as > one,

who is removed to and fettled in the Fortunate Islands. But if you perceive you fall from them and fucceed not thoroughly, retire boldly into some corner, where you may prevail by meeting with lefs oppofition; or even depart out of life altogether: yet not angry, that you could not prevail, "but with fimplicity, liberty and modefty; having at least performed this one thing well in life, that you have in this manner departed out of it." (B. X. 8.) Again; "Let nobody have it in his power to fay with truth of you, that you "are not a man of fimplicity, candour and goodness. But let him be mistaken, "whoever has fuch an opinion of you. Now all this is in your own power. "For who is he, that can hinder you from being good and pure at heart? Only do you determine to live no longer, if you are not to be such a man. For neither does reason in that cafe require you should." (B. X. S. 32.)

With respect to the length or fhortness of life being infignificant, and the number of duties to be performed undetermined, the good Emperor speaks much more rationally and to the purpose than Seneca. "To the perfon (fays he) who reputes that alone to be good, which is feasonable, and reckons it indifferent, "whether he has opportunity of performing a greater or smaller number of actions according to right reason; whether he beholds this univerfe for a longer or a shorter space; to him death cannot appear terrible. You have lived, o man, as a citizen "of this great state (the universe); of what confequence to you, whether it be only "" for five years ? What is according to the laws is equal and just to all. What is "there terrible in this, that you are sent out, not by a tyrant or an unjust judge, "but by that nature, which at first introduced you? As if the magistrate who "employed the player, should dismiss him again from the scene. But you say, "I have not finished the five acts, but only three. You fay true; but in life "three acts may make a complete play. For the fame perfon, who was the "cause of the compofition, appointing also its diffolution or end, neither of "them are chargeable on you. Though therefore the whole action of the dance or dramatic performance may be rendered incomplete by being interrupted and "broken off before its proper close, yet as to the foul, in whatever part of its "action or wherefoever it be overtaken by death, its past action may be a complete whole without any mutilation. Depart therefore contented and in good "humour; for he is propitious and kind who difmiffes

66

¢

you [G]."

[G] See B. XI. S. 1; and B. XII. S. 35 and 36 for the fubftance of this quotation.

He who acts well the part allotted him, attains to the greatest happiness and perfection of his nature; and, whether it be a short or a long part, equally completes the whole that is affigned him. But then his difmiffion from his part must not be of his own feeking, but clearly impofed on him by the great diftributor of parts. If an "involuntary" death feize him in early days, he deferts not his post, but is taken from it, But any fignal, or leave of a voluntary departure from the scene of life, must needs be very vague and uncertain, and scarce affignable even on ftoical reafoning; fince whatever be the outward circumstances of life, the foul may still be employed in its own proper offices, and also exhibit under the heaviest oppreffions, its purest exertions of difinterested virtue. Such in fact seem to be the real fentiments both of Epictetus and Antoninus. Inftances to prove this have already been brought from the writings of the former; and a few may fuffice from those of the latter.

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Why fhould you not (fays Antoninus) wait patiently either for your extinction or translation into "another state? And till the proper feafon of it comes, what should employ you "but to reverence the gods, and to do good to men; bearing with their weaknesfes, abstaining from injuries and confidering external things fubfervient to your pitiful body and life, as what are not yours nor in your own power?" (B. V. S. 33.) Again; "You may fo manage, that in whatever place ortime "one comes upon you, you may be found a man of an happy lot. He is happy, who procures this good lot to himself. The happy lots are good difpofitions of foul, good defires and good actions." (B. V. 36.) Again; "Make yourself regular, by regulating your feveral actions one by one; "fo that if each action answer its end and have what perfection belongs to "it, you may be fatisfied. But in this nothing can hinder you. But (you fay) may not something external withstand me? Nothing can hinder you "from acting the juft, the temperate, the wife part. Some external effects of 66 your actions may be obstructed; but then there may arise another action of yours equally fuited to this regular and orderly compofition of life, concerning "which we are speaking-in your acquiefcence under this obstruction and your calmly turning yourself to that conduct, which is in your power." (B.VIII.32.) Lastly; "It becomes a man of true wisdom neither to be inconfiderate, impe« "tuous nor oftentatiously contemptuous about death; but to await the season "of it, as of one of the operations of nature. As you await the natural season Dd 2 "of

"of the birth, so await the season of death, when your foul fhall fall out of thefe its teguments." (B. IX. 3.)

Such then are found to have been the opinions and tenets of the Stoics on the fubject of fuicide: and two things may in general be obferved concerning them. First and principally, that the better Stoics never seem to have allowed fuicide to be a proper refuge from vice and its just punishment, or to be practised as an evasion of the laws of one's country; but chiefly as a deliverance from evil or trouble in the extremity, which extremity they interpreted to be the fignal of God for quitting life. Secondly; that they differed much among themselves on the "extent" of thefe fignals. Cato in delivering the doctrines of Zeno feems to lay the greatest stress on the " fit opportunity" of dying, at the moment it is moft becoming a man's own perfonal dignity; and that, whether he be under fortunate or adverse circumstances at the time: accordingly when that moment feems arrived, no confideration whatever of externals, fuch as the affectionate regards and interests of a wife, a family or friends are to fway with the wife man, so as to divert him from his deadly purpose. In this manner did Cato himself act. But in Seneca, though a warm patronifer of suicide, there is some relaxation; as he evidently fuffers the concerns and attachments of others to bias the resolutions of the ftoical wife man and to call him back into life, at a time he would otherwise wish to depart: and he suffered himself to be more than once influenced by these motives. Again; in Epictetus's interpretation of the ftoical doctrine of fuicide, fo much refignation and submission to all the evils of life is required, before a man can discover the fignal of departure, that there is no fear (especially if his own example also be taken into confideration) of any number of fuicides on his allowance of its practice: fince the mean condition, the sufferings and penury of few can exceed thofe of Epictetus himself, who yet deemed them not fufficient fignals to justify his own departure. Lastly; the maxims and character of Antoninus exhibit original stoicism so much refined and meliorated, as to fettle in the exertion of every thing that is great and noble, that is capable of producing an excellent private citizen or public magiftrate; and the particular doctrine of suicide is so sparingly mentioned and fo little encouraged as to amount to an almost total prohibition of its practice. The modern race of suicides therefore (who are willing to fet afide the duties of Christianity) can yet scarce take shelter under the opinions of this fect of self-deftroying philofophers, because,

being in general of so very different a cast and temper from the ftoical wife man, they can claim no indulgence for falling into his errors, till they have first proved themselves to be the imitators of his virtues [H].

The principles of the "New Academy" being to doubt and confute the opinions of others, not to establish any of their own, could determine nothing precisely on this fubject.-Cicero.-Paffages produced from his writings either for or against fuicide only deceive, unless the character he is fupporting at the time be accurately obferved.— His own private opinions beft collected from his familiar Epiftles.-Quotations to prove, that he not only allowed the lawfulness of fuicide in certain fituations, but would have practised it on himself, had he not wanted refolution.-Sentiments of poets and tragic writers.-A paffage in the Odyfes.-Arguments concerning fuicide from Sophocles and Euripides.-The felf-murder of Ajax.-A paffage from Virgil's fixth book of the neis.—Explanations by Bishop Warburton and Addison.-Remarks on these and proposal of a third.—The only examples of fuicide in the Æneis are females.-Virgil's Hero fupports every trial with fortitude.-Opinions and practices of fome famous individuals of old.—Marcus Brutus not originally a favourer of fuicide, or an approver of Cato's death; changes his fentiments with his fortunes.-Conference between Brutus and Caffius before the battle of Philippi;. both agree on the propriety of fuicide, if defeated; and both execute it on them-felves.-Pliny the Elder.· Extracts from him concerning fuicide.- Pliny the· Younger. -Extracts from his Epiftles. Suicide of Corellius Rufus.- Pliny's opinion, that fuicide is honourable or otherwife according to the deliberation used concerning it.-Jofephus's and Eleazar's harangues to their foldiers on this fubject.-Summary of what has been collected concerning the opinions of the ancient philofophers.

[H] Pudeat ergo nuperos voluntariæ mortis patronos, imbelles homines, pro patriâ, pro familiâ, pro fe nihil unquam viriliter aufos, umbraticis tantùm in fcriptis audaces, ftoicam arabiar ridiculè often-'tare.- -BROTIER ad Cap. xxix. L. VI. An. Taciti.

THERE

TH

HERE was another diftinguished fect of philofophers, whofe principles on the fubject of fuicide have not yet been mentioned; thefe were the followers of Carneades or the New Academy. But as the chief employment of these was to doubt the truth of the opinions of all other fects, to confute those of one by another, and to advance nothing for certain of their [1] own, it must not be expected, that any positive affertions fhould be found in their writings respecting suicide. Much is occafionally faid in the philofophical works of Cicero (who was a great ornament of this fect) on the fubject of felf-murder; fometimes in its favour, fometimes otherwife: but the clue is easy. He is (according to the principles of the New Academy) either a follower of Plato, of Zeno, or Epicurus, as his fubject leads him; and what is to be met with in his works is rather a collection of the opinions of others (of the Greek philofophers in particular) than any determinations of his own. It is easy therefore for writers on either fide of this question to quote paffages from Cicero in appearance strongly making in their own favour; which must grossly mislead a reader not confulting for himself. The paffages therefore from Tully hitherto quoted in the present work have been given under their proper heads, as Platonic, Stoic or Epicurean; and as the Academics can ftrictly be faid to hold no opinion of their own, as a fect, concerning fuicide, it remains only to difcover Cicero's privatę fentiments of the matter.

Now it will not be difficult to discover thefe, fince it plainly appears from numberless paffages in his familiar Epiftles (where his real fentiments are most discoverable), that he not only thought favourably of fuicide on certain occafions, but would have actually destroyed himself, when in certain fituations, but for his natural timidity and want of refolution. It appears that he was fenfible it would have been more for his own honour (according to the ideas of his times) to have destroyed himself; but through a want of proper resolution to accomplish the bloody work, inftead of drawing his fword, he drew out his pen, confult his friends" on that point. He could eafily divine their answer; and thus not only his life was preferved (of which he was very fond) but his vanity (a ruling foible alfo) flattered by their affiduities and anxieties for his fafety. Thus when his friend Atticus, his brother Quintus, and all his well-wifhers urged

"to

[1] They went no further than "probabilities," which they allowed were to guide mankind in their pursuit of happiness.