Lucretius has wisely rejected this day-dream of philosophy, for, though he appear to believe that man may by his own efforts approach toward perfection, and emulate the gods in happiness, yet he has taken care to qualify this opinion by affirming that the seeds of vice and imperfection cannot be altogether eradicated ; that man, in fact, cannot shake off the imbecilities incident to materiality, nor can he annihilate those passions which the deity has, for wise purposes, attached to our system.

Sic Hominum genus est: quamvis Doctrina politos
Constituat pariter quosdam, tamen illa relinquit.
Naturæ cujusque Animæ vestigia prima.
Nec radicitùs evelli mala posse putandum 'st,
Quin proclivius Hic iras decurrat ad acreis;
Ille metu citiùs paullo tentetur: at Ille
Tertius accipiat quædam clementiùs æquo.
Inque aliis rebus multis differre necesse 'st
Naturas hominum varias, moresque sequaceis:
Quorum ego nunc nequeo cæcas exponere causas,
Nec reperire figurarum tot nomina, quot sunt
Principiis, unde hæc oritur variantia rerum.
Illud in his rebus videor firmare potesse,
Usque adeo Naturarum vestigia linqui
Parvola, quæ nequeat Ratio depellere dictis:
Ut nihil impediat dignam Diis degere vitam.
Lib. iii. 308.

Thus varies man: tho' education oft
Add its bland polish, frequent still we trace
The first deep print of nature on the soul,
Nor aught can all-erase it. Hence, thro' time,
This yields to sudden rage, to terror that,
While oft a third beyond all right betrays
A heart of mercy. Thus, in various modes,
The moral temper, and symphoneous life,
Must differ; thus from many a cause occult
The sage can ne'er resolve, nor human speech
Find phrase to explain; so boundless, so complex
The primal sources whence the variance flows!
Yet this the Muse may dictate, that so few
The native traces wisdom ne'er can rase,
Man still may emulate the gods in bliss.

The doctrine of Pyrrho, which inculcates perfect scepticism, and discredits even the testimony of the senses, Lucretius held in utter and deserved contempt; and in the following passage he has, in a striking manner, laid open the absurdity of his tenets. It is a lesson still applicable at the commencement of the nineteenth century; and may, with equal propriety, be addressed to the disciples of Berkley and of Hume; for he who denies the existence of matter, must in almost every instance disbelieve the evidence of sense.

Denique, mil seiri siquis putat, id quoque nescit,
An sciri possit, quoniam nihil scire fatetur :
Hunc igitur contra mittam contendere caufam,
Qui capite ipse suo in statuit vestigia sese.

Et tamen hoc quoque uti concedam, scire, at id ipfum

Quæram, quom in rebus veri nil viderit antè,
Unde sciat, quid sit scire, et nescire vicissim :
Notitiam veri quæ res, falsique creârit;
Et dubium certo que res differre probârit?
Invenies primis ab sensibus esse creatam
Notitiam veri, neque sensus posse refelli:
Nam majore fide debet reperirier illud,
Sponte sua veris quod possit vincere falsa.
Quid majore fide porro, quàm sensus haberi
Debet? An ab sensu falso ratio orta valebit
Dicere eos contra, quæ tota ab sensibus orta 'st?
Qui nisi sint veri, ratio quoque falsa fit omnis,
An poterunt oculos aures reprehendere? an aureis
Tactus? an hunc porro tactum sapor arguet oris ?
An confutabunt nares, oculive revincent?

Non (ut opinor) ita 'st: Nam seorsum quoique potestas

Divisa 'st sua vis quoique 'st: ideoque necesse 'st, Et quod molle sit, et gelidum, fervensque videri; Et seorsum varios rerum sentire colores,

Et quæcunque coloribu' sunt conjuncta, necesse 'st, Seorsus item sapor oris habet vim, seorsus odores Nascuntur, seorsum sonitus: ideoque neceffe 'st, Non possint alios alii convincere sensus.

Nec porro poterunt ipsi reprendere sesé,

Aqua fides quoniam debebit semper haberi.
Proinde, quod in quoque 'st his visum tempore,
verum 'st.
Lib. iv. 471.

Who holds that nought is known, denies he knows
E'en this, thus owning that he nothing knows.
With such I ne'er could reason, who, with face
Retorted, treads the ground just trod before.
Yet grant e'en this he knows, since nought exists
Of truth in things, whence learns he what to know,
Or what not know? what things can give him first
The notion crude of what is false or true?
What prove aught doubtful, or of doubt devoid?
Search, and this earliest notion thou wilt find
Of truth and falsehood, from the senses drawn ;
Nor aught can e'er refute them: for what once,
By truths opposed, their falschood can detect,
Must claim a trust far ampler than themselves.
Yet what than these an ampler trust can claim?
Can reason, born for sooth of erring sense,
Impeach those senses whence alone it springs?
And which, if false, itself can ne'er be true?
Can sight correct the ears? can ears the touch?
Or touch the tongue's fine flavour? or, o'er all,
Can smell triumphant rise? absurd the thought!
For every sense a separate function boasts,

A power prescribed; and hence or soft, or hard,

Or hot or cold, to its appropriate sense
Alone appeals. The gaudy train of hues,
With their light shades, appropriate thus alike
Perceive we; tastes appropriate powers possess;
Appropriate, sounds and odours; and hence, too,
One sense another ne'er can contravene,
Nor e'en correct itself; since every hour,
In every act, each claims an equal faith:
So what the senses notice must be true.

It being my intention to quote from the sixth book some lines descriptive of a disease the most dreadful that afflicts humanity, I have chosen, on an intervening page, and with a view to gratify the mind by the charm of contrast, as well as to evince the exquisite beauty of the original and translation, to present a picture taken from the conclusion of the fifth book, where the poet is expatiating on the origin of man, and on the progress of the useful and elegant arts. It is a design which has all that amenity of conception, harmony of colouring, and delicacy of finish, which distinguish the pencil of Albani.

At specimen sationis, et insitionis origo
Ipsa fuit rerum primùm Natura creatrix.
Arboribus quoniam baccæ, glandesque caduce
Tempestiva dabant pullorum examina subter.