IN

SECTION II.

ELOQUENCE OF THE SENATE.

I. Speech of the Earl of Chesterfield, in the House of Lords, Feb. 22. 1740, on the Penfion Bill.

MY LORDS,

IT is now fo late, and fo much has been faid in favour

of the motion for the fecond reading of the Penfion Bill, by Lords much abler than I am, that I fhall detain you but a very fhort while with what I have to fay upon the fubject. It has been laid by a Noble Duke, that this bill can be looked on only as a bill for preventing a grievance that is foreseen, and not as a bill for remedying a grievance that is already felt; because it is not. afferted, nor so much as infinuated in the preamble of the bill, that any corrupt practices are now made ufe of, for gaining an undue influence over the other House. My Lords, this was the very reafon for bringing in the bill. They could not affert, that any fuch practices are now made ufe of, without a proof; and the means for coming at this proof, is what they want, and what they propofe to get by this bill. They fufpect there are fuch practices, but they cannot prove it. The crime is of fuch a fecret nature, that it can very feldom be proved by witneffes; and therefore they want to put it to the trial, at least, of being proved by the oath of one of the parties; which is a method often taken in cafes that can admit of no other proof. This is, therefore no argu ment of the grievance not being felt; for a man may,. very fenfibly, feel a grievance, and yet may not be able to prove it..

That there is a fufpicion of fome fuch practices be-ing now made ufe of, or that they will foon be made ule of, the many remonstrances from all parts of the united kingdoms are a fufficient proof. That this sufpicion has crept into the other Houfe, their having fo› frequently fent up this bill is a manifeft demonftration,

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and a ftrong argument for its being neceffary to have fome fuch bill paffed into a law. The other House must. be allowed to be better judges of what paffes, or muft pafs, within their own walls, than we can pretend to be. It is evident, they fufpect that corrupt practices have been, or foon may be, made ufe of, for gaining an undue influence over fome of their measures; and they have calculated this bill for curing the evil if it is felt,. for preventing it if it is only foreseen. That any such practices have been actually made use of, or are now made ufe of, is what I fhall not pretend to affirm; but I am fure I fhall not affirm the contrary. If any fuch are made ufe of, I will, with confidence, vindicate his Majefty. I am sure he knows nothing of them. I am fure he will difdain to suffer them: but I cannot pafs fuch a compliment upon his minifters, nor upon any fet of minifters that ever was, or ever will be, in this na tion; and, therefore, I think I cannot more faithfully, more effectually, ferve his prefent Majefty, as well as his fucceffors, than by putting it out of the power of minifters to gain any corrupt influence over either Houfe of Parliament. Such an attempt may be neceffary for the fecurity of the minifter, but never can be neceffary for, must always be inconfiftent with, the fecurity of his mafter and the more neceffary it is for the minifter's fecurity, the more inconsistent it will always be with the king's, and the more dangerous to the liberties of the nation..

To pretend, my Lords, that this bill diminishes, or any way encroaches upon the prerogative, is fomething: very ftrange. What prerogative, my Lords? Has the Crown a prerogative to bribe, to infringe the law, by fending its penfioners into the other Houfe? To fay fo, is deftroying the credit, the authority of the Crown, under the pretence of fupporting its prerogative. If his Majefty knew that any man received a penfion from him, or any thing like a penfion, and yet kept his feat in the other Houfe, he would himself declare it, or withdraw his pension, because he knows it is against law. This bill, therefore, no way diminishes or en-croaches upon the prerogatives of the Crown, which can: never be exercised but for the public good. It dimis

nishes only the prerogatives ufurped by ministers, which are never exercifed but for its deftruction. The Crown may still reward merit in the proper way, that is openly. The bill is intended, and can operate only against clandeftine rewards, or gratuities given by minifters. These are scandalous, and never were, nor will be, given but for fcandalous fervices..

It is very remarkable, my Lords, it is even diverting, to fee fuch a fqueamishnefs about perjury upon thisoccafion, amongst thofe, who, upon other occafions, have invented and enacted multitudes of oaths, to be taken by men who are under great temptations, from their private intereft, to be guilty of perjury. Is not this the cafe of almost every oath that relates to the collection of the public revenue, or to the exercise of any office? Is not this perjury one of the chief objections made by the Diffenters against the Teft and Corporation Act? And fhall we show a lefs concern for the prefervation of our conftitution, than for the preserva-tion of our church?. The reverend bench fhould be cau❤ tious of making ufe of this argument; for if they will not allow us an oath for the prefervation of the former, it may induce many people to think, they ought not to be allowed an oath for the preservation of the latter.

By this time, I hope, my Lords, all the inconveni ences pretended to arife from this bill have vanished and therefore I fhall confider fome of the arguments brought to fhow that it is not neceffary. Here I must obferve, that moft of the arguments made ufe of for this purpose, are equally ftrong for a repeal of the laws we have already in being against admitting penfioners to fit and vote in the other Houfe. If it be impoffible to fuppofe, that a gentleman of great eftate and ancient family can, by a penfion, be influenced to do what he' ought not to do; and if we must fuppofe, that none but fuch gentlemen can ever get into the other House, I am fure the laws for preventing penfioners from having feats in that Houfe are quite unneceffary, and ought to be repealed. Therefore, if thefe arguments prevail with your Lordships to put a negative upon the prefent queftion, I fhall expect to fee that negative fol lowed by a motion for the repeal of thofe laws; nay, in

a few feffions, I fhall expect to fee a bill brought in for preventing any man's being a member of the other Houte but fuch as have fome place or penfion under the Crown. As an argument for fuch a bill, it might be faid, that his Majesty's most faithful fubjects ought to be chofen members of Parliament, and that thofe gentlemen will always be moit faithful to the king that receive the king's money. I fhall grant, my Lords, that fuch gentlemen will be always the most faithful, and the most obedient to the minifter; but for this very reafon, I should be for excluding them from Parliament. The king's real intereft, however much he may be made by his minifters to miftake it, muft always be the fame with the people's; but the minifter's intereft is generally diftinct from, and often contrary to both: therefore I fhall always be for excluding, as much as poffible, from Parliament, every man who is uder the leaft inducement to prefer the intereft of the minifter to that of both king and people and this I take to be the cafe of every gentleman, let his eftate and family be what they will, that holds a penfion at the will of the miniRer.

Those who fay, they depend fo much upon the ho nour, integrity, and impartiality of men of family and fortune, feem to think our conftitution can never be dif folved as long as we have the fhadow of a Parliament. My opinion, my Lords, is fo very different, that if ever our conftitution be diffolved, if ever an abfolute monarchy be eftablished in this kingdom, I am convinced it will be under that fhadow. Our conftitution confifts in the two Houses of Parliament being a check upon the Crown, as well as upon one another. If that check fhould ever be removed, if the Crown should, by corrupt means, by places, penfions, and bribes, get the abfolute direc tion of our two Houfes of Parliament, our constitution will, from that moment, be destroyed. There would be no occasion for the Crown to proceed any farther. It would be ridiculous to lay afide the forms of Parliament; for under that fhadow our king would be more abfolute, and might govern more arbitrarily, than he could do without it. A gentleman of family and fortune, would not, perhaps, for the fake of a penfion, agree to

lay!

lay afide the forms of government; because, by his ve nal fervice there, he earns his infamous penfion, and could not expect the continuance of it if thofe forms were laid afide: but a gentleman of family and fortune may, for the fake of a penfion, whilft he is in Parliament, approve of the moft blundering measures, confent to the most exceffive and useless grants, enact the most oppreffive laws, pafs the most villanous accounts, acquit the most heinous criminals, and condemn the most innocent perfons, at the defire of that minifter who pays him his penfion. And, if a majority of such House of Parliament confifted of fuch men, would it not be ridiculous in us to talk of our constitution, or to say we had any liberty left? This misfortune, this terrible condition, we may be reduced to by corruption : as brave, as free a people as we, the Romans, were reduced to it by the fame means; and to prevent fuch a horrid catastrophe, is the defign of this bill.

If people would at all think, if they would confider the confequences of corruption, there would be no occafion, my Lords, for making laws against it. It would appear fo horrible, that no man would allow it to approach him. The corrupted ought to confider, that they do not fell their vote, or their country only: these, perbaps, they may difregard; but they fell likewife themfelves: they become the bond-flaves of the corrupter, who corrupts them, not for their fakes, but for his own. No man ever corrupted another for the fake of doing him a fervice. And therefore, if people would but confider, they would always reject the offer with disdain. But this is not to be expected. The hiftories of all countries, the history even of our own country, fhows it is not to be depended on. The proffered bribe, people think, will fatisfy the immediate cravings of fome infa mous appetite; and this makes them fwallow the alluring bait, though the liberties of their country, the happinefs of their pofterity, and even their own liberty, evi dently depend upon their refufing it. This makes it neceffary, in every free ftate, to contrive, if poffible, effectual laws against corruption: and, as the laws we now have for excluding penfioners from the other House, are allowed to be ineffectual, we ought to make a trial, at

leaft,