have affifted his Majefty's rebellious fubjects from the other colonies in reducing this once happy country to its prefent deplorable ftate of mifery and confufion; And whereas a number of well affect ed perfons, partly through dread of the cruelty of their enemies, and partly from falle reprefentations being made to them of the ftate of public affairs, have been induced to embrace a caufe which must inevitably bring them to ruin :

In order, therefore, to prevent others from falling into the fame unhappy errors, and to quiet the ill-grounded apprehenfions of fome well-meaning people, I do fue this my proclamation, hereby alluring his Majefty's loyal fubjects in this province, that they may rely on Speedy and effectual fupport being given to them by the exertions of the forces under my command; and that, in every event and fituation, their interefts and fecurity shall be confidered as infeparably connected with thofe of his Majefty's

troops.

And I do alfo hereby give notice, that the fevereft punishments fhall be inflicted on all thofe who, having folicited for, and obtained the enjoyment of the privileges of a British fubject, fhall, in violation of every principle of honour and good faith, again take up arms against bis Majefty's government, or fhall terve in any civil capacity under a second ufurpation.

Given under my hand, at Charlestown, this 15th day of December, 1781.

ALEX. LESLIE." To counteract this proclamation, the American Generals Greene and Hayter bave iffued an edict for a general pardon to all thofe perfons who took the oath of allegiance during Lord Cornwallis's march to Virginia.

Charlestown, Dec. 22. On Tuefday arrived a large fleet of navy and army victuallers, ftorethips, tranfports, &c. from Portsmouth, under convoy of the Rotterdam, Aftrea, and Duc de Chartres. The Earl of Dunmore came paffenger in this fleet."

Extract of a letter from Maj. Gen. Chriftie Lord G. Germain, dated, Barbadoes, Dec. 15. 1781. Received by the Ranger floop of war.

"It is with real grief I am obliged to communicate to your Lordship the difagreeable news of the capture of St Euftatius and St Martin's, the 26th and

27th ult. by a handful of the enemy, not exceeding 300 men, landed from three frigates, and fome small craft, at Jen kinn's bay, at the back of the island, under the command of the Marquis de Bouille, without the smallest oppofition from the garrifons; the former confifting of 723, and the latter of 63 effective men, including officers." Lond. gaz.

GAZETTE of FRANCE, Jan. 8. Copy of a letter from the Marquis de Bouille, to the Marquis de Caftries, minifter and fecretary of State for the marine department, dated from St Eustatius, Nov. 26. 1781.

"I have the honour to inform you, that the King's troops have taken by furprife the ifland of St Euftatius this day, the 26th; that the garrison, compofed of the 13th and 15th regiments, of which the chaffeurs [light infantry] and grenadiers only, are detached to Antigua and St Chriftopher, and of which the prefent effective men, amounting in number to 677, were made prifoners of war. The Count de Bouille, Colonel of foot, will have the honour to deliver to you the four colours of thefe two regiments; and the floop l'Aigle carries you the news.

This event, attended with extraordinary circumftances, is fo fingular, that I think I ought to give you a detail of it.

Having learned that the garrison of that island guarded it very badly; that the governor was in the greatest security; and knowing befides of a place of debarkation that was not guarded, I thought I could, by arriving in the night with 1200 men, carry that important island. In confequence, I left St Pierre in Martinico the 15th with three frigates, one floop, and four armed cutters, that carried the troops, compofed of a battalion of Auxerrois, of 300 men; one of Royal Comtois, and one of Dillon and Walth, of the fame number, and of 300 grenadiers and chaffeurs of different corps. I caufed it to be reported, that I was going to meet our naval forces; and 1 weathered Martinico, where, after a thousand obftacles from winds and cur

rents, I could not get up until the 22d; and the 25th I arrived in fight of St Euftatius. The debarkation took place the fame night. The light veffels and the floop were to caft anchor, and the frigates to remain under fail, at hand to fend their troops on fhore; but our pilots were mistaken, and the boat in which

was

was the Count de Dillon, was the only one that could effect the debarkation, which he did with 50 chaffeurs of his regiment. An unexpected current on the coaft, occafioned the lofs of the boats, which were dashed against the rocks, with which that coaft is covered, and many foldiers were drowned. I arrived with the fecond boat; difembarked, and my boat was alfo overset in the fea; but we found means to land the men. At length we discovered a lefs dangerous place of debarkation, where, in the course of the night, we fucceeded in landing a great part of the troops from the boats, and the floop l'Aigle. The frigates were lying to; one hour before day-light, there were yet only about 400 men on fhore, and no hopes remained of landing the reft of the troops, moft of the boats and fhallops having been loft on the fhore. Deprived of every means of retreating, I had no other alternative, to extricate me out of the position I was in, but to conquer the enemy, whofe forces were almoft double to ours. The foldiers were full of fpirits and courage, I therefore refolved to attack. It was half an hour after four in the morning, and we were almost two leagues diftant from the fort and the barracks, when I put the troops on their march with a redoubled pace. I gave orders to Count Dillon, with the Irish, to march directly to the barracks, and to fend a detachment to take the governor in his houfe; to the Chevalier de Frefne, Major of Royal Comtois, to go, with 100 chaffeurs of Auxerrois, and of his regiment, to the fort, and scale it, if he could not enter at the gate; and to the Viscount de Damas, with the reft of the troops, to support the attack.

Count Dillon arrived at the barracks at fix o'clock, and found a part of the garrifon exercifing on the parade: deceived by the cloaths of the Irish, they were not aware of them until they received a home discharge clofe to their breafts, that brought feveral of them to the ground. Gov. Cockburn, who was going to the place of exercise, was feized that inftant by the Chevalier O'Conner, captain of the chaffeurs of Walth. The Chevalier de Frefne marched ftrait to the fort, where the enemy were running in crowds to get in, and arrived at the draw-bridge at the moment when they were going to draw it up. The Sieur de la Motte, captain of the chaffeurs of Auxerrois, who had reached the entrance

of the bridge, fired upon the English, who let go the chains of the draw-bridge, and he threw himself into the fort, where he was followed by the chaffeurs of Royal Comtois. The Chevalier de Fresne ordered the bridge to be drawn up after him, and the English, who were there in great numbers, laid down their arms. At that inftant the island was taken, and we afterwards affembled in the fort, the English officers and foldiers, who came from all parts to furrender. We had had but ten foldiers killed or wounded, but the number of those of the enemy was very confiderable.

[Here follows a paragraph in commendation of the behaviour of the officers and men. He then proceeds]

By a private letter, I fhall have the honour to beg fome favours for the different officers.

I inclofe herewith a lift of the garrifon and artillery of the island, confifting of 677 men, and 68 pieces of cannon. The English have erected the fineft batteries here, fince they became poffeffed of this place; and very little can be added to its means of defence.

I have fent the Viscount de Damas with 300 men to attack the island of St Martin, where there is but a weak garrifon. I ordered him to take the fort *, to throw the guns into the fea, and bring away the garrison.

We have found alfo about fixteen hundred thoufand livres, colony money, belonging to Admiral Rodney, Gen. Vaughan, and other officers, being the produce of the fale of their prizes. I have lumped it with what may be got from five or fix enemy's fhips found in the road, which will produce a total of about eighteen hundred thousand livres, or two millions currency of the islands, which fhall be divided, conformably to the ordinance for prizes, between the army and the marine.

The English marine in these feas, at the time of my operation, was compofed of the Ruffel man of war of 74 guns, which was careening at Antigua, and eight frigates, four of which are of 32 guns, but were difperfedt. BOUILLE."

* The Count de Bouille has reported verbally, that at his departure from St Eustatius, the island of St Martin, and the island of Saba, had surrendered to the King's troops.

+ Lt-Col. Cockburn of the 35th regiment, who commanded at St Eustatius when that

quering a country, and then deserting it, notwithstanding he had feen the mischiefs attending it in the inftance of New Jerky.

Inftead of fecuring South Carolina, and putting it in a pofture of defence, he left many of the feditious not disarmed, the loyalifts not embodied, and a rebel corps in the province; and, with the rapidity of a winged Mercury, purfued the light armed troops under the rebel General Greene upwards of 200 miles from the province thus infecure.

The mischief which this unprecedented conduct produced, are scarcely to be defcribed. The feditious, whom he had Beither confined nor difarmed, encoura ged by the diftance of his force, and the infecure ftate of the province, recovered their fpirits, and joined the rebel General Sumpter, in retaking his pofts and reconquering the province. He pursued the light-armed troops of his enemy in vain, because they knew the roads and the country better than himself. And by a march fo long and rapid, he wasted daily his own force, without taking a fingle tep to recruit it, although he faw the members of the army he was pursuing daily increafing. Thofe numerous loyalifts, whom he has acknowledged were in the province through which he was paffing, and whofe ardour to give him affiftance he could not for fome time fupprefs, he had forbid to join him until he had called for their aid. This aid he neglected to call for during his long march, until his own fafety compelled him; and that not before he arrived at Hillsborough. Here he iffued his pra clamation; upwards of 200 loyalifts intantly embodied, but not being properly fupported by him, they fell a facrifice to a rebel corps, who put them all to death after they had laid down their arms. This done, in two days after, inftead of waiting to fee what would be the further effects of his proclamation, he retreated to Cape Fear, leaving the country to the command of a rebel army, and confequently rendering it impoffible for the loyalifts to join him.

Here the policy of the British General formed a perfect contraft to that of the rebel. The first, with all the knowledge which long experience could finally give, reverfed the ufual practice of war, and that policy which has never failed of fuccefs; while the other, without any experience, made these the invariable rules VOL. XLIV.

of his conduct. If the first knew that there was a great number of loyalists in North Carolina, and rejected or neglect. ed the measures neceffary to obtain their aid; the other alfo knew there were likewife rebels, who adhered to the ufurpa tion he wished to support. On these be never ceafed to call, and to encourage them by every art and means in his power, to give him their aid. Nor did he call in vain; for there was no diftrict through which he paffed, wherein he did not pick up fome militia, and in the end amply fupplied the number he had loft. Thus this unexperienced young man, at the head of a defeated and retreating army of undifciplined troops, was enabled to increase his force, while his purfuer, with all his experience, and at the head of an army flushed with repeated victories, wafted and deftroyed his own ftrength, in a country where it might have been, by the fame measures, greatly increased.

By this wretched conduct on our part, and the good sense of the rebel general, he foon found himself at the head of a force which he thought could face and defeat our wafted army. Nor was he altogether miftaken. Inftead of flying, he offered a fair combat. The fuperior difcipline of British troops difappointed him of his wifhed-for fuccefs, though not of a real victory in the confequences. The rebel general was repulfed, and our general kept the field. But what were the effects? The first returned to the conqueft of that province which our folly had left in a state of infecurity, to fupport the feditious, imprudently left in it, while this rapid conqueror was obliged, for want of provifions, as he alledges, to go to Cape Fear, in North Carolina. Whether this reason be a good one, I fhall not ftop to inquire. However, this we know, that the rebel general did immediately return to South Carolina, and found provifions fufficient to fupport a greater number than thofe under the command of his Lordship.

The fuperficial examiner, who never looks deeper than the furface of things, may be deceived by the glittering of a name. Such men have highly applauded his Lordship's conduct in this rath and fatal march. But men of fente and military knowledge will afk the following queftions: Why did not his Lordship, after the battle of Camden, take the proper measures for fecuing the pro

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