1

1691-1707] Criticisms of Boisguillebert and Vauban

29

for the Duke of Burgundy, and in the Mémoires concernant la guerre de la succession d'Espagne. But, though all his writings imply a criticism on the absolutist system of Louis XIV, it is in a letter which he wrote to the King, probably in 1691, that the most hostile judgment is expressed. The fate of the letter is somewhat mysterious, and it is improbable that so bitter an indictment ever reached the eyes or the ears of the great King. In this letter he denounced the Dutch War as the source of all the others; he derided the King's military preparations, and directly attacked the ideals and the character of the King. "You are praised to the skies," he wrote, "for having impoverished France, and you have built your throne on the ruin of all classes in the State."

Before the end of the reign men of practical knowledge attacked the King's government with even greater energy. Pierre Le Pesant, Sieur de Boisguillebert, was a magistrate at Rouen. He published in 1697 a book called the Détail de la France and another the Factum de la France, which is little more than a repetition of the conclusions of the first, in 1707. He writes with vigour and occasionally with humour. His books are occupied to a large extent with theoretic problems of political economy, as to which he shows himself in advance of Colbert. But historically the most valuable part of his book is the picture that he gives of the working of the actual financial system of France, its clumsiness, its inefficiency, its tendency to discourage industry. The Crown, he tells us, derives little advantage from the system and the people lose the whole value of their labour. He was not content with pointing out the evil; he also suggested remedies. His suggestions fall into line with the general tendency of economic thought during the eighteenth century, to which he gave a powerful impulse. He demanded the abolition of pecuniary privilege, the establishment of free trade in corn, the removal of custom houses to the frontiers. His proposal for immediate application in the Détail de la France was an extension of a reformed taille

to the privileged classes. In the Factum de la France he goes further and suggests a capitation, which should amount to a tax of ten per cent. on all incomes, whether derived from land or other resources. The books were little read; but Boisguillebert procured an interview with Chamillart, who seemed inclined to accept some of his ideas. Yet, when the reforms were postponed on the ground that the war made them impracticable, Boisguillebert published a bitter ironic attack on the Minister under the itle of a Supplement to the Détail de la France. This brought upon him the suppression of his books and his own exile from Rouen (1707).

But criticism of the methods of government could not be repressed, and in 1707 Vauban published his Projet d'une dîme royale. After Turenne and Louvois the military glory of Louis XIV's reign owed most to Vauban; and he showed a moral courage and a social feeling that rank him, in truth, much higher than either of the other two. The Dîme royale is, in fact, a treatise on taxation, proposing to make a clean sweep of the

30 Domestic troubles of Louis XIV's last years

[1707-11

whole existing arrangements and to substitute a simpler system, which, by abolishing privilege, should be less burdensome to the people and more useful to the King. The preface justifies the search for a new system by showing the effects of the present one and contains an oftenquoted passage. "From all the researches that I have been able to make during several years of close application I have come to the clear conclusion that one-tenth of the people is reduced to beggary and does as a matter of fact live by begging; of the nine-tenths remaining, five cannot give alms to the first tenth because they are very little better off; of the other four-tenths three are in far from comfortable circumstances, in the tenth that still remains there cannot be more than 100,000 families." There is a good deal of confusion both in the arrangement and the style of the book; but its central contentions are placed beyond doubt. Vauban aimed at the destruction of the régime of privilege and the adoption of an income-tax on land and property, without privilege or exemption. He wished to sweep away the existing taxes, oppressive by reason of the exemptions allowed and the method of collecting them. He compared the ease with which the ecclesiastical tithe was realised and the absence of complaint against it with the vast expense and the constant irritation produced by the taille. He would, therefore, adapt the methods of the Church to the needs of the State and suggests the following taxes: (1) a tax of from five to ten per cent. on all land without regard to privilege; (2) a graduated tax on incomes not derived from land: the working-classes of France not to pay more than 3 per cent.; the incomes of the clergy to be taxed equally with those of other classes; (3) a modified salt monopoly ; (4) a remodelled system of customs, which should be collected only at the frontier. But Vauban's attempt to circulate the book privately among his friends aroused the anger of d'Argenson and Pontchartrain. The book was condemned by royal edict, and the shock of disgrace hastened Vauban's death (1707).

The end of the Spanish War brought to France some return of military glory; but her finances were hopelessly exhausted and her old King suffered from one shattering blow after another which fell on his domestic circle. No royal family could seem more firmly established than his. Maria Teresa had only borne one son to Louis XIV, who received the traditional name of Louis. But the King had three grandsons; Louis the Duke of Burgundy, Philip, Duke of Anjou (since 1700 Philip V of Spain); and Charles, Duke of Berry. The Duke of Burgundy was happily married to Maria Adelaide of Savoy, and had two children. Yet suddenly, in addition to all her other disasters, France was threatened by a difficult question of succession. The Dauphin died in April, 1711. He had been completely effaced by his father; and men welcomed the prospect of the accession of the Duke of Burgundy, who had been the pupil of Fénelon and had adopted many of his aristocratic liberal ideas. Men repeated with astonishment and hope his saying

1712-5] Plans for the Regency.

Death of Louis XIV 31

"that a King is made for his subjects, not the subjects for the King." Had he lived to inherit the throne there would have been an attempt ne made to alter the development of France, probably in a reactionary te feudal direction. But, in 1712, the Duke of Burgundy and his charming wife and eldest son were all carried off by a mysterious disease which seems to have been smallpox, though it roused at the time suspicions of poison. The Duke of Berry, the third of the King's grandsons, died in 1714. The second, Philip, was King of Spain, and his claim to the French throne was expressly renounced by the Treaty of Utrecht. Any attempt to revive this claim would be the signal for a renewal of war. The direct heir to the throne was Louis, Duke of Anjou, who was afterwards Louis XV. He was two years of age, and of feeble health. And if the boy were to live, according to all the traditions of France the Regency would come into the hands of the Duke of Orléans. All eyes were fixed on him; and his name awoke the wildest suspicions and fears. He had fought with distinction in Spain, and possessed a keen and inquisitive intellect. But he was of an indolent and self-indulgent nature, plunged in vice and drunkenness, openly opposed to the doctrines and neglectful of the practices of the Church. Louis XIV and Madame de Maintenon saw with alarm the prospect of power coming into his hands, for it would mean a complete reaction against the policy which the dying monarch had pursued in Church and State both at home and abroad. Hence arose the last intrigue of the reign. The King's fondness for his illegitimate children had been manifested throughout the latter part of the reign. And now it was determined to give the reality of power to the Duke of Maine, the son of Madame de Montespan and the pupil of Madame de Maintenon. He had shown himself unsuccessful and incapable in war; but it was determined to make him master of France after the King's death. Tradition made it impossible to deny to the Duke of Orléans the title of Regent; but the custody of the young King was to be in the hands of the Duke of Maine and a council of regency was to be established by the will of the King, so arranged that the present régime would be prolonged and Louis XIV would still rule France from his grave. But the King and his wife miscalculated the forces against them. The age was weary of the long and now disastrous reign; men were more attracted by the known opposition of the Duke of Orléans to the reigning policy than frightened by his reputation. Thus the King's schemes were foredoomed to failure, when, after a reign of seventy-two years (the longest reign recorded in history), he died on September 1, 1715.

CHAPTER II

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF LOUIS XIV

(1661-97)

THE prominent position occupied in Europe by France under Louis XIV from the death of Mazarin in 1661 to the Treaty of Ryswyk in 1697 affected in a marked though varying degree the politics of the whole of Western Christendom. In examining the causes and results of the rise of France to this position, a distinction must be drawn between the earlier and the later portion of the period. Till 1688, Louis succeeded in many of his aims, and during these twenty-seven years he secured for France territorial acquisitions of enormous value. After 1688, he was opposed by a European Confederacy against which he barely managed to hold his own. Nevertheless, in 1697 France still stood forth not only as the nation most advanced in the arts of civilisation, but also as the most powerful of European States, and a danger to the balance of power among them.

The supremacy which France had thus attained in both arms and arts, and the partial success which had attended Louis' policy of territorial aggression were due to many causes, chief among which were the consistent internal policy of the two great Cardinal Ministers and the political condition of the chief European States. Richelieu and Mazarin had, after infinite labour, reduced the nobility to obedience and laid down the lines on which the development of France should proceed. At home, religious toleration, the reduction of provincial autonomy, and the subordination of the Parlement of Paris to the royal power; abroad, alliance with England and the United Provinces, and encouragement of the independence of the Princes of the Empire - such was the substance of the political legacy bequeathed by the two far-sighted Cardinals to the young King.

It remained for Louis to take advantage of the political weakness of the great European States and, following the policy of the Cardinals, so to strengthen the monarchy that no Power or combination of Powers could by whatever means weaken its foundations. In carrying out this scheme Louis was aided by a variety of circumstances. England under Charles II

1661-99]

The designs of Louis XIV

33

and James II made no effective resistance to French projects; while the Empire was as disunited as ever, and many of its members continued more jealous of the power of the Emperor than they were of that of France. Moreover, the sudden recovery of Turkey under the Kiuprilis kept the east of Europe in a state of continual alarm; nor was it till the Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699 that the perennial menace to the Habsburg dominions was sensibly lessened. But the most alarming fact that Europe had to face was the fall of Spain from the position she had held under Charles V and his successors till the Peace of the Pyrenees. The disappearance of Spain from among the great European nations aided in a marked degree the rise of France under Louis XIV.

At the time of Mazarin's death the political outlook for France was promising. Louis XIV's marriage with Maria Teresa, the Spanish Infanta, brought with it possibilities of which time could alone determine the value. By the Treaty of the Pyrenees, France had strengthened herself on her north-eastern frontier by the acquisition of Avesnes, on the side of the Pyrenees by finally securing Roussillon, between Sambre and Meuse by the cession of Philippeville and Marienbourg, and in Lorraine by that of Bar, Clermont, Stenay, Dun, and Jarmetz. The Duke of Neuburg, the ally of France, had obtained Jülich; French troops had acquired the right to march through Lorraine; the League of the Rhine still more or less looked towards France for guidance.

The aspirations of the French nation were, however, by no means satisfied. The frontier of the Rhine had not yet been secured, and the Spanish Netherlands had not been conquered. Much, therefore, remained to be done; and by Louis XIV and his most astute advisers the Peace of the Pyrenees was regarded as merely a truce.

Till the War of Devolution in 1667, Louis contented himself with making elaborate preparations, with secretly helping the Portuguese, with concluding alliances in 1663 with Denmark, and in 1664 with Brandenburg and Saxony, and with taking an active part in the same year in the internal conflicts of the Empire. With the opening of the War of Devolution France entered upon a period of conquest and expansion, and till 1688 success on the whole crowned her efforts. From 1688, however, to the Treaty of Ryswyk in 1697, Louis XIV found himself confronted by an almost united Europe, and for the first time since the days of Mazarin a definite check was inflicted on French arms and French diplomacy. Nevertheless, throughout these years France held the foremost place in Europe. Had Louis XIV contented himself with following the policy of Richelieu, France would have been spared many disasters. But both in his home and foreign policy he aimed at ideals which in certain respects resembled those pursued by the Emperor Charles V.

No serious opposition to Louis' schemes was to be expected from Spain. That country was slowly but steadily declining in power and

C. M. H. V.

3