appeared, from the papers before the committee, that Sir George Rodney had written to the admiralty about this convoy before it failed; and acquainted the board with the course it was to steer: this letter was received March 25. When it was received, it was well known to the First Lord of the Admiralty, as the committee had learned from the papers, that a fquadron was fitting out at Breft the command of which was given to M de la Motte Piquet. Adm. Darby was then lying off the coast of Ireland; but no orders were sent to him on the sub ject. Adm. Rodney's letter faid, the Euftatius convoy was perhaps the riches that had ever been bound for England Mr Fox obferved, that as to the riche: that were on board of it, when he confi dered how they had been acquired, they were the riches, the lofs of which, of al others, he fhould the leaft regret; but still, as it was the duty of the First Lord of the Admiralty to protect it, his neglec was alone fufficient to fhew how dif qualified he was for the office he held The fquadron under De la Motte Pique had been a confiderable time fitting out very regular intelligence had been tranf mitted to the admiralty, of the progref of preparations during the months of Fe bruary, March, and April; and yet no one ftep had been taken to guard againf it: and this was the more criminal, a we were at the time in almost daily ex pectation of the arrival of the Jamaica as well of the St Eustatius fleet. No pre paration, however, was made to affor them protection; and all that was don was, that two frigates had been difpatch of intelligence of the defigns, numbers, and ftrength of the enemy, that he omitted fending Adm. Darby to meet M. de Graffe; but it was after having had the moft correct intelligence on the subject that he fent our fleet to Ireland. He defired gentlemen would confider this, and fay, whether it was credible that it could have happened without treachery fome where? But fuppofing treachery totally out of the question, those who fhould think fo far favourably of Lord Sandwich, as to suppose him incapable of treachery, muft ftill in candour admit, that, from the evidence contained in the papers juft read, he was totally inadequate to the management of the navy of this country. No one could conceive the reafon why a fleet of thirty ships of the line should be fent out of their way to Ireland to meet the transports from Corke, which ought to have been ordered to join the fleet in the Channel: if that had been the cafe, there was not a doubt but Adm. Darby would have given a good account of the French; and perhaps he might have arrived time enough to fall upon the rear of the Spanish fleet, which, after a cruise of two months, was returning, in very foul condition, to Cadiz. It was a very great injury to our affairs, that Count de Graffe fhould not have been intercepted in the European seas; but still an able First Lord of the Admiralty might have feen that it was not irreparable; for he might still have defeated the Count's expedition, by a proper detachment from Adm. Darby's fleet. It was his business to have given orders to our commander to detach to the West Indies, if it should fo happen that the Spaniards should noted to meet them, if poffible, warn then difpute the paffage of the Streights with us. A minifter of common forelight would have faid to his admiral, either the Spaniards will fight you on the way to Gibraltar, or they will not. If they fhould not, then you will immediately dispatch a part of your fleet to the Welt Indies, to counteract the Count de Graffe. This would have been the language of a provident minifter, but it was not the language of Lord Sandwich. If he had fo inftructed Adm. Darby, a detachment of clean English fhips, without convoy, would have in all probability joined Sir S. Hood before the Count's arrival; and in that cafe there was every degree of likelihood that the French would have been defeated. 2. The fecond head of accufation was, the lofs of the St Eustatius convoy. It of their danger, and enable them to a void it, if they could, by making fome por in Ireland, or going north about. One o the frigates fortunately fell in with the Jamaica fleet, which accidentally efca ped the danger; but the St Euftatius convoy was taken, at least in part, of the 2d and 3d of May. The convoy had been expected ever fince the receipt of Sir George Rodney's letter on the 25th of March, and Lord Sandwich knew of the preparations of M. de la Motte Piquet from the beginning of February, and yet no step had been taken to protect the one, or defeat the other; nay, fo great was the negligence of the Fir Lord of the Admiralty, that he never thought of making Adm. Darby acquainted wih the expected arrival of the St Euftatius Euftatius convoy, till May 10. and then dispatched a frigate to him, to give him orders to fail to a particular latitude, in order to protect a convoy which had been taken juft feven days before the frigate had been dispatched to him: now the probability was, that this frigate could not reach Adm. Darby in much kis than a fortnight; fo that near two months had elapfed between the receipt of Sir George Rodney's letter, giving nofice of the failing of the convoy, and the time when Adm. Darby got orders to fail for its protection. He asked gentlemen, if this alone was not fufficient to julify any motion that he fhould think proper to make against the First Lord of the Admiralty? There was only one excufe, which, however poor for a naval minifter, ought to be admitted in fach a cafe as the prefent; and that was, that he really had not any force fufficient to cope with M. de la Motte Piquet: but poor as this excufe must be in the mouth of an English naval minifter, Lord Sandwich was not fortunate enough to have it; for it appeared, from the monthly returns, that there were thips enew in port, which, from the month of March, when Sir George Rodney's letter gave notice of the intended failing of the conFoy from St Eustatius, to the latter end of April, might have been got ready: he read a lift of the thips, and, including one or two fifties, there appeared to have been in our different ports twelve fail of the line, a force fufficient to have defeated M. de la Motte Piquet: he read alfo the returns from the guardships, fating the numbers on board, from which he proved, that if we had fhips, fo alfo we had men to put on board of them: fo that he concluded, that the les of the convoy could and ought to be attributed only to the mifmanagement, or fomething worfe, of the First Lord of the Admiralty. 3. The third head of accufation was, the letter from the admiralty to the Mayor of Briftol. Adm. Darby, as appeared from the papers, had acquainted the admiralty, that he had fallen in with a Swedish brig, the mafter of which had informed him, that he had been boarded by a frigate, under Spanish colours, belonging to the combined fleets, which were then in the Channel; and that, in confequence of this intelligence, he had thought proper to return up the Channel for orders; and had put into Tor bay. And here it was to be observed, that the mafter of the brig was an Englifhman, who would not deceive his country, and whose journal confirmed his ftory. How did the First Lord of the Admiralty answer this letter? In an infulting manner, telling the Admiral, he did not believe the intelligence; and adding, if the account had been true, that the combined fleets had appeared in fuch a latitude, he (Adm. Darby) muft have feen them. In answer to the Mayor of Bristol, he said, that the combined fleets were not in the channel, and that Adm. Darby had put into Torbay only to water. This he muft have known at the time to have been a falfehood; for the Admiral in his letter affigned a very different reafon for returning to port: so that it looked as if the naval minifter wanted to enfnare the trade of Bristol, by inducing the merchants to fend their hips to fea, that he might deliver them into the hands of the enemy, juft as he had fent Capt. Moutray into the hands of Adm. Cordova. But to thew how completely the admiralty either had been deceived itself, or had deceived the Mayor of Bristol, it appeared, that Lord Stormont had, on the very day of the date of the admiralty letter to the Mayor, fent an express to Lord Carlisle, with positive intelligence, that the enemy was in the Channel. 4th. The fourth charge related to the management of the Dutch war. That war was, he faid, of all foolish, abfurd, and mad undertakings, the most foolish, abfurd, and mad. It had been represented to that Houfe, in order to get them to approve of the war, that the Dutch were in a moft defenceless state; that there was a very great party for us in Holland; and that we had only to make a vigorous effort in the beginning, to give that party the fuperiority in the councils of the Republic. Upon fuch a state of the cafe, would not any one have expected that the naval minister would have fignalized the outfet of the Duch war by an appearance of an English squadron in the Texel? An attack might furely be expected to be attended with every fuccefs that we could with for. But nothing was more foreign to the intention of Lord Sandwich. He fuffered the enemy to equip thofe fhips which he might have deftroyed in the Texel, and then brought them to an action; which certainly redounded greatly to the honour of Adm. Parker and his officers, and of the ene my my too; but which was far from ending in fo decifive a victory as might have been expected over an enemy who was reprefented as weak and enervated. In this cafe alfo, as that of the St Euftatia convoy, Lord Sandwich had many fhips which he might have fent to reinforce Adm. Parker. The Sampfon, of 64 guns, was one, which, inftead of fending directly to the Admiral, Lord Sandwich fent to the Gunfleet, where he was to be fent for if wanted. Here he took an opportunity to retract a thing which he had afferted in a former debate, viz.—that it was mere chance that had made the Berwick fall in with the fquadron in the North fea. This he found not to be true; for it now appeared that it was by order of the admiralty fhe had joined the fquadron. The fquadron under a very gallant friend of his, and a member of that House (Keith Stewart), had been kept in the Downs for the purpose of watching the Dutch. How well they had been watched, the fafe arrival of Adm. Byland had proclaimed to the world: yet in this, he prefumed, his gallant friend was not to blame; at least, he had never been called to an account for it. -- As an epitome of all the other charges, he fubjoined a fifth, drawn from the lateft circumftance, that of the meeting between Adm. Kempenfelt and the Breft fleet. He did not throw any new light on the subject*, except that he read the mames of the ships which might have -- *To infert the debate here alluded to would far exceed our limits; nor is it neceffary, as the above is nearly the fame in fubftance. In that debate Mr Fox averred, that the admiralty must have been perfectly well acquainted with the state of the French force; for all the world knew, that there were twenty-three fail of the line in Breft water. It was confcffed nineteen had failed, though he believed there were twenty. Against this powerful fleet the admiralty thought proper to fend only twelve fail, though they could, without any difficulty, have fent a force equal, if not fuperior, to that of the enemy, as there were a great many fhips at that time in port ready for fea. From this it was evident, the admiralty had neither ignorance nor inabili. ty to plead in defence of their conduct with regard to the expedition under Adm. Kempenfelt. He therefore could not confider the affair in any other point of view than premeditated neglect, fo like treachery did it look. On the part of the admiralty it was contended, that the first intelligence been fent out to join our Rear Admiral and which, including the fquadron in th Downs, made about twenty fail of th line. With this force, which might, h faid, have been sent out, it was not t be doubted, but through the know bravery and abilities of Adm. Kempenfel we fhould have completely deftroyed th French fleet and convoy. He concluded by observing, as he ha done already on a former occafion, th his firft motion ought to be for a remov of Lord Sandwich from his Majefty councils; but he thought it inexpedie now; he would first move a cenfure u on him, and if he should carry that, i would follow it up with an addrefs to t King, which, no doubt, would have i effect; and then, undoubtedly, he wou purfue the inquiry through every par when the minifter, whose administrati should be the subject of it, fhould longer be vefted with the power to d feat it. He then moved the followi refolution, "That it appears to th committee, that there was grofs mifin nagement in the administration of nav affairs in the year 1781." Lord Mulgrave expreffed his furpri at hearing a motion which could not 1 paffed but in direct oppofition to t mafs of evidence which the committ had heard read. He trufted, howeve that though there had been found o member who was not afraid to fly fo penly in the face of evidence, the they received made the enemy only eig fail: they indeed afterwards learned th had fourteen; but furely fuch a force w no way terrible to that under Adm. Ket penfelt; and fo preffing and urgent we the various demands for other importa fervices, that it was utterly impoflible have fent out a ftronger force with Ad Kempenfelt. Such being the cafe, it was ce tainly more prudent to fend twelve fail of t line and a so gun fhip to intercept fourte incumbered with a large convoy, than to a low them to purfue their voyage unmoleste Some ships indeed joined them at fea before t engagement.-It was asked, why Sir G. Ro ney did not accompany Adm. Kempenfel Did any officer or merchant with, that S G. Rodney and his fleet fhould be fent cruife in the bay, where, from the feafo of the year, damage and obstruction mig have been expected; and fuppofing th French fleet had flipped out without th knowledge of our commanders, what wou have become of our islands, if the defen had been out of reach? would be very few who would fupport him. In common queftions in that Houfe gentlemen might make it a point to adhere to their leader, and carry him through with every thing he propofed; but in fuch a cafe as the prefent, he conjured gentlemen to reflect how improper, how unjuft, how unfair it would be to perfae fuch a principle, when the private honour, character, fituation, and fortune of an individual was at ftake: upon thefe they were going to give judgement; and he trufted that all party-confiderations would be abforbed in the fenfe of their own private honour and confcience; and that the principle of Mr Grenville's law in the decifion on contefted elections would be found to operate in the prefent cafe. Much had been fuggefted about treachery: to that he would make no reply, because he was convinced that no one in that Houfe believed it, nay, not even the accufer himself. Much had alfo, on many occafions, been said of the regard the Noble Earl whose conduct was the fubject of the inquiry had for his fituation, and the great defire he had to retain and preferve it: but might it not be inferred from this, that it was improbable he thould do any thing by which he might forfeit that fituation? If he had an intereft in preferving it, might not thofe who charged him with mifmanagement have an intereft in driving him from that fituation? They certainly might: and therefore gentlemen fhould be on their guard, left they fhould miftake, in the enemies of Lord Sandwich, a fondness for his fituation, for a love of juftice. The Hon. Member blamed the admiralty for not having ftationed frigates off Breft, from Jan. 1779 to March 1781. The fact was truly ftated, but no charge ought to be deduced from it; becaufe little or no intelligence could be procured by frigates looking into Breft, unlefs they had been fent there from a squadron, as it were to dare the enemy to come out. The reafon why in other cafes no benefit could be derived was this, the frigate malt pafs by Ufhant, and immediately figuals would be made along the coaft to Breft, to give notice of every thing that was in the offing, and fhips would be fent out to drive away the frigate. Another charge made by the Hon. Member was, that no fhips had been stationed off Jerfey to protect that ifland: If the genleman knew what a dangerous ftation it VOL. XLIV. was for men of war, he would not be furprised that there were none stationed there in winter. The people on the ifland had been always given to underftand, that in cafe of a fudden invasion, they must truft to the forces on the island for defence in the firft inftance; and that on the firft intimation in England of their danger, relief fhould be instantly dif patched to them. With respect to the first charge, relative to the Count de Graffe, the evidence which had been read fufficiently pointed out a reafon why he had not been intercepted. The relief of Gibraltar was looked for by the whole nation; and from the beft intelligence which the committee had heard read, it was understood that the Spaniards intended to meet us, and give us battle. The intelligence, as the committee had heard, had held this language for two months: the Spanish force was fometimes varied in the accounts; but the force was generally fluctuating from thirty to thirty-fix fail of the line, befides frigates, and eighteen fire-fhips, collected for the purpose of burning the British fleet in paffing through the Streights. To oppofe fuch a force, it was highly neceffary to get together a fleet that should put it out of the power of chance to defeat our expedition: fuch a force was collected; and would it have been prudent to have rifked the lofs of Gibraltar on the bare chance of meeting with M. de Graffe? Would it have been confiftent with the fpirit of the nation to have taken any ftep that would look as if we had been bullied out of our purpose of relieving Gibraltar, after the Spaniards had in a manner challenged us, after they had thrown down the gauntlet, when they drew their fleet in line of battle acrofs the mouth of the Streights ? All Europe looked at the time for an engagement between the two fleets; the Spaniards were fure of it; and, when the British fleet appeared in fight of Gib. raltar, the befiegers could fcarcely be lieve their eyes; and on that day they firft opened their batterics against the town. In the mean time our fleet in the West Indies had not been forgotten; information was difpatched to Sir Samuel Hood by a frigate, of the failing of Count de Graffe; and when the latter arrived, he did not feel himfelf fuperior, as the Hon. Member feemed to represent him, for he three days conftantly refufed the challenge which Sir Samuel was daily gi ving ving him to renew the engagement. But the Hon. Member would fay, why were not fome fhips detached to the Weft Indies from Adm. Darby's fleet? The reason was obvious; it was upon that fleet alone we had to depend for the defence of our coafts, the protection of the Channel, the fafety of our convoys, and the annoyance of the Dutch. As to the fecond charge, the lofs of the St Euftatius convoy; he would fay that there had been much more reafon to fuppofe that M. de la Motte Piquet was bound for America, than for the coaft of Ireland; but that as foon as his real deftination was known, two frigates had been dispatched to meet the Jamaica fleet and the St Eustatius convoy: one of them was fortunate enough to fall in with the former, which went north about, and efcaped all danger: unfortunately the other frigate did not meet with Com. Hotham; and the misfortune, which it was the wish of the admiralty to avert, fell upon the convoy. The Hon. Member ridiculed the idea of fending a frigate to Adm. Darby long after the capture of the convoy; but the convoy was very near being retaken; for as foon as the frigate reached the fleet, Adm. Digby was detached with ten fail to look out for Monf. de la Motte Piquet, and he came fo near him, that one night a fhip of each squadron had a very fharp en gagement. vol. 43. p. 319.] The third charge, relative to the combined fleets, and the letter to the mayor of Bristol, was of much lefs weight than the gentleman feemed to think. And firft, as to the combined fleets: the mafter of a brig said he had been boarded by a Spanish frigate, and that she belonged to a very large fleet of men of war; and the admiralty did not believe the intelligence. Truly it would be a dangerous thing to be in office, if a minitter was to have a charge made against him in parliament every time he should be found not to have believed the ftory that should have been told him by a merchantman! Oh! but the mafter of the brig was an Englishman, and therefore his intelligence might be relied on. This war had afforded inftances that an Englishman could betray England as well as an enemy could. Well, but his journal confirmed his ftory. Yes; but it was poffible it might have been made for the very purpole of confirming the ftory. The reafon why the admiralty did not believe the intelligence, was, that it was directly contrary to the whole tenor of the in formation they had from Spain; from which it was conjectured, that most probably a part of the fleet was cruising off Cape Spartel, while another part was fent to Minorca. On the other hand, the admiralty, fuppofing the mafter of the brig not to have impofed upon Adm. Darby, accounted for the fleet he had feen at a great diftance, in this manner: juft about that time a very large convoy of 100 fail of transports was to fail from the isle of Rhe, and might at the time be juft in the latitude in which the mafter of the brig faid he faw a large fleet. It was upon this principle that the anfwe to the mayor of Bristol was made, and not for the purpose of decoying the trad of Bristol into the hands of the enemy juft as Capt. Moutray, as the Hon. Mem ber was pleased to say, had been fent to deliver up his convoy to the Spaniards As to Capt. Montray, (it was with rea concern of mind he faid it), he was cen fured by his judges for his conduct i that affair; and indeed it was not with out pain that he heard that officer's nam mentioned fo often with very little re fpect; because until that fatal day, whe he loft his convoy, his name ftood hig and unblemished in his profeffion; an therefore he had rather pafs his name o ver in filence, than fpeak difrefpe&tfull of a very gallant officer. The loss of th convoy might be attributed to the me chants, who had ordered their fhips t touch at Madeira for wine. He did ne blame Adm. Darby for returning to po for orders; on the contrary, he thougi he acted for the good of the fervice, an confiftently with that judgement and ski which he displayed in the expedition t Gibraltar. There were two reafons wh he would neither blame the First Lord the Admiralty for having told the may of Bristol that the fleet had put into To bay only to water-one was, that he di not think it neceffary that the may fhould be made acquainted with the re fon of our manoeuvres at fea-the oth was, that the Admiral bad, in one of h letters, faid, he would put to fea aga with the firft fair wind; this did not loo like an intention in him to remain coo ed up in Torbay. The fourth charge had perhaps lefs it than any of the former. The reaf Adm. Parker did not stop before the Te el to prevent the Dutch from coming ou |