live, when he simply regards the criminal's welfare, but at the same time desires to perform his own duty in dooming him to die, and therefore wills to pass sentence.

To obtain health a man desires the action of drinking a nauseous drug, and wills to perform it, while the drug itself is not an object of desire, but of aversion. The truth seems to be this: we desire many things which we know to be independent of our own volitions; but for some reason or other, we desire, upon the whole, to do all those actions which we will to perform.

NOTE C. Page 11.

This is a fact which relates to the faculty of agency, rather than to that of the will. The power to will may exist, when the power of making the accustomed, corresponding effort is gone. I may think that I have power to regulate my thoughts; I may will to do it; and may not find that power of doing which I have formerly found connected with similar volitions. Cut the unseen ligament which connects doing with willing, without discovering the fact to the mind of man, and he might will without effect, for ever.

NOTE D. Page. 11.

Bias and habit, which are formed by the repetition of desire, volition, or action of some sort, may be said to be immanent in the soul, and constitute that something in the preceding state of the mind that disposes or inclines us to many volitions. Something, however, may be discovered without the mind, which disposes to determinations, preference, and choice. Every operation of the will requires then three things: 1st, an agent, who possesses the power of willing: 2dly, an object, which is the thing willed and 3dly, a motive, which disposes the agent to will. By motive to any operation of the will, we intend any thing which the mind perceives or feels, which moves it, or inclines it, to that volition.

It may be the perception of a simple, or of a complex object. It may be a sensation, a conception, a judgment, a course of reasoning, an instinct, a habit, an appetite, a pas

sion, or a previous determination, whether immediately previous, or ripened into a deliberate purpose. The perception of the motive is immediately antecedent to the volition.

If we could choose, prefer, determine, will, without the perception of some motive, it would be absurd to ask, and equally absurd to answer those common questions; why did you make such a choice? why did you prefer this? why did you will it? what induced you thus to determine ?" either men are destitute of common sense, or else common sense teaches, that every volition is dependent on some motive, perceived by the understanding.

It is common, in all languages, to ask for the reason of human conduct; and that reason, which is candidly disclosed, is the true motive to volition. I will to eat, because I am hungry; I will to read, because it affords me instruction; and I never will without the perception of something, which seems to me, at the time, to be desirable. Let another show that he wills without motives if he can.

NOTE E. Page 14.

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We do not excuse a maniac because he acts from those motives which his passions present, foremen often do the same same; but because he is deprived of the use of those intellectual faculties, which are requisite to constitute a moral agent. We acquit him of moral turpitude for the same reason that we do idiots. Some physical defect has rendered him incapable of those intellectual operations, and acts of the will, or dictates of the moral sense, which constitute an agent amenable to his Maker according to the standard of morality.

NOTE F. Page 15.

The American Indian, like all savages, speaks in figurative language; but he is not so much of a fool as to think that drink is an intelligent, accountable being. If drink committed murder, drink, and not the Indian, should be brought to the gallows, and some philosopher should be the hangman. For the honor of the venerable writer we could wish that this chapter had never seen the light. Certainly he was not ignorant of this maxim of common law, that for a crime com

mitted in a fit of drunkenness the culprit must account when sober.

NOTE G. Page 23.

Mr. Locke says, "it is as insignificant to ask, whether man's will be free, as to ask, whether his sleep be swift, or his virtue square: liberty being as little applicable to the will, as swiftness of motion is to sleep, or squareness to virtue." Essay B. II. ch. 21. § 14. In the next section he proceeds to state, that "liberty is the power a man has to do or forbear doing any particular action, according as its doing or forbearance has the actual preference in the mind, which is the same thing as to say, according as he himself wills it." This doctrine we think has a greater semblance to truth than the hypothesis of Dr. Reid, that liberty consists in the power of determining our volitions, and must necessarily be impaired in proportion to the strength of impulse, of passion and appetite. We apprehend that both philosophers were wrong. It is as absurd to attribute liberty to the power of doing as to the power of willing. The power of doing what we will, is the faculty of agency, in consequence of which we attribute to man that quality or attribute which we call activity. Liberty is not a faculty or power, any more than virtue and vice are powers: it is an attribute of character, which lies not in the power of willing, nor in the power of doing, but in the connection which the Author of our nature has caused to subsist between the faculty of the will, and the faculty of agency. While the being, who wills any action, finds the performance of that action to follow his volition, he is a free being, or an agent possessed of the attribute of liberty. Human liberty is circumscribed; for we are not at liberty to cease from thought, consciousness, and sensation, even if we will to think and feel no more. Liberty is exactly commensurate with that unseen link, which connects the power of willing with the power of doing. So far as we can perform the actions which we will, our liberty extends, and no further. Here" it is carefully to be remembered, that freedom consists in the dependence of the existence, or non-existence of any action, upon our volition of it, and not in the dependence of any action, or its contrary,

on our preference." Locke, Essay B. II. ch. 21. § 27. Take away from man either the power of will, or the power of action, or the connection in the constitution of our nature between the two, and liberty cannot exist; but while these remain, nothing more is requisite to freedom. To ascertain, therefore, in what liberty consists, it is not requisite to ask how or why we will. Has a man liberty to walk? He wills to walk; the action of walking follows, and every one pronounces that he enjoyed the liberty of walking, without asking," what motive disposed him to will to walk?"

To push, or not to push, are actions which most men, who will, are able to perform, and therefore they relate to the question of human liberty; but to be pushed, or not to be pushed, are different things. The man, who is moved by the physical force of another, in being moved performs no action, concerning which we ask, "was the man free in performing it?" If he wills to resist, and the act of resisting, whether it be effectual or not, follows the volition, he is free in making some sort of resistence. Suppose a man, who is standing, to be pushed. In this he is passive. He wills to resist, and exerts his muscular agency to push himself back against the person pressing him. In this he is free. But the force ap plied to his back is so great that he must either fall or put one foot before the other. He prefers to keep on his feet, and therefore wills to take one step, in order, to stand. The fear of falling, the desire of standing, or his reluctance against being made to slide along like a log, was his motive for willing to take one step in the direction in which he was pushed. The action followed his volition, and in this he was free. In no action in which his liberty is concerned, is that liberty impaired or taken away. We impute to him the step he took, and judge of him by the motive which influenced him; but we do not impute to him the being pushed.

The influence of appetites and passions upon the will is very different from physical impulsion. If indeed, they have a physical power of pushing, or of excitement, it must be upon some material object, or animal constitution. Passion and appetite may cause the blood to mattle the cheeks, may

quicken or diminish the pulse, and these animal operations we do not esteem voluntary actions. But upon the will, appetite and passion can have no animal or physical impulsion. They are simply motives for volition, and no more impair liberty or operate by a physical agency than the coolest decision of the judgment, which disposes to volition.

According to the principles of Dr. Reid, no action is censureable which proceeds from passion, and for no action should we blame a man, but for such an action as proceeds from a decision of the judgment. Of course if I will to kill my neighbour, because I hate him vehemently, or will to seduce his wife because lust, and not cool judgment prompts me, I am not to be blamed by any reasonable being.

NOTE K. Page 32.

Here are two distinct determinations, or volitions; the first of which relates to the action, and the second to the time of performing the action.

NOTE L. Page 38.

The habit, bias, or state of the soul, produced by antecedent operations of the mind, may be immanent; and will require a more powerful motive than they present, to counteract their influence; but every act of the will we think transient.

NOTE M. Page 43.

When the reader examines Essay IV. ch. 4. he is requested to recur to this passage, that he may have Dr. Reid's authority against Dr. Reid.

NOTE N. Page 70.

To feel the sensation of hunger, and desire food, we allow to be neither morally good nor evil, but for a rational man to act from appetite, is to perform some action, which from the motive of appetite he wills to perform. This we apprehend to be a voluntary action, for which the agent is accountable. Were man destitute of those faculties which constitute him a rational, accountable agent; were he a mere animal, then