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1665-96] Spanish feeling. Infirmity of Charles II 379

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by the English to Spain were different kinds of cloths, stuffs, cotton and silk, fish and other commodities. The goods imported from Spain. in return were wine, oil, wool, iron, and other articles, and the balance paid to England in bullion had been very great. A considerable number of British merchants at that time lived in Cadiz and other ports of Spain, which were the marts of the English manufactures for the Indies. Besides this, a great carrying-trade was carried on by English ships between Spain and other countries. Even the intercourse between Spain and her colonies in the West was, under the names of Spanish firms, in a great measure carried on by English and Dutch merchants. If to this are added the numerous legal and illegal advantages gained by British and Dutch merchants, the large smuggling trade in progress between the West Indies and the American continent, the deficiencies of the Habsburg administration in Spain as compared with that of nations much further advanced in their economic development, it becomes evident why the British and Dutch merchants derived the greatest benefit from the colonial possessions of Spain. To the Crown not much was left besides the trouble of administration. The enormous amount of bullion brought over every year by the silver-fleets from the New World only reached the Spanish ports in order to fill the pockets of the foreign merchants.

Ever since the testament of Philip IV, confirmed by the Cortes of Spain, had been drawn up for settling the Succession to the throne, this great question had continued to occupy the minds of the Spanish people as well as the Cabinets of Europe. The weak physical constitution of Charles II seemed to presage a premature death. He was never healthy and often so ill that his life was despaired of. The well-known Habsburg type seemed in him exaggerated to a caricature. His lower jaw stood out so far that the two rows of teeth could hardly meet. His diseases were so many that even at his Court there were some persons, and the doctors among them, who would repeat the saying common among the superstitious people, that his sufferings were caused by witchcraft. Whenever his health improved, the recovery was ascribed to a miracle. In his dangerous illness in 1696 the King was cured by the intervention of St Diego of Alcalà, whose body had been brought to him in his greatest extremity.

Every fit of illness that befell Charles II alarmed Europe. But still the Powers postponed during many years any decisive resolution on the point, the more so since the policy of Louis XIV set difficult problems enough to European diplomacy. Nothing had been settled, when the Congress was at work at Ryswyk to secure anew the peace of Europe. Indeed, the great question more than once threatened to confuse the labour of the diplomatists - especially in the autumn of 1696, when not only Charles II, but also his Queen, who had been believed of late to be with child, was dangerously ill. A few weeks later William III had to oppose

380

The Succession question after Ryswyk

[1697-8

the Imperial Court, which wished the Spanish Succession to be fixed by one of the articles of the Treaty to be concluded. Practically no serious negotiation had been opened on the Spanish question, and no decision had been taken in regard to it, when the peace instruments were signed at Ryswyk.

In any endeavour to describe the development of this question from the Treaty of Ryswyk onward to the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession, it is necessary to distinguish between the proceedings and events which took place at the Court of Madrid, and the political transactions among the European statesmen outside Spain. For neither could his Catholic Majesty alone make an arrangement sure to satisfy all and therefore to meet with a general assent, nor were the other Powers likely, even if they came to an unanimous conclusion, to obtain for it the approval of the Spanish nation. Castilian pride would never admit the possibility that the monarchy of Philip II could be dismembered, or give room to any doubt, except as to whether the sole heir of the monarchy of Charles II should be a Bourbon or a Habsburg or a Bavarian prince; and, further, held it indispensable that the choice should be determined within Spain itself. On the other hand, the political pretensions and commercial interests of the Powers concerned in the first or in the second line were so diverse that it seemed hardly possible to find a satisfactory solution without proceeding to a partition of the vast empire.

More than at any former period in the life of Charles II, the intrigues as to the Succession began after the Peace of Ryswyk to perturb court life at Madrid, where each candidate had his own party - where at one day the French, at another the Austrian or Bavarian, influence seemed to prevail. Next to these, the hereditary right of the Duke of Savoy, whose great-grandmother had been a daughter of Philip II, was also much discussed. Indeed, in addition to these European dynasties, the pretensions of certain noble personages in Spain were also occasionally brought up who could lay claim to at least one or another part of the great inheritance. Among these was even the bearer of the great name of Montezuma.

During the greater part of the following year, while the health of Charles II was in a very desperate state, the general inclination in Spain seemed to be in favour of a French Prince. The ambassador of Louis XIV made all imaginable endeavours, squandering great sums of money, to strengthen the French sympathies among the common people. His influence grew stronger every day. "The French ambassador," wrote

Stanhope, "dares all this Court, as a hawk does larks." It might be expected that no opposition would be attempted, if after the death of the invalid monarch a Bourbon prince should come into the country as his successor. And this single condition only had to be fulfilled, that the two neighbouring monarchies should remain distinct from each other.

The Austrian party at the Court of Madrid consisted at this time

1698] Court intrigues at Madrid.

Queen Mary Anne 381 only of a few persons, among whom Queen Mary Anne, Charles' second wife, was the most important. She was a Palatine princess and sisterin-law to the Emperor Leopold, whose ambassador, Count Harrach, was her regular adviser. For some months they struggled hard against the French influence, trying to obtain a recognition of the claims of the Archdukes in Spain. But the King's growing weakness seemed to indicate an approaching crisis. Under these circumstances, when, as one authority tells us, the French gained and the Germans visibly lost ground every day, Queen Mary Anne was prudent enough to make her peace with the French party. Moreover, she had been disappointed of late by the conduct of the Court of Vienna towards herself. The Austrian ambassador had come so seldom to ask for an audience, and the letters of the Emperor had been so dry, that she believed he would not lend her his assistance. Her constant fear was lest, after the King's death, she might be locked up in the convent of Toledo, the usual place of retirement for the royal widows in Spain. She did not believe in the assurances of Count Harrach, that, in case she would lend her aid in bringing one of the Archdukes into Spain, she would really govern and the new monarch would be dependent on her; moreover, she had lost all hope of ever seeing the succession settled on an Austrian prince. On the other hand, she had every reason to set her hopes on Louis XIV. The French ambassador, and still more his lady, to whom the Queen was much attached, made her the most far-reaching promises. She should continue in her position even after Charles' death; indeed, the question was discussed whether she might not become the Queen of a Bourbon King of Spain, as she had been the consort of a scion of the House of Habsburg. She was additionally confirmed in her French feeling by Louis XIV seeming in return inclined to make concessions concerning certain territorial questions disputed between him and the Queen of Spain's brother, the Elector Palatine John William. In consequence, she was now as much in the French interest as she had before been in the German. Indeed, after these successes of the French policy, one might have expected that immediately after Charles II's death a descendant of Louis XIV would have appeared in Spain and, amidst the applause of the Grandees as well as the common people, ascended the vacant throne.

At the same time, however, while his affairs in Spain wore so favourable an aspect, Louis XIV was labouring at a solution of the Spanish question in a wholly different sense. Since the first month of this year, 1698, negotiations were in progress between him and William III, with the purpose of partitioning the Spanish monarchy. From the language held by the Earl of Portland, the favourite Minister of the British monarch, Louis became convinced that a Bourbon Succession in Spain would meet with the opposition not only of Austria, but also of the Maritime Powers. A European war would be the inevitable consequence of any attempt to bring about this Succession. The French King,

382

France and the Bavarian claim

[1698

therefore, began to listen to proposals coming from the British statesmen, aiming at the succession of the young Electoral Prince of Bavaria.

"What!" exclaimed Marshal Tallard, who negotiated with William III by order of Louis XIV, "Spain, India, Italy, the Netherlands all this to fall to a son of the Elector of Bavaria!" But soon afterwards the opposition of France to such a scheme was laid aside. It is not easy to say what were the real motives that induced the King of France to prefer the Bavarian candidature to the succession of one of his grandsons or perhaps we should rather ask, was this really his preference? If the Electoral Prince became King of Spain, as it was proposed by the English, this would in itself be more advantageous to France than the succession of an Archduke, which to Louis was the most disagreeable of all possibilities. In such a solution France, moreover, would find her profit, since it was intended that some parts of the great inheritance should be detached from the main body to enlarge the Austrian as well as the French dominions. While, therefore, Louis' dynasty was interested in the Bourbon Succession, France would gain through the Bavarian candidature. If to this is added the natural wish of the French monarch, when only a few months had passed since the Peace of Ryswyk, to preserve France from a new war, there were reasons enough to incline Louis to the plan of a Partition implied in the British proposal.

During six months, from spring to autumn, 1698, French policy seemed to be working at the same time for two different purposes. Harcourt, the ambassador in Spain, tried his utmost and spared no money to bring about the entry of a Bourbon King at the moment of the daily expected catastrophe. In France, England, and Holland, meanwhile, statesmen were endeavouring to find out another expedient by proclaiming the young Joseph Ferdinand heir of Charles II, though not without detaching some portions of the inheritance for the benefit of the other pretenders. One only of these schemes could be realised. Did Louis XIV deceive William III, intending merely to amuse him in order to be the better able to execute his plans in Spain? Or, as some think, were Harcourt's endeavours meant only to make an impression on the Maritime Powers, to give them a high opinion of the influence which France possessed in Spain, of her sympathies with the Spanish people, of the good prospects awaiting her candidate in Spain, in case France should proceed to extremities? No doubt, all this is very probable; and not less probable is it that the splendid military reviews held near the French capital in summer, 1698, in the presence of Portland and Wassenaer, the two intimate friends of William III, the confidants of his policy in England and Holland, were intended to inform the world how rich and powerful France still was after the conclusion of the War; what large resources she possessed - while a great part of the British army had of late been disbanded; how valuable an ally and how formidable an enemy she would be in any future war; and how advisable,

1698] Illness of Charles II.-Harcourt's instructions 383

therefore, it was to make acceptable proposals to the King of France in the treaty to be negotiated.

But if we must allow that of the two different schemes of policy with which Louis XIV was occupied in 1698, only one could in the end be realised, it by no means follows that the King did not take both schemes seriously. He seems to have desired that either way should be left open to him, so that he might choose the one or the other, according to the course of events. If the death of Charles II had occurred in 1698 and the French preparations had been finished, Louis would assuredly not have hesitated to send a Bourbon prince as the new King to Spain, and to defy the Powers and their Partition Treaty. This is exactly what he did afterwards in 1700.

In 1698, indeed, the preparations of his ambassador in Spain had not reached the degree of perfection requisite for success, in case King Charles should die. Louis had therefore to observe the greatest caution. His intentions are clearly explained in a letter to Harcourt, written on September 15, 1698, when the negotiation with William III was drawing near to its conclusion. With all goodwill on the side of the Spaniards, Louis finds things not yet ripe to build his entire policy on the future succession of one of his grandsons. For it is only the people that wish it-none of the Grandees, except Cardinal Porto-Carrero, whose timid nature, moreover, does not allow him to give any but general assurances. No force is ready in Spain to support the French claim. Nay, even if the troops of Louis XIV should succeed in entering Spain and in establishing his grandson on the throne, it would still be necessary to take by force the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, the Indies, Milan, the Netherlands, and the other territories belonging to the monarchy of Spain; or the other Powers would certainly form a league against France still stronger than the last. So King Louis proposes to conclude on special terms a treaty with the King of England. This treaty, however, is not to be published during the lifetime of the present King of Spain. If Charles should die, and if Porto-Carrero and other wellintentioned persons should then ask whether Louis would not send one of his grandsons to Spain, Harcourt was to make answer as follows. All the King of France had hitherto been able to do was to move his troops near the Spanish frontier — which was indeed the principal measure that must precede the sending of the Bourbon prince in person but now he, the ambassador, had to inform his master what facilities and what assistance his troops would find on their way through Spain; what places of safety would be delivered into their hands; what confidence might be placed in the several viceroys and governors; and that only in reply to such information could his master give him his orders, so that within a few days they might receive the answer desired by them.

This time, however, the sick King survived, and the expected catastrophe in Spain did not happen. This only added to the importance

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