reward; and fourthly, all those temperaments indicated by the epithets Wisdom, Courage, Fortitude, Constancy, Hopefulness, Activity, and Ability.*

2. The term, Virtue, however, is most commonly used in a somewhat more limited sense; including only those impulses -part of them impulses of benevolence, and part impulses of the sentiment of selfcomparison — whereby men are induced to confer benefits upon others, without the expectation of any reward beyond that which arises from the consciousness of having conferred them. This last is the proper moral sense of the word Virtue; and actions having this origin are called Disinterested Actions.

3. The forensic supporters of the disinterested theory of morals, seizing upon the pains and pleasures of benevolence, and totally disregarding all the other sources of beneficial actions, defined virtue to be, Benevolence, or the Love of Man; while the mystical supporters of that theory, looking to a personal deity as the true and exclusive object of the sentiment of benevolence, defined virtue to be, Love of God. Both agree in declaring that Virtue and Disinterestedness are synonymous terms; a proposition generally so interpreted by those who have laid it down, as to make virtue consist in perpetual self-sacrifice; a thing which all men admire, and which a few may attempt; which, as to isolated acts, may be, and constantly is, accomplished; but which, regarded as the sole rule of life, is utterly impracticable.

* In its most general sense, Virtue signifies the power of giving pleasure. Thus we speak of the virtues of minerals and herbs. When applied to man, however, its most general sense is that above stated.

4. The Stoics, directing their attention exclusively to the remarkable influence of the sentiment of selfcomparison, in producing beneficial actions, defined virtue to be Greatness of Mind, superiority to vulgar pains and vulgar pleasures. This definition, like that of the self-sacrificing moralists, made virtue either wholly impracticable, or practicable only for a few.

5. The Epicureans, Hobbists, and those mystic doctors who adopted the selfish theory of morals, wishing to bring Virtue within the reach of the multitude, and perceiving the influence of punishments and rewards in producing beneficial actions, seized upon that as the essence of Virtue, which they declared to consist in the pursuit of our own highest happiness. Descending to particulars, Hobbes maintained that doing right consisted merely in obedience to the civil magistrate. For, according to him, peace, which is the greatest of blessings, and absolutely essential to the happiness and even the existence, of man, can only be secured by entire submission and implicit obedience to existing authority; whence political obedience becomes the great duty of man, including every other. The mystics of this school, as they referred all events to the will of God, held that happiness could only be attained by securing God's favor, and they consequently declared that Virtue consisted not in political but in religious obedience, in fear of God, perfect submission to his commands, and total devotion to his will.*

* The modern sect of Non-resistants, starting with the same adoration of peace, as the great panacea of all evils, which Hobbes enter

The more exigent of the mystic doctors, and those who applied most thoroughly to the Deity the theory of pure selfishness, were soon led to perceive the total impracticability, as men are naturally constituted, of any such perfect obedience on the part of man, as pure selfishness on the part of the Deity would oblige him to require. They taught, in consequence, that to the natural man Virtue is impossible; that by nature men are totally depraved; and that goodness can only be implanted in the heart by a special interposition of divine power, vouchsafed only to an elect few. Thus, again, the partisans of this school closed that broad door which the selfish theory had opened to all men, and, like the Stoics and the partisans of self-sacrifice, again made Virtue possible only to a select few. It is this appeal to the love of superiority, which has tended to secure for all these exclusive theories a certain number of followers, who delight themselves with the idea, that they alone are capable of Virtue, and that all other men are naught.

Helvetius and Bentham, the advocates of interest well understood, and of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, made an ingenious but desperate attempt to amalgamate together the doctrines of pure selfishness and entire self-sacrifice. When pushed

tained, have differed from him in substituting a passive non-resistance in place of that active obedience which he inculcated. In this point they agree with Grotius, whose love of peace made him an advocate for that absolute power by which he himself suffered so much. They differ, too, from Hobbes in this, that, with all the merit which they ascribe to non-resistance, they do not make it the sole virtue; and so far from thinking government the foundation of morals, they denounce all government as wrong.

to extremity, they are driven into the paradox, that pure selfishness may require of us the entire sacrifice of ourselves for the benefit of others.

6. The Platonists, ancient and modern, perceiving that every moral judgment includes the perception of a certain relation between acts done, and the consequences of those acts to the happiness of others and ourselves, vaguely define Virtue to consist in conformity to absolute relations, that is, the absolute nature of things; a definition easy to repeat, but more difficult to understand, and far more comprehensive than the thing which it attempts to define.

7. Aristotle, and his followers, brought this definition down from the clouds, and gave it a subjective character and a practical application. They defined Virtue to consist in conformity to the nature of man; a habit of mediocrity according to right reason. We have shown, in another place,* that this definition includes only ordinary virtue. It has, however, the advantage, like the definition given by the forensic partisans of the selfish theory, of making Virtue a thing possible for all men.

8. All the above definitions are true to a certain extent. Except the Platonic, they fail in not being sufficiently comprehensive; they fall into the common error of mistaking a part for the whole. The Platonic definition has the opposite fault of including too much.

* See Chap. I. § 71, note.

CHAPTER V.

OF MORAL OBLIGATION, DUTY, RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITY, MERIT, DEMERIT, PUNISHMENTS, AND REWARDS.

1. THE preceding investigations have prepared us to understand the origin and application of the terms Moral Obligation, Duty, Rights, Responsibility, Merit, Demerit, Punishments, and Rewards, terms which have given rise to infinite disputes among philosophers, and which stand for notions that have never yet been thoroughly analyzed, and fully explained.

2. Moral Obligation is that which binds, compels, or obliges men to do certain moral acts, that is, certain acts beneficial to others. It receives the name by way of analogy to physical obligation, as when a man is bound by a rope, and dragged along by some external force. All the terms employed in describing mental operations originate in similar analogies. Moral obligation differs, however, from physical compulsion, in the circumstance, that the force described by it is not an external, but an internal force, to wit, the force of the sentiment of benevolence, modified by the force of the other sentiments above pointed out as coöperating with it in the production of disinterested beneficial actions; in other words, the force of Moral Sentiment; by which phrase the compound force that impels to the performance of disinterested beneficial actions, is commonly described. Whatever a man does by the force of moral obliga