it is a point, not very easy to determine, "whether counsel ought to be interrupted by the bench, or whether the most effectual sort of interruption does not consist in the distress which an attentive judge will generally be seen to suffer from wandering and repetition." We confess this is a nice point; but, for ourselves, we should prefer an interruption which acquainted us with the reason of the judge's "distress," to the exhibition of an irritation whose silence afforded no clue to its removal.

Mr. Miller also proposes, that the number of counsel who address the court, should be limited to two; and, he thinks, (which is no great compliment to the gentlemen of the bar,) that, by this limitation, those who spoke would come better prepared, and thus there would be a saving of time in the length of each speech, as well as in the number of speeches.

A considerable cause of procrastination is owing, he conceives, to the courtesy which solicitors shew each other, or the remissness with which they act themselves; and, he adds, that part of the delay is attributable to the clerks in court; a species of auxiliary solicitors, which he thinks might be dispensed with altogether. After adverting to the conflicting statements which have been made by the solicitors and clerks in court, he says,

"The only conclusion which can with certainty be drawn, is, that every suitor in the Court of Chancery is obliged to have two solicitors in the same cause, the first of whom charges the second with delay and expence, and the second charges the first with inattention-neither of the charges being perhaps altogether without foundation. But what possible reason can be given why two agents in this case should be better than one? First of all, the cost is greater, and that is an obvious disadvantage. In the next place, it must naturally take more time to communicate through two than through one, which is another disadvantage of no small moment. Last of all, if blame is imputable, it is much more difficult to fix it upon two than one, and that is also disadvantageous. Upon every ground, therefore, one agent appears to be preferable to two; and if so, there can be no doubt that the client's own solicitor ought to be preferred, and the clerks in court superseded.'

"

Amongst the delays occasioned by the regulations of the court, the author particularly enunierates the multitude of parties whose presence is deemed essential:

"The object of courts of equity is to make a complete decree between all the parties who have any present or future interest in the matters in question, and for this purpose it requires every individual among them to be represented, so that none may be affected who are unheard or undefended. Laudable as this end must be admitted to be, it is exceedingly questionable whether it does not create a great deal more hardship than it prevents. In many instances it is impracti

cable to produce strict legal evidence that all the parties who may be affected by a decree are before the court, and in most cases which occur, the property in question would be exhausted before the inquiries were ended."

We shall abstain from conducting our readers through all the details of a chancery suit: the obtaining evidence,―references to the masters,-applications to the court, &c. &c. But there is one cause of delay to which the author has not adverted, that we think as important as any other, and that consists of the delays occasioned by the suitors themselves.

It is very strangely assumed, that each party conducts his case with the most perfect candour, and is really anxious to obtain the speedy opinion of the court on its true merits, and it is supposed that these laudable objects are unfortunately frustrated by the negligence or cupidity of solicitors and counsel, and that from the court they can obtain neither hearing nor decision. It is overlooked, (perhaps from its obviousness,) that the defending parties are severally interested in devising and obtaining every species of delay, and that frequently litigation is prolonged, because the complaining party will not set reasonable bounds to the extent of his demands.

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Besides this additional source of procrastination, it should be observed that there is another cause equally fruitful in the same effect, namely, the nature of many of the subjects of litigation. The generally involved nature of the property in dispute, the conflicting claims of the different parties, frequently numerous, and usually obstinate, and the various incidental points, independently of the principal issue,—all require an extent of investigation that has not been sufficiently noticed by those who have raised the outcry against the abuses of our equitable system.

No one has yet ventured to maintain that a court of equity is a needless appendage to our system of jurisprudence; its importance and necessity are indeed admitted by its assailants, and we must be content to submit to such portion of inconvenience, for the sake of the general benefit, as we find inseparable from its nature, and the due efficacy of its principles and objects. This is no party question. It has a loftier aim than the alteration of a political measure, or the removal of an obnoxious minister; it is one of infinite magnitude both to the rights of private property, and the general furtherance of public justice

We subjoin some highly judicious advice which will be found in the conclusion of the volume.

"Amendments in the law, (says our author,) should be projected long before the adoption of them becomes indispensably necessary.

No new system of law, or material alteration in one already established, ought to be sanctioned without full and fair examination. It is owing to the haste of Tribonian to do that in three years which he was allowed ten to accomplish, that the Digest exhibits such a mass of incoherence and confusion. To press the adoption of any legislative measure when insufficiently known or imperfectly comprehended is neither wise nor honest. It is to the hurry and confusion in which the laws of England are made, that the greater part of their blunders and miscarriages are owing. Scarcely any permanent and important measure can be figured, which ought not, after it has been put into the shape of a bill, to be submitted to the judgment of the public for one year at least, and if it were to undergo a probation of several, it would usually be so much the better. Whenever the government is persuaded that any matter connected with the dispensation of justice requires revision, the examination to which the proposed alteration is subjected, can hardly either be too general, severe, or protracted. Above all, it ought to be submitted to the inspection of those who are supposed to be most suspicious of its expedience, or hostile to its introduction. Let such persons report upon it, not in any kind of collective body, but what is invariably much better, in their own words, according to their own plan, and upon their own responsibility. If any objections have been offered, let them be canvassed with candour, temper, and patience, and let the fate of the proposal depend upon the result of the ordeal to which it has been subjected."

The Practice of Elocution, or a Course of Exercises for acquiring the several Requisites of a good Delivery. Second Edition, elucidated and augmented. By H. Smart, author of the Theory of Elocution, Grammar of Pronunciation, Practical Logic, &c. London, 1826. Richardson, Whittaker, Hookham.

Practical Logic, or Hints to Young Theme-Writers, for the purpose of leading them to think and reason with accuracy. By B. H. Smart, author of the Theory and Practice of Elocution, Grammar of Pronunciation, Guide to Parsing, &c. &c. London, 1823. Whittaker.

We have long intended to present our readers with analyses of the various works by which Mr. Smart has illustrated the art of which he is so distinguished a professor. This purpose, however, (like many other good ones,) has been hitherto post

poned in consequence of a variety of circumstances which we regretted, but had not the power of averting. In its full extent we are still obliged to postpone this gratifying duty. Our present limits will permit us to notice only two of Mr. Smart's valuable publications; and those very briefly.

The "Practice of Elocution" is divided into four chapters. The first treats of Articulation. Although certainly not the most attractive part of the book, this chapter demands, and will receive, from the sensible student, the severest attention. No other quality can compensate for the want of a fine articulation. It is not only of absolute necessity to render speech intelligible, but it is in itself a beauty of no ordinary kind.* To attain it, great care and attention are indispensable. It is astonishing to observe the ridiculous vices of articulation, into which very sensible persons are in the habit of falling. We cannot now stop to point them out; but there are two so very common, and so very annoying, that we must allow ourselves to advert to them. We mean the two opposite faults of giving an undue preponderance either to the consonants or the vowels. Both these practices are bad enough; but the latter is the more abominable of the two. When a speaker expends all his labour upon the consonants, he distresses our ears indeed, but we know what he says; but when he bounces out the vowels, and leaves the consonants to shift for themselves, the very purpose of speech is frustrated; we hear a confused noise, but are utterly unable to gather what the man would say.†

"In just articulation, the words are not hurried over nor melted together; they are neither abridged nor prolonged ; they are not swallowed, nor are they shot from the mouth; neither are they trailed, and then suffered to drop unfinished; but they are delivered from the lips as beautiful coins are issued from the mint, deeply and accurately impressed, neatly struck by the proper organs, distinct, sharp, perfectly finished.”

This observation is quoted by Mr. Smart from “ Austins Chironomia ;" an excellent work, not half so well known as it deserves to be.

"It is well known that a piece of writing may be understood if all the vowels are omitted; but if the vowels are set down, and the consonants omitted, nothing can be made of it. Make the experiment upon any sentence: for example: judge not that ye be not judged. Take out the vowels and it will stand thus,-jdg nt tht y b nt jdgd. This may readily be made out; but take away the consonants and nothing can possibly be made of it, -ue o de o ue. It is the same in speaking as in writing: the vowels make a noise, and thence they have their name; but they discriminate nothing. Many speakers think they are heard if they bellow them out: and so they are; but they are not understood; because the discrimination of words depends upon a distinct articulation of their consononts; for want of considering which, many speakers spend their breath to very little effect. The late Bishop of Peterborough, Dr. Hinchcliffe, was one of the most

The acquisition of a distinct, firm, smooth, and spirited articulation, should be regarded as the first object of elocutionary study: not only the first in the order of time, but the first in importance. Mr. Smart's chapter on the subject is well calculated to facilitate the progress of the pupil. It is subdivided into two sections, respectively devoted to the consonant and the vowel sounds; and a steady practice of the exercises, combined with a due attention to the rules laid down, cannot fail of ensuring to the student the attainment of a correct and graceful articulation.

The second chapter, which is on modulation, contains many judicious precepts and improving exercises. The third chapter is on expression. It presents a great number of exercises, in every variety of manner. The narrative,-the argumentative,—the meditative, the vehement,-the plaintive,— the lively, the solemn. Exercises in popular, senatorial, forensic, and pulpit elocution; each exercise being preceded by instructions for its appropriate and efficient delivery. The fourth chapter, which is very short, consists of exercises in dramatic reading.

Our limits will not allow us more than this very brief notice; but all who have witnessed Mr. Smart's powers of elocution, will agree that upon the principle of Pope, he is admirably qualified to produce a treatise on his art.

"Let those teach others who themselves excel."

The "Practical Logic" is stated to be an attempt to fill up a remarkable gap in the course of elementary treatises intended for youth." It is indeed remarkable, that while we are overwhelmed with school books, to teach every thing which can properly be taught at school, and every thing which cannot, there should be none, excepting the one before us, to teach the art of reasoning,-the most important of all We do not mean to say that it is a proper subject to occupy the time of school-boys of all ages; but surely the eldest scholars could not be better occupied than in ac

arts.

pleasing preachers of his time. His melodious voice was the gift of nature, and he spake with the accent of a man of sense, (such as he really was in a superior degree;) but it was remarkable, and to those who did not know the cause, mysterious, that there was not a corner of the church in which he could not be heard distinctly. I noted this myself with great satisfaction; and by watching him attentively, I perceived it was an invariable rule with him, to do justice to every consonant, knowing that the vowels will be sure to speak for themselves. And thus be became the surest and clearest of speakers; his elocution was perfect, and never disappointed his audience. Life of Bishop Horne, by the Rev. W. Jones.