CONTENTS OF THE FOURTH VOLUME. 11. Of the influence of incitements and motives upon the will I. The notions of moral liberty and necessity stated ESSAYS ON THE ACTIVE POWERS OF THE HUMAN MIND. ESSAY II. OF THE WILL. CHAP. I. OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE WILL. EVERY man is conscious of a power to determine, in things which he conceives to depend upon his determination. [Note A.] To this power we give the name of will; and, as it is usual, in the operations of the mind, to give the same name to the power and to the act of that power, the term will is often put to signify the act of determining, which more properly is called volition. Volition, therefore, signifies the act of willing and determining; and will is put indifferently to signify either the power of willing or the act. But the term will has very often, especially in the writings of philosophers, a more extensive meaning, which we must carefully distinguish from that which we have now given. In the general division of our faculties into understanding and will, our passions, appetites, and affections, are comprehended under the will; and so it is made to signify, not only our determination to act or not to act, but every motive and incitement to action. It is this, probably, that has led some philosophers to represent desire, aversion, hope, fear, joy, sorrow, all our appetites, passions, and affections, as different modifications of the will; which, I think, tends to confound things which are very different in their nature. The advice given to a man, and his determination consequent to that advice, are things so different in their nature, that it would be improper to call them modifications of one and the same thing. In like manner, the motives to action, and the determination to act or not to act, are things that have no common nature, and therefore ought not to be confounded under one name, or represented as different modifications of the same thing. For this reason, in speaking of the will in this Essay, I do not comprehend under that term any of the incitements or motives which may have an influence upon our determinations, but solely the determination itself, and the power to determine. Mr. Locke has considered this operation of the mind more attentively, and distinguished it more accurately, than some very ingenious authors who wrote after him. He defines volition to be, "An act of the mind, knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man, by employing it in, or withholding it from any particular action." It may more briefly be defined, The determination of the mind to do, or not to do something which we conceive to be in our power. If this were given as a strictly logical definition, it would be liable to this objection, that the determination |