be in a state of punishment or at least of probation. Hence he deduced the СС were bound to the body in this life, as a punishment; and that the Deity "had declared, that unless they remained quietly in these prisons, till He should "be pleased of his own accord to give them a release, they should fuffer more " and heavier calamities. Wherefore all, who are cautious and fearful of lofing the present state of their fouls, avoid and dread a "voluntary" departure from life, being perfuaded, that the death, which happens from old age, is of all others the most cheerfully to be fubmitted to, as being that "feparation of the foul from the body, which can be faid with most propriety, to "fall out by the will and decree of the Deity. Such are the opinions, which we, "embrace." The following converfation of Socrates tends alfo to elucidate the Pythagorean notions, of what was to be regarded as a leave of departure from the Deity; as well as to explain that great man's own fentiments on the fame fubject. The paffage indeed is not free from fome obfcurities, but is fufficiently decifive upon the whole of a perfect coincidence in fentiments between these two shining lights of antiquity on the subject before us. This famous conversation on the immortality of the foul was fupported in the prison between › Socrates and his friends on the day on which he was compelled to drink poison [T] Illud breve vitæ reliquum nec avide appetendum fenibus, nec fine causâ deferendum fit: vetatque Pythagoras injuffu imperatoris, id eft Dei, de præfidio & ftatione vitæ decedere.Cic. de Senectute. [u] See his Deipnofophifts or Table-Talk, Lib. IV. p. 157. 1 to do what you say." by order of the Athenian magistrates; and it is related by Phædo in the dialogue bearing his name among Plato's works. All that concerns the present fubject is contained in the following [x] extract. Socrates. "You may give "this anfwer [y] then, O Cebes, to Evenus, and moreover bid him farewell, " and follow me, if he be wife. For I go hence to-day (" meaning, he dies") by order of the Athenians." Simias. "What is it, Socrates, that you are recommending to Evenus [z]? I have often met with that man; but from "the judgment I have formed of him, I think he will not be easily perfuaded you fay." Socrates. "What then! is not Evenus a philofopher?" Simias. "It should seem fo." Socrates. "Not only Evenus then, but who"foever judges rightly of this bufinefs, will wifh to do fo [A]. However he "will not perhaps offer violence to himself, because that, they say, is for"bidden." Cebes. "How is it then, Socrates, that not allowing it to be law"ful to commit violence on oneself, yet you advise a philofopher to follow one, "who is dying?" Socrates." What, Cebes, have not you and Simias heard "of these matters from Philolaus, with whom you were fo intimate?" Cebes. Nothing clearly." Socrates." But I only speak from hearsay of these [B] things; yet what I have heard I will communicate without referve. For [x] See Plato's Phædo near the beginning. Tavla er, w Knons, Eurvy Opals, &c. [x] Which refers to what is mentioned in the preceding part of the dialogue. [z] According to a marginal note at the place in Stephens's folio edit. of Plato's works, " Evenus was a Parian fophift (a would-be philofopher) who led a voluptuous life, and was particularly fearful of death." Those who confult the original will find in the preceding part of the dialogue, that Evenus had been somewhat jealous of Socrates, because he had been writing verfes in prifon; and that he was afraid of being rivaled by Socrates in poetry. But the philofopher bids his friend tell Evenus, he need not fear that, but that now he might have an opportunity, if he pleased, of rivaling Socrates in the manner of his death. This may be implied from what goes before, and gives an air of pleasantry and irony to that part of the paffage before us relative to Evenus, which is very confiftent with the ufual Socratic ftile of converfation. [A] That is, will wish to follow me in such a kind of death: fince it may become a philosopher on many occafions to wish to meet death, though not to haften it voluntarily; and on none fooner than in defence of his principles and virtuous manners, which was the cafe with Socrates. [B] Namely, of Philolaus's opinion of these matters; viz. of death and its confequences, and what a philofopher ought to think of embracing it. N. B. Philolaus of Crotona was a Pythagorean, and the first who divulged the philofophy of Pythagoras, by felling the works, which contained it, to Plato; fays Formey in his History of Philosophy. X furely "furely it is most of all becoming one, who is just about to emigrate from "hence to form in his mind some idea of what this migration is likely to prove, "and to converfe about it; befides, what better can we do, till the fetting of "the fun ?" Cebes. "But why, Socrates, do they fay, it is wicked to kill one"felf? For in regard to your inquiry just now, I have before-time heard from "Philolaus and from fome others, "that it does not become a man to do fo;" " but I never heard the matter difcuffed and [c] laid open by any one." Socrates. "If you are attentive then you fhall quickly hear. Perhaps it appears extraordinary to you, why, the position being so plain and simple, " that it may happen to a man to prefer death to life," why (I fay) it fhould not be permitted to those, to whom it might be of advantage to die, to administer "that advantage to themselves rather than wait for another to do it for them? "You may smile and think it abfurd, that this fhould not always be lawful:: "but there is reason in the prohibition. Truly that which is maintained in "the fublimer parts of philofophy [D] concerning these matters, "that we men are, as it were, on guard, and that it does not become any one to relieve " himself from his station, or to fly away of his own motion, feems to me an important. doctrine, but not of eafy or vulgar comprehenfion. But truly,. Cebes, I think. it also well faid, "that the gods take care of us, and that we are as one of their poffeffions: Is not this your opinion too?" Cebes. "Yes certainly." Socrates. "Would you not then be "men angry, if one of your flaves [c] The meaning feems to be, "I have heard the thing in general afferted to be wrong, but neverheard the reasons affigned for its being fo." [D] There is fome difficulty here with respect to the meaning of the word, va amorpla; but see a note of the learned Bishop Warburton on this paffage, where he tranflates it, "The Mysteries."Div. Leg. Vol. I. B. ii. f. 4. His Lordship likewife mentions the exoteric and esoteric, that is, the popular and fecret doctrines of the philofophers. He allows the impiety of fuicide to be an exoteric doctrine, on account of its practice being fo pernicious to fociety; but he feems to doubt its being an esoteric opinion alfo of the philofophers among themfelves. But without entering into this abftrufe point of popular and fecret doctrines, which would carry us too great lengths, it seems as if Socrates in this place first mentioned, what had been usually advanced against suicide by Pythagoras and other preceding philofophers, concerning the station of man, which he thinks though an important, yet an abftruse argument, and not much levelled to common capacities. He therefore proceeds to make ufe of fuch other allutions and arguments of his own, as feem beft adapted to explain the impiety of fuicide in an easy and familiar manner. "fhould "fhould kill himself, when you had given him no intimation of your pleasure, "that he fhould depart out of life? and if you then had power over him, "would you not punish him?” Cebes. " Certainly." Socrates. "Perhaps "then on the fame grounds it is not against reason, that it does not become any one to kill himself, before God has impofed fome neceffity of doing it upon him, as He has at this time [E] on me." Cebes. "This is very con"fiftent. But as to what you faid before, that philofophers might defervedly "be anxious to die," that must be abfurd, if your prefent affertion be true, “viz. “ that the Deity has a regard and care for us, and that we are a part "of his property and poffeffion." For there can be no reason, why the most prudent and wife men should not at all times grieve to be removed from that care and providence, which the good gods and great governors of the universe "exercife over them. A wife man can never think, that he is able to take "better care of himself when delivered from fuch protectors; but a fool indeed may judge it right to fly from fuch mafters, because he is not capable of seeing, that what is good is not to be fled from, but rather continued in; " and therefore a fool may fly without reafon. But he, who has a mind "enriched with fenfe, must always defire to remain with Him, who would take "the best care of him. And fo, Socrates, the contrary of that which was before "maintained, is the more probable; fince it rather feems to behove wife men "to repine at death and fools to fuffer [r] it gladly.” A few remarks must be made on this paffage, which will rather concern its general tendency than be employed in endeavouring to clear up a few obscure [E] The neceffity Socrates here alludes to, is his being "compelled" to put an end to his own life by drinking the hemlock-draught. He fays towards the end of Phædo," as one ready to depart when "Fate calls him, as it now does me." [F] It must be remarked here, that Socrates's friends had been perfuading him to fly from prison, as he eafily might, and to live fecretly among them. But he thought it injurious to the state to attempt an evafion of its laws however unjustly enforced against himself. Cebes therefore artfully gives this turn to the argument and attempts to perfuade Socrates (from his own propofition of a fuperintending Providence) that a fool only (and not a wife man) could rejoice in putting himself out of the care of such a Providence by suffering death when he could avoid it. This leads Socrates to discourse on the foul and its immortality, by which he would prove to his friends, that though his body should be dead on earth, yet his foul or nobler part would be more than ever under the protection of the gods :-the difcuffion of which point takes up the reft of the dialogue. phrafes. From the words of the valediction of Socrates to Evenus an important question feemed to arise, "whether a philosopher might not on certain occafions "wish for and eagerly defire death rather than life?" This Socrates affirms. But this being acknowledged, a fecond question presents itself, why then is he not at liberty to pursue what would conduce to his happiness by killing "himself?" Here Socrates demurs; and upon his friends defiring him to unfold his reafons, he proceeds thus ; "because man is fituated in this life, as it were " on a poft or ftation, which he must not quit without leave; because the "gods exert a providential care over us, on which account we are a part (as "it were) of their property and poffeffions; and because, we should think it unjust and punishable (if it were in our power to punish) in any slave of our own, to kill himself without our leave." These are reasons why a philosopher, though he may be ever fo defirous of dying, has no power or authority to haften death's arrival by an immediate ftroke of his own hand. He must be clear, that he has leave from the Deity to quit his station, before he prefumes to do it of his own accord. This leave can be made manifest no otherwise than by a "vifible neceffity of dying;" a strong and pertinent instance of which neceffity was exhibited in himself. He administered the deadly potion to himself, by which he might be faid in fome fenfe to kill himself; but then as a refusal fo to do was not in his own power, neceffity ftamped innocence on the action, or in other words was, as it were, his paffport from above or leave for quitting his earthly station. It may also be further remarked, that thefe arguments against fuicide are very judiciously interwoven (however accidental the introduction of them may feem to be) in the beginning of the Phædo, that though on account of the foul's immortality afterwards proved and its fuperior enjoyments in a future ftate, it might feem defirable to obtain that state, as soon as poffible, even by suicide; yet that for the fubftantial reafons here adduced, we are to wait the pleasure of the gods without haftening our own departure. This Pythagorean and Socratic doctrine is further illuftrated in the following paffage of Tully, where it must be obferved, that he is fpeaking not in his own perfon, but in that of the family of Scipio [G]. "Since, [G] See Somnium Scipionis in Tully. In this fragment, P. Scipio Emilianus, the deftroyer of Carthage, is fupposed to be converfing in a dream with the shades of his ancestors, who are exhorting him to follow the fteps of their glory, in order that he might be exalted into their prefent fituation. The |