictions.

It is the existence of these discrepancies and contradictions, it is the disputes which are constantly arising in every inquisitive and progressive society, upon certain points of the Moral Law, which give its chief interest and importance to our present inquiry. What are the principles upon which the distinction between Right and Wrong depends? Amid so many disputes and contradictions, by what rule shall we be guided?

The rule above stated, according to which actions are classified as Praiseworthy, Indifferent, and Wrong, will at once help us, if it be true, tò explain many of these discrepancies, to reconcile many of these contradictions, and to account for many of the changes, slight or extensive, slow or sudden, imperceptible or violent, which moral codes are constantly undergoing. There are, indeed, some discrepancies and contradictions in these codes, and some changes, which are dependent upon other causes, to be pointed out hereafter.

Not only the term Moral Law, but the greater part of the phraseology of morals, has been borrowed from legal analogies. Thus certain actions which produce pleasure to others, and the abstinence from